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University of Sussex 
 
The Aesthetics of Hegemony 
Sloanism and Mass Persuasion in the United States, 1900-1930 
 
 
Theories regarding the power of the United States in the International Political-Economic 
order conventionally treat issues of culture and aesthetics as functional aspects of the system 
of mass production created in the early 20
th
 century. The ‘hegemony’ of the United States is 
attributed to the ability of its political-economic elites to create and maintain ‘consensus’ 
amongst other nations. Cultural manifestations of American hegemony are regarded as ‘soft’ 
signposts of this power, serving to entrench the values of American capitalism at a global 
level. Yet critical theories of international political economy have evaded analysing the 
‘appeal’ of this cultural power, prioritizing materialist aspects of consensus formation such as 
the compromises made between capital and labour during the early 20
th
 century during the 
rise of the mass production society. 
 
The task of this thesis is to provide the theoretical tools which allow critical evaluations of 
American hegemony to move beyond these materialist conceptions of cultural power. It is 
argued that an aesthetic approach to hegemony can fully realize the enduring power of 
American culture in political-economic terms. It does so by critically re-situating the terms of 
hegemony in Sloanism, which provides a more adequate template for realizing the power and 
meaning of mass consumption for non-elite social agents. Sloanism’s focus on branding and 
stylistic obsolescence demonstrates that the ‘aesthetics’ of hegemony can be grasped by 
evaluating the role of style and design in a mass production, mass consumption society. It 
therefore places epistemological priority on the contestations over cultural meanings of style, 
and the rise of ideals of upward social mobility which upset materialist expectations of a 
clearly discernable characteristics for different social groups. 
 
This in turn allows a questioning of the stability of norms, values and interests of ruling 
elites. It also restores the social agency of non-elite groups who contribute to ‘hegemony’ 
through the provision of styles, techniques and designs that represented challenges to 
received ideas of cultural order. Furthermore in the context of early 20
th
 century, new 
techniques of mass persuasion in advertising and public relations provide a ‘site ‘ in which 
the discordant and antagonistic aesthetic values of different social groups resolve in an 
uneasy tension- one that is nonetheless powerful enough to hold a durable cultural power, 
celebrating both upward social mobility and aspirations of abundance. 
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Introduction 
 
Narrating American History: Exceptionalism, Manifest Destiny and the Promise of 
Abundance 
 
America’s gradual ascent as a global power, and self-recognition as one, begins in the 
aftermath of the Civil War, the traumas of Southern Reconstruction and the rise of its 
formidable industrial power during the Gilded Age following the Panic of 1873.  By the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century, with Britain facing off Western European contender challenges 
in the Scramble for Africa, the stability of the international order that accompanied the 19
th
 
century Pax Brittanica began to unravel, with succesive inter-European conflicts paving the 
way for a new international political-economic system of the capitalist world anchored in 
American military, political and economic supremacy after 1945.  
 
The story of this expeditious rise finds its most popular explanation in the idea of American 
‘exceptionalism.’ The ‘exceptional’ set of circumstances that Providence bestowed upon 19th 
century America include both an absence of factors
1
 that prevailed in the ‘Old World,’ and 
historical factors that were unique to the pioneering spirit of Anglo-American settlement of 
the West.
2
 The lack of a feudal past, hereditary aristocracy and dispossesed proletariat, for 
commentators like Louis Hartz, meant that ‘Americans did not have to wage a revolution 
against privilege and property,’ and that in contradistinction to the travails of European 
societies of the 19
th
 century
3
 ‘class-based ideologies and modes of political organisation held 
no appeal to them...from the very outset Americans have been keen Lockean individualists 
whose pragmatic politics have always been quintessentially liberal.’4 The providential 
historical factors, on the other hand, finding its most enduring narrative in the ‘Frontier 
Thesis,’ affirms the confrontation of European settlers with the vast American wilderness as 
                                                 
1
 Halpern, Rick and Morris, Jonathon ‘The Persistence of Exceptionalism: Class Formation and the Comparative 
Method,’ in Rick Halpern and Jonathon Morris (eds.) American Exceptionalism? US Working-Class Formation in 
an International Context, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1997 pg. 1 
2
 Carroll, Peter and Noble, David The Free and the Unfree: A New History of the United States, London, 
Penguin, 1977 pg. 237 
3
 Davis, Mike Prisoners of the American Dream: Politics and Economy in the History of the US Working Class. 
Chapter 1 ‘Why the American Working Class is Different’ provides an detailed account of the differences 
between US working class organized labour and its European counterparts in the 19
th
 century. Davis argues 
that whilst working class consciousness and meaningful organized labour existed in the US, the parameters of 
the demands made by working classes were not fought in the terrain of political enfranchisement, lending it a 
different character and aspirations. 
4
 Halpern, Rick and Morris, Jonathon ‘The Persistence of Exceptionalism: Class Formation and the Comparative 
Method,’ in Rick Halpern and Jonathon Morris (eds.) American Exceptionalism? US Working-Class Formation in 
an International Context, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1977 pg. 2 
2 
 
the key to unlocking America’s past. In this historiographical rendition, ‘the uniqueness of 
America came from breaking the links with the Old World conception of place.’5 
 
“Into this vast, shaggy continent of ours the first feeble tide of European settlement. 
European men, institutions and ideas were lodged in the American Wilderness, and this great 
American West took them to her bosom, taught them a new way of looking upon the destiny of 
the common man, trained them in adaptation to the conditions of the New World. And ever as 
society on her eastern border grew to resemble the Old World in its social forms, as it began 
to lose faith in the ideal of democracy, she opened new provinces, and dowered democracies 
in her most distant domains.”6 
 
Turner’s thesis was first delivered at the Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893 and went 
on to dominate academic American History for the next fifty years, and marks a turning  
point ‘as a crucial event in the evolution of historical scholarship from Victorian belles lettres 
into a modern state-certified social science.’7 Yet Turner’s explanation was also a reworking 
of historical language into a form ‘that harmonized well with the tacit belief of his reader,’ 
and was decisively convincing enough that by 1932 its ‘dominated synthetic understandings 
of the American past,’ so as to provide a ‘semblance and conceptual stability in a period 
where the material reality suggested not only a breaking down of the celebrated economic 
system underpinning America’s ascent, but turmoil amongst and within the society itself.’8 
Crucially, it was delivered just five years before the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, 
when the United States ‘broke free’ of its own frontier, with political and military leaders 
excavating its spirit to justify full scale military intervention and its first dominion of empire.  
If the idea of American exceptionalism helped to shape understandings of the American past 
and the ‘unique conditions’ that led to its industrial and political rise, the expansionist nature 
of the Union was anchored in the ideals of Manifest Destiny. This discourse, to stretch US 
influence ‘until the whole boundless continent is ours,’9 expressed the desire to spread the 
brilliance of republican governance and ‘blessings of political liberty’: 
 
                                                 
5
 Carroll, Peter and Noble, David The Free and the Unfree: A New History of the United States, London, 
Penguin, 1977 pg. 237 
6
 From Frederick Jackson Turner ‘The Significance of the Frontier in American History,’ in Carroll, Peter and 
Noble, David The Free and the Unfree: A New History of the United States, London, Penguin, 1977 pg. 238 
7 Klein, Kerwin Lee Frontiers of Historical Imagination: Narrating the European Conquest of Native America, 
1890-1990, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1997, pg.  
8
 Ibid., pg 
9
 Paraphrase of John L. O’Sullivan in Carroll, Peter and Noble, David The Free and the Unfree: A New History of 
the United States, London, Penguin, 1977 pg. 167 
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“By carrying these institutions across the continent, American expansion would broaden the 
foundations of liberty, extend the area of freedom and elevate the benighted people who still 
lived under inferior forms of government.”10 
 
Based on ideas of ethnic supremacy, ‘manifest destiny’ was the primary discursive anchor 
that justified westward expansion and European conquest and settlement of Native lands 
during the 19
th
 century. Ordering the ‘virtue’ of their Lockean heritage against the savagery 
of ‘benighted people,’ the mid-19th century hosted the final subordination of Jefferson’s 
principles of peaceful co-existence with Native Americans, and saw the continual violation of 
treaties with both Natives and the European Imperial power of Great Britain, France and 
Spain, before confronting Mexico over the issue of Texas during the Mexican-American war 
between 1845 and 1848. In the consequent ‘peace settlement’ in the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo, ‘the United States obtained California, New Mexico and the disputed Rio Grande 
areas for $15,000,000.’11 Carroll and Noble argue that the principles of ‘American 
continentalism’ contained internal contradictions that would set the tone for future American 
political-economic policies, mediating the tense line between ideals of racial exclusion and 
the spread of liberal democratic institutions, or the paradox of ‘the institutionalization of 
space and the advocacy of geographic mobility,’ for ‘it was only by imposing rigid territorial 
order on non-WASP peoples that white Americans could preserve a sense of geographical 
mobility.’12  
 
If ‘manifest destiny,’ was the key discursive anchor that justified expansion at the expense of 
the material and spiritual dismantling of Native societies and cultures, then the Turner’ 
Frontier Thesis of 1893 acted as a modernized, ‘scientific’ assertion of American 
expansionism during the Spanish-American War, where the principles of the Monroe doctrine 
coupled with the military power derived from the ‘Second Industrial Revolution’ left no one 
in doubt about the supremacy of the United States in the Western Hemisphere, paving the 
way for ‘the American century’: 
 
The ‘closing of the frontier,’ as such never ended. Though the United States would 
experience periods of ‘isolationism’ in the first half of the 20th century, most notably in its 
initial intransigence to intervene in the two World Wars and the reluctance to extoll its 
                                                 
10
 Carroll, Peter and Noble, David The Free and the Unfree: A New History of the United States, London, 
Penguin, 1977 pg. 167 
11
 Ibid., pg 175 
12
 Ibid., pg 173 
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principles of liberal democracy in genuine global leadership in the interwar period, the 
constant involvement of American corporations and politics in Central and South America 
showcase a change from spreading the institutions of liberal democracy to spreading and 
benefitting from corporate and industrial power and influence. This power was derived from 
the completion of continental expansion, paving the way for a full-scale national 
industrialization, and the potential fulfillment of the promises of abundance and fecundity 
that had co-existed with manifest destiny as motifs and ‘lyrics’ justfying westward 
expansion.
13
 This promise of abundance would finally be realized in the mass production 
factories of the Ford corporation at River Rouge and Highland.
14
  
 
“Under the influence of the new ideology that had grown up with capitalism and mechanical 
invention, the leading minds of the period thought that mankind had found the secret of 
happiness by turning its attention to the quantitative solution of all its problems.”15 
 
 
The American Century: Global Hegemony and American Popular Culture 
 
The second half of the 20
th
 century witnessed a dramatic expansion of American corporate 
activity around the world. American political-economic dominance over the rest of the 
capitalist world was achieved following the Second World War, when American leaders 
finally proved willing to embrace global leadership. They did so under the conditions that the 
form of American Capitalism borne from its own ‘exceptional’ 19th century conditions would 
become the primary template for other nations to follow and emulate. American corporations 
gained footholds in all the capitalist countries. The system of mass production perfected by 
Henry Ford in the early 20
th
 century became the standard model of corporate industry all over 
the world, with non-capitalist societies also utilizing the methods of mass production to 
stimulate their own domestic industrialization. As such, the 20
th
 century has often been noted 
as the ‘American Century,’ a term originally quoted by media mogul and Time magazine 
founder Henry Luce in 1941 to galvanise support for US entry into World War II.
16
 
 
By the onset of the 21
st
 century, with the Communist world defeated, very few nations had 
been left untouched by the indelible mark of American influence. American products were to 
                                                 
13
 Lears, Jackson Fables of Abundance: A Cultural History of Advertising in America, Basic Books, 1995, pg. 19 
14
 Smith, Terry Making the Modern: Industry, Art and Design in America, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 
1993, pg. 2 
15
 James, CLR, in Anna Grimshaw and Keith Hart (eds.) American Civilization, London, Blackwell, 1993, pg. 29 
16
 Hogan, Michael The Ambiguous Legacy: US Foreign Relations in the ‘American Century,’ Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999, pg. 20 
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be found everywhere and its political-economic influence appeared to translate into a cultural 
grip over the rest of the world- a ‘soft,’ subtle form of power that lingered in the daily lives of 
everyone. From the products people bought, to the entertainments consumed in television and 
film, it seemed that the promises of manifest destiny had been finally fulfilled. A fully 
integrated world system, technologically, culturally and economically, had been created for 
the first time. ‘Signposts’ and ‘symbols’ of this enduring power were to be found everywhere, 
with corporate logos of companies such as McDonald’s and Coca-Cola assuming more 
relevance than national flags.
17
 American music and film filtered through television screens, 
overpowering centuries-old national traditions in a short amount of time. It seemed that once 
any nation, or group of people, were exposed to these American products, images and tastes, 
there was no turning back, no ability to escape from or isolate against this soft power. This 
power is known as American hegemony, a dominance of the international system so complete 
that it achieves the acquiescence of less powerful nations without demonstrations of its 
military supremacy. To put it another way, American power was consented to by less 
powerful nations, who acquiesced to the political-economic and cultural values of the United 
States. 
 
As a result, explanations of why it has been so hard to resist American hegemony have 
abounded in academic discourse, as scholars sought to unravel and interrogate the 
relationships of power that affirm American hegemony at military, political-economic and 
socio-cultural levels. In explaining the rise of the ‘American Century,’ academics and 
journalists alike have sought to isolate particular areas of American influence that are 
graspable by the tools provided by social science. As such, critical evaluations of American 
power and influence have tended to analyse changes (and consistencies) in American foreign 
policy and American corporate activity around the world. Depending on the ‘school of 
thought,’ different social actors, institutions and processes have been prioritized as the 
primary units of analysis from which theories and explanations of American power derive 
from. Some of the more sophisticated renditions have integrated political and economic 
analyses, demonstrating sensitivity to American hegemony amongst both states and markets 
simultaneously. One such school is that of critical International Political Economy. 
 
                                                 
17
 Discussion about the global visibility of American corporate brands and logos finds it most popular 
expression in Naomi Klein’s No Logo, published in 1999. See section ‘No Space,’ in Klein, Naomi No Logo, 
Picador, 1999. 
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Yet despite the richness, diversity and quantity of scholarly work dedicated to evaluating the 
historical rise of American power, the manner in which that power manifests in cultural terms 
has been curiously evasive. The ‘soft’ power of American popular culture is often used to 
explain the grip of American hegemony, but why and how this popular culture finds its 
appeal is sidestepped. There is much talk about the enduring power of corporate logos, 
American advertising and Hollywood film industry without ever really getting to the heart of 
why this would be appealing to non-Americans in the first place. Instead, these cultural 
phenomena appear to ‘hang over the heads’ of people, instantaneously transforming their 
tastes and attitudes- in short, Americanizing them. As such, a whole series of American 
cultural artefacts, fashions, styles and tastes exist only to serve the ‘fundamentals’ of 
expanding American political-economic power. Industries such as advertising are regarded as 
corollaries of capitalist elites, serving in some cases to deceive and manipulate the global 
public into ‘buying’ into the American way of life. As mentioned before, the constant stream 
of images, films and sounds emerging from the United States all over the world, serves to 
reinforce that perspective. 
 
Aesthetics and Hegemony 
The neo-Gramscians have attempted to theorize the rise of American power. Taking 
inspiration from Antonio Gramsci’s essay ‘Americanism and Fordism,’ hegemony as 
articulated by neo-Gramscians concentrates on evaluating the ‘consensual’ branches of 
political-economic power. In other words, they seek to ask what mechanisms exist that 
empowers dominant elites over other groups in society without recourse to ‘coercive’ 
branches of power such as the military and police. Like Gramsci himself, scholars like Robert 
Cox, Mark Rupert, Kees Van der Pijl and William Robinson have sought to interrogate the 
ideological apparatuses through which hegemony works. They do this by tracing American 
hegemony back to the site from which the United States established the political-economic 
model that would be later exported around the world: the Ford factory. Using the tools of 
social scientific explanation, neo-Gramscians focus on the rise of ‘productivist’ ideologies 
and the relationships between capitalists and labour that resulted in class compromises.
18
 
Through these sets of compromises, neo-Gramscians argue that capitalists were able to 
articulate their own interests as the general interest of society, thereby placating worker 
                                                 
18 Rupert, Mark Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995, pg. 59 
 
7 
 
resistance to the changes initiated by the system of mass production. The question is how elite 
interests were able to achieve a consensus amongst the rest of American society? What were 
the mechanisms existing used to make this possible, without needing to enforce it in an 
authoritarian or coercive manner? 
 
This is where the problematique lies for this thesis. Focusing on the Marxist categories of 
capital and labour, neo-Gramscians have prioritized certain social groups that are involved in 
the process of hegemony. Of particular relevance here is Mark Rupert’s Producing 
Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power (1995), which 
traces American global hegemony back to the site of the development of mass production 
techniques in early 20
th
 century America. However, they neglect other social groups or 
classes that might also contribute to this process. They explain that there are mechanisms in 
society that contribute to the ‘consensualization’ of power, without fully exploring what those 
mechanisms are, or who contributes to them. This is because the tools of social science 
prioritize certain categories of analysis and methodologies of study. An object of 
phenomenon of study is a priori conceived in a certain way, as a certain process. In terms of 
explaining the rise and strength of American global power, neo-Gramscians argue that it is 
anchored in a particular historical process of mass production, and the social relationships 
and interests that developed out of that process. It is intimated about how the hegemony of 
American power might be exercised, but not what processes lend it such a distinct and 
historically unique power. 
19
 
 
When we think about the ‘symbols’ and ‘signs’ of American soft power, things such as 
advertising, corporate branding, television and film, control of global media and more 
generally mass produced commodities themselves are all given as explanations. It seems that 
culture and consumption are the ‘sites’ in which American global power manifests itself. It is 
where that power is ‘understood’ or made apprehendable by individuals in society. It then 
appears strange that scholars seeking to explain American power evade questions of culture 
and consumption, and how they might bring the meaning of power into the daily lives of 
individuals. Is this because the tools of neo-Gramscian theory do not provide the requisite 
‘space’ for considering those questions? It is the contention of this thesis that looking at the 
aesthetic dimension of hegemony can provide a critical account of those questions of culture 
                                                 
19
 Scott-Smith, Giles The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom and the Political 
Economy of American Hegemony 1945-1955, London, Routledge, 2002. 
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and consumption that compliments the neo-Gramscian oeuvre. In other words, it still seeks to 
resolve questions of the articulation and dissemination of power as laid out in the neo-
Gramscian framework, but offers an alternative ‘terrain’ of conceptualizing the processes of 
hegemony. Aesthetics is significant for hegemony because it is not just about the materialist 
aspect of political-economy. In other words, the period in question was not just about a series 
of compromises that raised wages for workers in order to ‘compensate’ them. Rather, it was 
about the conveyance of social values. It was not about ‘who gets what,’ but what social 
values and ideas were conveyed that made mass consumption such an appealing domain of 
activity. Aesthetics can therefore better capture ideas of status and mobility that cannot be 
addressed in a materialist framework. It should be noted however, that it requires a ‘re-
animation’ of the precise period of history from which the building blocks of neo-Gramscian 
theory emerge from; that is to say the early 20
th
 Fordist period in the United States. For this 
reason, Mark Rupert’s Producing Hegemony acts as the most relevant neo-Gramscian work 
to pursue how that very period was also inscribed with contestations of art and culture that 
lent American hegemony an historically distinct texture. We are ultimately concerned here, 
with the dynamics that structures the consolidation of capitalist hegemony within the during 
1900-1930, rather than the extension of US hegemony on a world scale after 1945. From this, 
the key contribution is how the domain of aesthetics and the agencies of mass persuasion  
offer a way of explaining the dynamics structuring the consolidation of capitalist hegemony.  
 
The importance of aesthetics is that it offers a ‘non-rational’ mode of cognition. It offers an 
opportunity to grasp and bring importance to processes, social agents and institutions that are 
ignored or evaded in the schema of critical political economy. This evasion is not intended, 
but rather a part of the limited field of vision of the discipline. If the aesthetic dimension is 
taken into account, phenomena such as styles, fashions and tastes become central to the way 
hegemony (and more broadly American global power) operates. The leitmotifs of mass 
consumption are then not rendered as ‘afterthoughts’ or corollaries to the fundamentals of 
mass production.  As such the processes and ideas that make mass consumption a powerful 
force in the daily activities of individuals are not ‘functional’ aspects of capitalist society. 
Indeed, it will be explored that those ‘processes and ideas’ actually provide a new and unique 
grammar to understand the power of the ‘American way of life.’ To put in another way, the 
aesthetic provides a template for understanding why mass consumption became popular. It 
allows the exploration of why it held socio-cultural appeal for those individuals and social 
classes who were not a part of political-economic or socio-cultural elites. As such, this thesis, 
9 
 
methodologically, seeks to extrapolate the aesthetic contestations between different social 
groups as well as affirm the importance of social agents such as advertisers and public 
relations practioners who acted as auxilliaries to the capitalist political-economic elite. Their 
practices and techniques grounded ideals and expectation of mass production and mass 
consumption amongst a mass society. And so this thesis must task itself with integrating 
studies from American History, Cultural Studies and sociological accounts of advertising and 
public relations in order for neo-Gramscian IPE to have a substantive encounter with those 
practices and techniques at a theoretical level. 
 
How does this help us to understand the process of hegemony? The neo-Gramscian template 
argues that the moment of consent in hegemony occurs through the dissemination of the 
norms, values and interests of elite groups. That their values are somehow ‘normalized’ 
amongst the rest of society. An aesthetic template showcases that variant norms and values of 
different social groups contend against one and other, synthesizing different cultural values 
that provide a new vocabulary and imagization of power. This is of particular importance for 
the period of study of this thesis. For during the United States between 1900 and 1930, there 
is a growing importance of the medias of dissemination. This includes the widening 
circulation of newspapers, magazines, journals and ‘lifestyle’ supplements. It also includes 
relatively new ‘arts’ of photography and cinema. Finally, the growth of the advertising 
industry and changes in the techniques of advertising art become a prominent feature of the 
daily lives of Americans. The early 20
th
 century witnessed the rise of a mass persuasion 
around which these medias became vital channels through which individuals began to 
understand their transforming material and social environment. Did these medias contribute 
to the articulation of hegemony? And if so, what were the ‘norms,’ and ‘values’ of the social 
agents who were producing the words, images and styles of these medias. Do the techniques 
and styles involved in these medias suggest anything about the way in which hegemony 
operates in society, its process of articulation and dissemination? 
 
As mentioned before, the theoretical frameworks of neo-Gramscianism allows us to ‘see’ 
these processes as ‘functional’ aspects of capitalist society. They exist to reinforce the 
dominance of capitalist ideology and the power of the social agents and institutions that 
benefit from from the expansion of capitalism. An aesthetic template, on the other hand, 
allows us to grasp the meanings and values of these new medias and how the art and 
information produced by them is apprehended by non-elite groups. It also allows the 
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possibility of explaining how non-elite individuals and social groups contribute their own 
ideas of culture, society and life to the ‘values’ and ‘norms’ of hegemony. As such, an 
aesthetic approach fulfills the neo-Gramscian promise of working out the processes of 
consensualizing power, and why that power holds some kind of appeal for non-elite groups. 
Traditions of Marxism that have focused on questions of culture and aesthetics, such as 
contained in the work of Walter Benjamin and the Gramscian-focused scholarship of 
Raymond Williams have attempted to trace the power of capitalist society by evaluating 
transformations in cultural and artistic practices. They provide tools of an aesthetic approach 
that can be appropriated by neo-Gramscian political-economic theory to explore the 
processes of hegemony. They allow a perspective that privileges alternative social agents and 
institutions that contribute to the consensualization of a dominant ideology, or ‘way of life.’  
 
An aesthetic approach also allows an interrogation of the actual ‘values’ and ‘norms’ of these 
different social groups and whether or not they make a difference to how the ‘soft’ power of 
American hegemony is understood. In the specific case of early 20
th
 century America, this is 
important because of the diversification of social classes, tastes and styles that occurred. For 
example, the rise of artistic modernism contributed techniques of design and illustration that 
became hallmarks of both the commodities produced (such as the automobile) as well as the 
channels of persuasion (for example, the advertising industry). In an aesthetic rendition of 
hegemony, design features of commodities and the ‘artistic’ ways in which they were 
marketed do not appear as ‘afterthoughts’ of the production system, but were actually cultural 
challenges to the socio-political order of the late 19
th
 century. As such, they are moments 
where ‘counter-hegemonic’ practices and ideas form an intrinsic feature of the way American 
hegemony emerged. Moreover, it requires consideration of the role of potential ‘organic 
intellectuals,’- such as artists, advertisers, commodity designers, newspaper editors and 
photographers- have in inscribing hegemony with particular values that are distinct to the 
period in which their agency become of importance to capital. As chapters 4 and 5 will 
demonstrate, artists and cultural producers influenced by ideas from the left-wing political 
spectrum (from tempered social democracy to anarchism) often found work in the early 
advertising and public relations agencies that served emergent corporate interests. 
 
The ‘alternative’ terrain that aesthetics contributes to an understanding of hegemony is 
precisely the focus it provides on the emotional, sentimental, and sensual aspects of cultural 
artefacts, discourses and social processes. The ‘aesthetics’ of hegemony prioritize those 
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domains of cognition and explanation that escape the traditional tools of social science. In the 
case of how hegemony developed in early 20
th
 century America, it can more fully explore the 
styles, fashions and tastes that contribute to the power of the ‘American way of life.’ It 
therefore ‘re-situates’ the neo-Gramscian framework in the same period of history, but can 
showcase a different explanation of the same processes of power that neo-Gramscians seek to 
uncover. In order to fulfill this, the following section will show why re-situating the 
development of mass production-mass consumption society in a framework of ‘Sloanism’ is 
more useful in this sense than the traditional concept of ‘Fordism.’ 
 
Fordism or Sloanism? 
 
‘Fordism’ is a term used for explaining the system of mass production of commodities that 
emerged in the United States between 1900 and 1930. In a wide range of social scientific 
disciplines it is also used as a heuristic framework for analysing the transformation of 
relationships between capitalist industry and workers during that period. Anchored in the 
relationships of production, it has been argued that tensions between capitalists and workers 
were ‘resolved’ in the United States within the site of production. Henry Ford’s introduction 
of the ‘$5 day’ for his factory workers is regarded as a crucial departure point in this sense. 
Ford’s idea was that by raising the wages of his workers, they would be less inclined towards 
unionization, striking, and industrial sabotage. Furthermore, the increased income of workers 
meant that they would be more likely to be able to afford the very products they were 
producing. In a sense, this artificial raising of the worker’s wage was initiated in order to 
stimulate demand for consumer goods, a hallmark of Keynesian economic policy-making. 
 
The importance of this is that the demand for goods such as automobiles had previously been 
the preserve of ‘leisure classes.’ The high costs of production and craftsmanship for 
individual parts for the automobile meant that only a small minority of society could afford 
the final product. The system of mass production perfected by Ford dramatically reduced the 
costs of automobile production through a gradual process of replacing the craft performed by 
individual skilled workers by machines. As a consequence, automobiles became more 
affordable to salaried workers for the first time. The automobile that represented the 
culmination of this system of mass production was the Ford Model T, released in 1908. It was 
the first automobile that was mass produced with completely interchangeable parts and 
marketed towards the middle classes. 
 
12 
 
However, the replacement of individual worker skill by machines also had consequences for 
the relations of production and management within the factory. Workers suffered ‘de-
skilling’ in the sense that their role in the production of the automobile was reduced to 
contributing, or ‘adding’ parts of the automobile to the assembly line of manufacturing. Their 
tasks were repetitive and because of the low level skill involved, found their jobs were easily 
replaceable by other non-skilled labourers. This process of de-skilling is regarded by 
Marxists as completing the ‘alienation’ of the worker from their product and self, compelling 
them to find refuge in a meaningless world of commodities. 
 
Another additional feature of this new system of mass production was the introduction of the 
role of monitoring workers. Influenced by ideals of efficiency in methods of production that 
would save time in the production process (known as ‘Scientific Management’), a new layer 
of management was introduced in the factory to ensure that workers were completing their 
tasks on time and adhering to company policies of behaviour. This new layer of management 
is considered to be a part of a broader transformation of corporate capitalism known as the 
‘managerial revolution.’ The managerial revolution included the emergence of specialized 
‘departments’ in corporations that dealt with administrative work and bureaucratic 
management. It is regarded as having further distanced the worker from the capitalist owner, 
with internal tensions and problems within the factory being dealt with by a specialist corps 
of ‘white collar’ assistants. These people carried out the tasks of monitoring and controlling 
workers- or ‘disciplining’. 
 
The ideas developed under the aegis of Fordism had profound consequences for American 
society, and gradually the rest of the capitalist world. The Fordist system, by dramatically 
decreasing the costs of production and increasing the wages of workers, is seen as initiating a 
corollary phenomenon of ‘mass consumption.’ Whereas in the 19th century the phenomenon 
of consumption of commodity goods was an activity conducted by a limited section of 
society, the early to mid 20
th
 century witnessed a rise in the demand for consumption by 
middle and working class groups. Consumption became a daily, everyday life phenomenon as 
attested to by the sheer rise in numbers of department stores and the diversification of 
commodity goods that were to be produced and sold. The market place for consumer goods 
became a central, societal-wide node of daily activity. The questions emerging from this is 
how and why mass consumption became such a popular activity? How were people 
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convinced that they should now purchase goods that had previously been regarded as luxury 
items? It is at this juncture that it is relevant to introduce the concept of ‘Sloanism.’ 
 
Alfred Sloan became Chairman of General Motors in 1923. General Motors was Ford’s chief 
rival throughout the 1920s, and by the end of the decade had surpassed Ford in terms of 
market share in the automobile industry.
20
 Like Ford, Sloan’s background was in engineering, 
and shared with Ford a reverence for the principles of ‘Scientific Management,’ in order to 
save time and costs of production. General Motors also utilized a similar method of machine-
led mass production. However, in order to wrest back market share from Ford and the 
phenomenal success and popularity of the Model T, Sloan introduced a series of key 
innovations that would also create an enduring legacy for the capitalist world, the most 
important of which were brand differentiation and planned obsolescence.  
 
Brand differentiation introduced a ‘hierarchy’ of styles in automobile production. Rather than 
producing the same model of automobile, Sloan created five different ‘brands’ of automobile- 
the Chevrolet, Pontiac, Oldsmobile, Buick and Cadillac between 1923 and 1927. These 
automobiles had different designs and features, and were marketed at different social classes 
in society. Planned obsolescence refers to ‘in-built’ features of the style and technicality of 
the product that are designed to either ‘go out of fashion,’ or make its usage redundant. In the 
case of General Motors’ automobiles, there are two main consequences of these strategies. 
 
The first and most immediate consequence relates to the technical obsolescence of the 
automobile, or parts of the automobile. By engineering an automobile that would become 
unusable within a few years, consumers would have to buy the product again. This seemingly 
mundane aspect is crucial to the expansion of mass consumption as a form of daily activity 
described above. Ford’s idea was to raise the wages of salaried workers so that they could 
afford the product. Sloan’s idea was that those workers should keep buying the same product 
over and again. As such, this engenders perpetual consumption, an artificial ‘demand’ for the 
product created through its own obsolescence. 
 
The second and most important consequence is the introduction of a hierarchy of ‘styles’ to 
the automobile industry. Sloan’s idea in this was to engineer a culture, or idea, amongst 
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people that the brand represented the social status of the individual that purchased it. The 
Cadillac, for example, was designed and marketed for the tastes of the upper classes. The 
Chevrolet, at the bottom of the ladder in this brand hierarchy, was marketed towards lower 
income groups. Tellingly, Sloan utilized advertising campaigns to suggest a culture of 
stylistic emulation. That is to say, that lower income groups could demonstrate their ability to 
‘climb the ladder’ of socio-cultural hierarchy by saving money and purchasing the brand that 
was one-rung above their actual social status. The idea of Sloan was to make the purchasing 
of the ‘higher’ brand a goal for individuals; to ‘emulate’ and ‘aspire’ towards the more 
refined and expensive design and features of the higher brand.  
 
In order to make these strategies realizable, Sloan had to pay closer attention to the tastes and 
design preferences of the different income groups that the automobiles were marketed 
towards. Market researchers, advertisers, industrial designers all play a more prominent role 
in the achievement of these strategies than in the Ford Corporation (Ford himself was 
notoriously resistant to advertising). More detail was involved in the actual design and 
manufacture of the automobile as a result of the stylistic differentiation of brands. Ideas of 
style, fashion and art filtered through into General Motors in order to keep this idea of 
perpetual consumption alive and profitable. The success of General Motors in overhauling 
Ford’s market share by 1928 attests to the viability of the Sloanist model. 
 
It should be mentioned also what both Ford and Sloan envisioned their automobiles as. Ford’s 
idea of the Model T was a ‘car for everyone.’ He prized its efficiency, durability, simple 
design, and ease of replacing broken parts. His ‘social’ objective was that every working 
person in America could one day afford this model. As such, Ford had a utilitarian attitude 
underpinning his vision of the relationship between industry and society. For Ford, the Model 
T represented the culmination of a system of perfectibility in production methods that he had 
personally contributed towards. The aesthetic of Fordism as such celebrates the system that 
brought the Model T into being. 
 
Sloan’s ideas on the other hand, were about perpetually injecting the design and marketing of 
the automobile industry with new styles in order to keep the motor of consumption 
perpetually in motion. Focusing more instrumentally on profitability, Sloan’s ideas were not 
motivated by aesthetic concerns as such. However, he manoeuvred into the industry 
individuals whose tasks were to integrate the latest styles and techniques of art and design 
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into the manufacturing process and marketing process. Placing emphasis on a culture of 
emulation and aspiration to move up the ladder of social hierarchy through the consumption 
of particular brands, the aesthetic of Sloanism celebrates the style of the product itself, rather 
than the system that brought it into existence. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 1 surveys the key literature from the three key areas of inquiry for this thesis: a) the 
relationship between political economy and culture b) the rise of a mass persuasion complex, 
and c) the changing structures of class and consciousness. These literatures are synthesized in 
a way that seeks to interrogate the ‘norms’ and ‘values’ of the ‘hegemonic’ moment in early 
20
th
 century, during the embryonic crystallization of a Sloanist Political-Economic formation. 
 
The central claim of Chapter 1 is that Edward Bernays' treatise in Propaganda offers a 
powerful normative vision of how ruling elites should mobilise the agencies of mass 
persuasion to pursue their interests and circumvent challenges to their power. By explicitly 
detailing an ‘invisible’ government and offering advice and guidance on how to engineer 
societal-wide consensus for both corporations and politicians, Bernays unwittingly addresses 
a key concern of the neo-Gramscian oeuvre, hegemony, providing strategic policies to contain 
the ire of the masses whilst simultaneously embedding the norms and values of the ruling 
elite amongst those masses.  
 
It is claimed that the role of mass persuasion (as outlined by Bernays) is as a portal through 
which the hegemonic moment- the moment of ‘consent’- is achieved and articulated through. 
However, both Bernays and neo-Gramscians stress the co-ordinated and strategic nature of 
power relations in the Fordist context; the ‘invisible’ government of Bernays resonates with 
Robert Cox’s idea of nébuleuse, in the sense of a constellation of power located out of reach 
and out of sight from the social groups and individuals subordinated beneath the weight of 
ruling class hegemony. However, I argue that this dismisses the role of subordinated groups 
and counter-hegemonic ideals that contribute (often willingly) to this period of rapid 
transformation. It also portrays the idea that the needs and desires of those groups are being 
engineered from above for the sake of a particular, pecuniary rationality that occupies the 
norms and values of ruling elites. 
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Chapter 2 goes on to outline the key theoretical tools provided by i) neo-Gramscian political 
economy and ii) the lineage of Marxist aesthetics and cultural theory, focusing on Walter 
Benjamin’s The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction and Raymond Williams’ 
tripartite schema of hegemony. The theory section aims to elaborate how a critical 
interrogation of the aesthetic contestations taking place in early 20
th
 century America can 
contribute to the neo-Gramscian understanding of hegemony. 
 
The central theoretical claim of Chapter 2 rests on shifting the terrain of analysis from 
Fordism to Sloanism. I argue that Sloanism is a heuristic concept that captures the dynamic 
transformation of American society and political-economy because it portrays a system of 
production and consumption that requires the continual injection of techniques and styles of 
persuasion. Furthermore, because Sloanism differs from Fordism in the sense of giving a 
more central role to product/brand differentiation and stylistic/technical obsolescence, the 
configuration of political-economy requires us to broaden the spectrum of social agents that 
actively contribute to its maintenance, articulation (including its imagization) and 
‘deepening’ in society. The broadening of social agents in this hegemonic formation likewise 
necessitates a closer inspection of the variant and contesting values and norms of these 
groups and individuals, and how these synthesize amongst the agencies and instructions of 
mass persuasion. 
 
The aim of the chapter as such is to contribute to the neo-Gramscian oeuvre by theoretically 
re-situating the analysis of hegemony in the relations of consumption. I argue that Walter 
Benjamin’s ideas emerging from The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction 
animate the period precisely because the very idea of the ‘mass’ of society being able to 
consume to the products of culture and art (one only possible in conditions of mass 
reproducibility) represents a qualitatively unique stage of history that open up the possibility 
of counter-hegemonic and subordinated social groups exercising political and cultural 
leverage against dominant elites. In other words, in contradistinction to the perspective of The 
Mass Culture Industry, processes of mass consumption and mass culture do not operate as a 
deceiving re-ification of the actual and lived inequalities wealth and power, but rather 
become a key site of contestation between different social groups who ascribe their own 
values and interests into a the broader hegemonic ‘moment.’ 
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Chapter 3 interrogates the transforming structures of class and class consciousness in the 
United States at the end of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. The rapidly changing socio-
economic and demographic nature of American society during this period suggests that 
Bernays’ plea towards the ruling class in Propaganda was made precisely because of the 
presumed disorder of urban mass society as opposed to the relatively more stable Victorian 
conceptions of social order and hierarchy. These challenges ‘from below’ are reflected by a 
discursive and practical interest in the ‘emergent’ mass, and the lack of solidity of the terms 
used to comprehend them (varying from the ‘middling sort,’ to the ‘public’ to the ‘people’) 
demonstrate the presumed mobility inherent in the American social structure, one that I argue 
has a longer heritage in the United States than other countries, lending the processes of 
modernization a particular fungibility in terms of the way in which they were apprehended 
and understood by different social groups.  
 
The central claim of Chapter 3 is that the embryonic years in which something recognizable 
as either a Fordist or Sloanist political-economic formation emerged witnessed a 
transformation of class structures and class consciousness. This change- a socio-economic as 
well as cultural one-  questions the stability of ‘norms’ and ‘values’ of ruling elites, and 
therefore complicates the relatively clear pattern of ‘hegemony’ articulated in the neo-
Gramscian work of Robert Cox and Mark Rupert. I argue that whilst they were not wrong in 
their depiction and critical analysis of labour-capital relationships, class alliances and national 
economic-policy making, more attention needs to be paid to the aesthetic contestations that 
emerge between and within social groups vying for a voice- sometimes directly political, in 
the case of the Progressives, sometimes purely ‘moral’ or ‘cultural’ in the case of the 
Modernists.  
 
Chapter 4 follows directly by interrogating the tensions of American vernacular culture and 
art set against the transnational circulation of 19
th
 century bourgeois artistic tastes and styles. 
It is the story of the gradual path from a pastoral society that acclaimed virtue and beauty 
from simple and efficient tools and the engineered constructions from those tools towards a 
society that celebrated a fusion of modernist and highly stylized cultural products. I highlight 
a longstanding tension between a moralistic discourse that prioritized the ‘simple life,’ on the 
one hand, and the explicit demonstration of wealth and ‘worldliness’ on the other. Within this 
nexus, I argue that the ideas of social mobility in the United States became increasingly 
measured by the fashions, mannerisms and tastes of social groups and individuals. The 
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contradictory aesthetic that underpins the iconologies of Sloanism and mass persuasion 
inherit these tensions, but in the early 20
th
 century come to explicit blows as the academy-
sanctioned criterion of aesthetic judgement was questioned and openly challenged by avant-
garde modernists. The mass persuasion industries drew heavily from modernists, integrating 
their sleek forms and contemporary visualizations whilst appealing to the vernacular 
sensibilities of efficiency and simplicity. Charles Sheeler’s photographic narrative of the 
River Rouge and Highland Plants are highlighted by Terry Smith as the ultimate culmination 
of this process; a photographer trained in the avant-garde bohemian neighbourhood of 
Greenwich Village imagizing the very forms of industrialization. 
 
The central claim of Chapter 4 is that the development of the artistic styles and techniques 
that eventually contributed towards the mass persuasion industries- that provided the 
hegemony of American capitalism with a particular aesthetic power- is the culmination of 
tensions between a developing sense of American vernacular art and the transnationalized 
aesthetic developments within bourgeois culture. The 19
th
 century was generally dominated 
by European-led developments in painting, literature and architecture that were hegemonic in 
the sense that they provided the criterion of good taste and set the parameters (common 
sense) of aesthetic judgement. These artistic preferences were held by the Custodian set, and 
were disseminated through society amongst aspirational lower classes through pamphlets, 
serializations and later public libraries and galleries, often organized, built and paid for in the 
preferred mode of dissemination of the Custodians: public philanthropy.  
 
Yet this vision of art and culture faced tension in the developing vernacular arts of America- 
something which John Atlee Kouwenhoven argues occurred as a result of the westward 
expansion and settlement, where individuals and social groups learned a different kind of 
appreciation of beauty, one that prioritized and found virtue in simplicity and the products of 
engineering. Whilst considered austere and even ugly by the standards of the East Coast 
elites, this vernacular art contributed to the gradual mechanization of American society, 
providing the tools and design of proto-mass productions systems such as the American 
System of Manufactures. It is intimated that the ‘Lockean’ conditions of American nation-
building facilitated a distance between the cultural authority of the Custodian elites whose 
preferences gazed towards Europe and the vernacular, ‘folk arts’ of civil society social groups 
and individuals. At the same time, these Lockean conditions also fostered commercialism and 
ideas of materialist aspiration that would also become hallmarks of the aesthetic of Sloanism. 
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Chapter 5 critically analyzes the rise of the mass persuasion industries, and the aesthetic 
styles they fostered to legitimate capitalist society in the United States. By counterpoising 
two advertising agents, and their respective clients- Ford and General Motors (Sloan), I hope 
to demonstrate the key differences in marketing strategies between Ford and Sloan, and to 
therefore substantiate the claim that Sloanism might be a more compelling framework to 
understand capitalist hegemony, in light of the broadening out of social agents involved in the 
process, and the perpetual challenges to the presumed norms and values of the elite. A 
presentation of a ‘social tableau’ of advertising a car manufacturer, taken from Duke Library 
collections, aims to demonstrate fully the aesthetics of Sloanism; the aspirational materialism, 
sense of social mobility and ideals of progress and abundance that underpin it. In the annex to 
chapter 5, a full case study of Edward Bernays, from the Library of Congress Archives, is 
presented in the hope of fully resolving the sets of arguments claimed in this thesis. 
 
Conclusion: Three Contributions to the Neo-Gramscian Concept of Hegemony 
 
This thesis will make three central contributions to the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony.  
 
Firstly, it will demonstrate the importance of aesthetics to hegemony. It aims to demonstrate 
that the processes involved in securing ‘consent’ in society requires a template to understand 
the emotional and sentimental ways in which this consensualization occurs. The aesthetic as a 
category focuses on ‘non-rational’ ways in which individuals understand their environment, 
and articulates the way in which those individuals apprehend beauty and sublimity from 
cultural and artistic products. The ‘aesthetic’ also holds particular relevance for hegemony as 
it acts as a form of both concealing and revealing contradictions and antagonisms in the 
relationships of power.
21
 It can therefore act as a portal through which class relationships can 
be understood outside the materialist based theories of traditional Marxism. The aesthetic can 
further fulfill the concept of hegemony in the particular conditions of early 20
th
 century 
America, in which massly reproducible cultural artefacts became widely available, and 
increasing imagizations of society began to prevail through a variety of media forms. As 
such, it can resolve unanswered questions of hegemony to do with the style and manner of 
the dissemination of ‘norms’ and ‘values’ that underpins a hegemonic formation. As a means 
of conveying ideas, assumptions and challenges in society, it can provide us with a greater 
sense of what phenomena such as mass consumption mean to people.  
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Secondly, it will be shown how shifting the terrain of analysis from Fordism to Sloanism can 
better capture the processes of hegemony in early 20
th
 century America. This is because 
Sloanism as both framework of analysis and practices of design and marketing holds 
aesthetic issues centrally rather than as corollaries to the fundamentals of the relationships of 
production. Brand differentiation, marketing strategies and hierarchization of styles all 
contained sentimental, emotional and sensual qualities that help us to understand the power of 
American culture and the ‘consensus’ it creates through the interaction of alternative and 
counter-hegemonic groups that are positioned outside the traditional Marxian framework of 
labour-capital relations. It brings to the forefront social agents and groups such as artists, 
designers and advertisers in contributing to the ‘aesthetics’ of hegemony. In this way, shifting 
the terrain to Sloanism offers an aesthetic template for understanding the process of 
hegemony, and the manner in which ‘consent’ is achieved in society. It shows why aesthetics 
is important precisely because the emotional and sentimental ways in which social groups 
and individuals apprehend their political-economic environment. Fordism, on the other hand, 
prioritized a materialist dimension to the process of mass production, rendering cultural 
change a ‘function’ of capitalist interests. Chapter 2 will argue that the perspective of Walter 
Benjamin in The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction and Raymond 
Williams’ schema of cultural hegemony can be appropriated by the neo-Gramscian 
framework to assist in theoretically capturing the relationships, channels of dissemination, 
and values that constitute American hegemony. 
 
The final contribution to the neo-Gramscian oeuvre is how the norms and values of different 
social groups intersect with each other to produce new cultural meanings that legitimate the 
rise of Sloanism. Arguing that discourses of upward social mobility co-exist and eventually 
triumph over ideas of class-based political organization, it will be shown that tracing the 
aesthetic contestation between different social groups provides a portal for neo-Gramscians 
to better interrogate the norms and values of social classes under conditions of rapid social 
transformation. This aesthetic understanding is more sensitive to the aspirations of 
subordinate, non-elite groups, rather than thinking about those aspirations being engineered 
‘from above.’ Given that American ‘soft’ power is often articulated in cultural terms, an 
analysis of the influence of these practices should be central to a neo-Gramscian evaluation of 
American hegemony. Once again, shifting the terrain towards Sloanism provides a more 
dynamic grasp of how styles and cultural ideas gave rise to a mass production-mass 
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consumption society. Tracing the development of an American vernacular culture and the 
tensions with bourgeois criterion of art and culture helps us to understand the ‘power’ and 
‘appeal’ of the American way of life because it is sensitive to both the direct, efficient 
aesthetic of vernacular culture as well as the stylish, modernist cultures of the early 20
th
 
century. In this way, we can understand the system of mass production not just as a 
culmination of scientific progress, but also as a ‘cultural’ artefact in its own right. The power 
derived from this, aided by the imagization of early 20
th
 century from modernist techniques 
provides the neo-Gramscian framework with a means of exploring the ‘aesthetics’ of 
hegemony through the templates provided by art and culture.  As such it provides a more 
dynamic way of thinking about class and class consciousness, aspects that are intimated by 
neo-Gramscians, but not realizable with the current tools of social science. It suggests that the 
terrain of political struggle can be fought over in domains outside the visible political realm. 
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Chapter 1: Review of Literature 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Having established in the introductory chapter the problematique and key set of arguments of 
the thesis, this review of literature will survey the important schools of thought and works 
relevant to ‘The Aesthetics of Hegemony,’ in the United States. 
 
To begin with, the Frankfurt School perspectives on mass culture and society will be 
evaluated in terms of their ability to explain the power of capitalism over individuals and 
social classes. The work of Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer are regarded as key 
interventions in the Marxist canon of literature over issues of culture. By theorizing a role for 
the industries of mass culture, the Frankfurt School present a depiction of a totalizing form of 
capitalist society in which potentialities for resistance and emancipatory change continually 
diminish. The growth of mass culture contributed to this by diverting attention away from the 
drudgery and exploitation of daily existence. This eventuates in an anaestheticization of the 
masses as they become ever more content with participating in a daily life of consuming the 
products of mass culture.  
 
It will be argued that although the work of Frankfurt School represents a rich contribution to 
understanding the relationships between aesthetics, culture and political economy, there exist 
a number of deficiencies for understanding the power of American hegemony. Firstly, the 
philosophical focus of the school prevents an engagement with the relationships between 
social groups and classes. Indeed, the powerful portrayal of the totalizing, inescapable nature 
of the mass culture industry fails to address the values, norms or interests of different social 
classes or how they might change over time. As such it does not address the re-shaping of 
class relationships and the interaction of those relationships as a mass production-mass 
consumption was coming into being. Secondly, the Frankfurt School demonstrate a 
compulsive interest in differentiating ‘authentic’ art from ‘kitsch’ art. This is something 
shared with a number of conservative commentators in the United States at the time like 
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Dwight MacDonald.  The Frankfurt School interrogate this differentiation as a means of 
showcasing the falsity of consciousness under conditions of the mass culture industry. As 
such it seems unable to grasp why or how individuals or particular social groups might 
actually draw emancipatory cultural and socio-political meanings from mass culture. Gramsci 
himself wrote, ‘one must speak of a struggle for a new culture , that is , for a new moral life 
that cannot but be intimately connected to a new intuition of life , until it becomes a new way 
of feeling and seeing reality.’22This demonstrates how he thought art and culture could play a 
role in transforming politics, one which is payed slight attention to in neo-Gramscian writing 
on the early Fordist period. It curtails the role of subordinate or counter-hegemonic groups in 
contributing to the formation of hegemony. I argue in Chapter 2 that this deficiency is 
successfully addressed by Walter Benjamin, Raymond Williams and David Gartman. 
 
The issue of ascribing characteristics and values to social classes is also something that 
resides in the neo-Gramscian framework. The assumed stability of class consciousness 
appears only to be transformable through pressure from classes positioned higher in the 
political-economic order. The political-economic interested of the higher, dominant or ruling 
elites also remain relatively constant. As such, the full spectrum of social classes and 
individuals involved in the processes of hegemony is narrowed down to those participating 
directly in the capital-labour-state relationships. It will be argued that by considering the 
‘aesthetics’ of hegemony anchored in Sloanism, social agents from the world of artistic and 
cultural production have a more prominent role in the process of hegemony. Furthermore, 
those that have control and influence over medias of dissemination such as newspaper editors 
and public relations consultants also become vital social agents in analysing the 
transformation and dissemination of norms and values in society.  It will be argued that the 
lack of sensitivity to issues around art, culture and the mediums of representation constrain 
the theoretical framework in terms of explaining the ‘spontaneous’ moment of consent in 
hegemony.  
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The issue of class and class consciousness, central to the neo-Gramscian analysis of 
hegemony encounters a further problem in the historical conditions of early 20
th
 century 
America. ‘Class’ as conceived of in the Marxian sense relates to the position of groups and 
individuals in the hierarchical relations of production. Neo-Gramscians appropriate this 
category, albeit in a more fluid sense, to analyse the relationships that secured a consensus in 
the relations of mass production, and then at a state and inter-state level, for Fordist society. 
Yet these categorizations of class and class consciousness remained anchored in the 
European experience of industrialization and capitalism in the mid-19
th
 century. As such, 
literature regarding the nature of class and class consciousness in the United States will be 
explored to locate key differences in the experience of working classes and middle classes. 
 
A long standing question over why no nationally organized working class movement 
meaningfully challenged the political system during the Great Depression is a counterfactual 
starting point to the analyses of working classes in the United States by Mike Davis. Davis’ 
account in Prisoners of the American Dream is a convincing narrative of why and how 
opportunities for working class politics making an enduring impact were missed. Through 
this, the issue of class consciousness in the United States is analysed, with a number of 
‘exceptional’ characteristics for working and middle classes developing in the United States. 
However, Davis remains anchored in a categorization of class renderable to the European 
experience, and as such there are issues of culture and aesthetics that remain unexplored. C. 
Wright Mills evaluates the role of ‘white collar’ workers and the types of norms and values 
emerging from their historic emergence. This goes some way to explaining the particular 
dynamism of class consciousness in the United States, centred around ideas of upward social 
mobility, rather than consolidated political action to improve conditions of life. Mills also 
highlights the growing importance of the white collar classes in terms of a political-economic 
constituency that politicians and corporations sought to influence and capture attention. Mills 
also points towards thinking about different channels through which this might happen, 
particularly the new forms of media emerging in early 20
th
 century.  
 
The final area of the review of literature evaluates the authors of work that addressed the 
relationship between these medias and the ‘mass society.’ Both Edward Bernays and Walter 
Lippmann are important figures in this. Bernays and Lippmann worked in the Committee for 
Public Information (CPI) during the First World War. This government sponsored bureau 
was responsible for the production and dissemination of domestic ‘propaganda’ to support the 
25 
 
entry of the United States into the First World War. The first national-scale organization of its 
kind, the CPI mobilised an array of available media including newspapers, cinema and radio, 
as well as poster art to create images that demonised the German enemy and portrayed the 
American nation and a liberator and bringer of freedom. As such, Bernays and Lippmann had 
first hand experience of creating propaganda for the ‘masses,’ and drew lessons from the 
positive reaction of a large sector of the population.  
 
Bernays and Lippmann authored works that both outlined the dangers and positive 
potentialities for ‘propaganda,’ and ‘public relations,’ in terms of influencing the public. 
Bernays was also a practioner of public relations during peacetime, working with a range of 
companies and governmental agencies and initiating some of the core techniques of public 
relations. These included mobilising artists, newspaper editors, celebrities, photographers, 
scientists to create an interest in certain products or characters. Chapter 5 will present a case 
study of Bernays' work, drawn from the Library of Congress Archives. For this chapter, what 
is important is how Bernays and Lippmann are sensitive to the role of culture and media, and 
how it influenced people’s ideas of society. They also understood how powerful a mass 
persuasion complex anchored in industries such as public relations and advertising could be 
for the maintenance and stability of political-economic elites. It was the ability to both 
withhold information and create influential discourses and ‘montages’ of a way of life where 
this power lay.  
 
Finally of importance is that both understood and recognized the power of sentiment, emotion 
and sensuality in the dissemination of public information. Whilst Bernays delves into the 
psychological and scientific foundations of the public relations, there is less attention to the 
role of art and culture- precisely those domains involved in the stimulation of the sentimental, 
emotional and sensual thoughts. In short, Bernays and Lippmann intimate aesthetic processes 
involved in the maintenance of power (through mass persuasion), but tend to be dismissive of 
what cultural and political meanings might be apprehended in the process, by the very masses 
they seek to influence. 
 
To begin with though, the key neo-Gramscian scholarship on Fordism and hegemony will be 
reviewed in order to establish the gaps in the lacanae that can be attended to by a focus on 
aesthetics, and the agencies of mass persuasion that lend hegemony such as distinct form in 
early 20
th
 century America. 
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1.2 The Neo-Gramscian Offensive 
“A concept of control represents a bid for hegemony: a project for the conduct of public 
affairs and social control that aspires to be a legitimate approximation of the general interest 
in the eyes of the ruling class, and at the same, the majority of the population, for at least a 
specific period. It evolves through a series of compromises in which the fractional, special 
interests are arbitrated and synthesized.”23 
 
This section aims to establish the key theoretical and conceptual framework of the neo-
Gramscian school of International Political Economy, and to initiate both a critique of and 
contribution to the oeuvre. Essential concepts such as hegemony and control, derived 
primarily from the intuitive and original writings of Antonio Gramsci, have been enriched 
through a sustained intellectual engagement with international political-economic 
transformation, and have sought primarily to engage these transformations in terms of the 
changing parameters of class contestation and conflict that underpin the character and 
practice of power in International Relations.  
 
In the work of Robert Cox, Stephen Gill, Kees Van der Pijl, Mark Rupert and William 
Robinson, two prominent anchors of epistemological concern emerge: i) the processes of 
class formation and alliance-forging at both national and international levels are privileged in 
terms of how hegemony at a transnational level is exercised as capitalist social relations 
matures during the course of the twentieth century and ii) the norms and values of leading 
political-economic classes are scrutinized and evaluated in terms of the consensualizing 
processes of hegemonic power; that is to say, the manner in which the ideals, ideologies and 
idiosyncrasies of the dominant classes are articulated and disseminated as general interests. 
As demonstrated in the opening quotation, however, the ‘legitimate approximation of the 
general interest,’ can only be achieved through a series of compromises over competing and 
sometimes antagonistic ‘special interests,’ for which the neo-Gramscians filter through the 
prism of class interests. The transformatory processes of international political economy are 
therefore conditioned by a perpetual confrontation between the leading political-economic 
classes and other exploited, marginalised or absorbed social classes, presumably providing 
the dynamic for re-shaping power relations. 
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As such, neo-Gramscian scholarship has synthesized an insightful and critical narrative of the 
trajectory of 20
th
 century global political-economic transformation, underpinned by the 
concepts of hegemony and control. Broadly, this narrative is one that locates the exercise of 
international or global political-economic power within a detached and transnationalized 
constellation of agents and institutions and around the dominant ideational trends that have 
accompanied the rise and wane of a variety of these constellations; a ‘nébuleuse’ sufficiently 
powerful enough to drive key structural changes in the global economy, yet distantly 
positioned enough to circumvent direct accountability, existing instead as an almost ethereal 
matrix of absentees ‘that tries to generate a consensus for the management of global 
capitalism.’24. This idea of generating ‘consensus’ involves a careful mediation of interests, 
firstly in an intra-elite contestation over the style, technique and content of any managerial 
offensive, and secondly a cross-class arbitration that whilst fundamentally international in 
nature (a priori from a neo-Gramscian perspective given the epistemological privileging of a 
transnational capitalist class), undertakes its manifest resolution within national and regional 
socio-political formations. Centrally bound and organised around the Gramscian notions of 
hegemony and control, and critically grounded in a historical account of the 
internationalisation, or transnationalization of capitalist political-economic power and class 
formation, there are nonetheless significant variances between the key neo-Gramscian 
scholars regarding the manner in which ‘consensus’ is generated and disseminated, 
implicated as it is inescapably in the apparently discernible norms and values of society, 
economy, politics and culture. 
 
The work of Robert Cox and Mark Rupert has focused on the engineering of a productivity-
orientated consensus that came to dominate the international political economic order during 
the Bretton Woods era, underpinned by both the techniques of mass production and the 
compromised social relations of mass production that were negotiated in the United States in 
the two decades prior to her assumption of hegemonic, global political-economic leadership 
after the end of the Second World War. Rupert argues that the era of ‘embedded liberalism,’ 
is fundamentally characterised by a historical accommodation of labour in advanced Western 
capitalist countries in a broader arc of capitalist ideology.
25
 Distinct to this era, lasting 
roughly from 1945 until 1973, was a practical and discursive phase of capitalist entrenchment 
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that simultaneously prioritised international trade, capital accumulation (within the national 
sphere), and social prosperity through both increased access to a range of welfare provisions 
as well as the enablement of working class access to mass produced goods.
26
 The significance 
of this, retrospectively claimed, was the securing of the ideals of social justice, mobility and 
welfare within a Keynesian economic management framework. By integrating the demands 
of a potentially restive Western European working class into a ‘broader arc of capitalist 
ideology,’ capitalism, per se, and capitalist social relations were re-shaped and re-articulated 
as nationally-based and co-ordinated projects of socio-economic development, initiating a 
more secure bond between the leading political-economic classes and national civil society.
27
 
 
The Bretton Woods agreements and the Marshall Plan together make up the foundational 
architecture of international political economic order that made this period of embedded 
liberalism possible; of particular note, aside from labour’s accommodation into the structures 
of national governance, the ability of Western governments to retain a measure of control and 
leverage over the international circulation of capital is regarded as a crucial feature of this 
order, and an aspect that was legitimated and guaranteed (until Nixon’s decision to withdraw 
from Bretton Woods) by what Van der Pijl deems to be an ‘Atlantic Ruling Class.’ By 
curtailing (but by no means eliminating) the potentiality of national economic destabilisation 
by the movement of speculative and unstable finance capital, and allowing significant levels 
of government intervention in the economy and economic planning, the Bretton Woods era of 
embedded liberalism showcased on the one hand a concessionary approach to arbitrating 
cross-class interests; successfully (at least at a discursive and aesthetic level) integrating 
‘forms of social democracy that are in keeping with the  goals of social justice, equality and 
human dignity that lay at the heart of socialist, social-democratic, and other worker-based 
political movements.’28 On the other hand, it can be reflected that this was also a period of 
‘deepening’ the entrenchment of capitalist social relationships and inculcating socio-
economic norms and values around both the productivity-orientated consensus of Fordism as 
well as emergent patterns of mass consumption. 
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In either case, the importance of this period lays in the internationally co-ordinated 
management of the Bretton Woods system, which brought forth new institutions such as the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank, and encouraged the creation of transnational 
consultation bodies in the form of the G7 and OECD. In its primary policy-making and 
execution strategies, both Robert Cox and Kees Van der Pijl demonstrate that such leading 
agencies and institutions of this era were composed of people drawn from similar ideological 
and class backgrounds, holding shared values and norms about the management of the 
international economy, and versed in the themes of managerialism, productive efficiency and 
capital accumulation. As Van der Pijl states in the introduction to The Making of an Atlantic 
Ruling Class: 
 
“In this era, the specific form and content of the internationalization of capital allowed the 
bourgeoisie in the North Atlantic area to regroup and develop a series of comprehensive 
concepts of control by which it could reinforce its hegemonial position both nationally, and 
in confrontation with extra-Atlantic challenges, internationally.”29 
 
As such, Van der Pijl’s specific interpretation and contribution is to implicate Atlantic class-
formation processes as the foundation of capitalist hegemony during the BWS, a process that 
ultimately reaches back into the 19
th
 century with increased co-ordination of class interests 
over the circulation of money capital in the North Atlantic, and one where New York 
eventually displaced London as the ‘epicentre’ of an anticipated internationalization of that 
circulation
30
 during the First World War. Although ‘nationally productive capital’ would then 
sideline international finance capital during the turbulent years of the Great Depression and 
the Second World War, the Atlantic circuit was reconstituted following the end of the Second 
World War and is considered by neo-Gramscians to be a prerequisitional structural change in 
the international political economy that underpinned the Pax Americana. Characterised by the 
ever-increasing advance of American multinational firms and banks, and organised under the 
aegis of i) Taylorist principles of Scientific Management, ii) Fordist methods of mass 
production
31
 and iii) Sloanist techniques of planned obsolescence
32
, traditional or mainstream 
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International Relations analysis has cast this era as one of United States hegemony within the 
overarching, bipolar structural condition of the Cold War. Whilst the United States 
undoubtedly remained the paramount capitalist power during this era, the neo-Gramscian 
focus on the contentious strategies of international class formation stress that a critical 
political-economic approach to understanding hegemony should remain epistemologically 
and historically grounded in the way in which these class formations generate and re-shape 
structural conditions of the international political economy, or as Stephen Gill writes, ‘social 
interaction and political change takes place within what can be called the limits of the 
possible, limits which, however, are not fixed and immutable but exist within the dialectics of 
a given social structure.’33 As such, we might consider the international system of nation-
states to be just one kind of social structure, which has become re-ified as fixed and 
immutable, and one which leads to analyses of power as rooted within that closed 
epistemological system. The neo-Gramscians, like other schools of Marxist thought (notably 
the ‘World-Systems’ school), have attempted to transcend this by locating power in class and 
the unequal, internationalised social relationships that have developed during the maturation 
and profusion of capitalism.  
 
The ‘neo-Gramscian’ offensive began in earnest during the waning of the bipolar system, and 
during a period where neo-liberal economic policy-making had already become predominant 
in the North Atlantic arena and the major international economic institutions. Entering a 
broader series of discourses in International Relations about the ‘globalization’ of the world 
economy, and at pains to re-assert the historical materialist critique of political economy, 
neo-Gramscians were problematizing, explaining and criticizing features of the international 
political economy from a standpoint of the post-BWS political economic order. Further 
galvanised by the ascendance of International Political Economy and Development Studies as 
sub-genres of IR, critical IPE sought to re-historicise the artificial dichotomisation of Politics 
and Economics, States and Markets, Core and Periphery in order to exfoliate the surface-level 
interpretations of the dominant Realist and Liberalist interpretations of World Order and 
reach for critical depth in analysis and interpretation, and as such bring about a more 
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historically coherent critique about the deployment of power at an international level.  Cox’s 
Production, Power and World Order, regarded as an exemplar of the neo-Gramscian canon, 
mobilises the concept of production to primarily construct a heuristic theoretical and 
conceptual framework for the study of IPE, approaching the ‘understanding of current 
historical change from the standpoint of a reciprocal relationship between power and 
production.’34 
Moreover the analysis is set in motion during the process of political-economic structural 
reconfiguration during the crisis of the 1970s following the collapse of the BWS. In a typical 
Marxian way, Cox states that: 
 
“The world economic crisis appears as a threshold- a phase of transition between the 
definable structures of the recent past and the as yet unclear structures of the emerging 
future...made by the human material of history, shaped as it is by its own past. It is fitting, 
then, to end with a look at this human material in its collective aspect- at class formation and 
the prospects of politicization of class toward the formation of new state structures.”35 
 
The privileging of class as a central organisational category, Cox admits, may well be 
outdated and appears to have been outmoded ‘ever since productive forces have been able to 
produce abundance and that the real social issues now turn upon arousing consciousness 
directed toward psychic emancipation.’36 In order to re-invigorate class, and for it as a 
category of social scientific analysis to remain relevant in a capitalist world quite 
unrecognisable from the one which gave rise to the concept in the first place, Cox believes 
that a return to production is necessary, or as he puts it ‘starting at the beginning with 
production so as to consider how the diversity of ways in which production is carried on and 
the variety of social relationships generated in production processes condition the social 
forces that can become the bases of power in state and world order.’37 In sum, Cox believes 
that ‘the structure of production in a particular society gives the basis for its class structure,’ 
but that the organization of production only ‘creates the potential for class,’ and that 
‘whether or not classes in fact emerge depends on factors affecting consciousness.’38 It 
therefore leaves room for re-interpreting the notion of class, dependent on that variety of 
material and ideational forces existent within any given political-economic configuration, and 
as Chapter 2 will demonstrate, this is precisely what is needed to draw out the specificity and 
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uniqueness of the American experience during the genesis of the Fordist political economy 
between 1900 and 1930; a period characterised by historically distinct class consciousness, 
the rise of the white collar workforce and the proliferation of new media and artistic 
techniques that galvanised an aesthetic of aspirational bourgeois materialism. 
 
Likewise, Van der Pijl introduces the concept of class as denoting the ‘aspect of agency 
producing and reproducing the structures of a society based on exploitation...by embodying 
the structural inequalities of the social order, classes constitute the living reality of these 
structures.’39 Both these visions of class as such elevate the category as the fundamental and 
lived reality of social divisions, and within a traditional Marxian base-superstructure 
framework allude to the ultimate structuring of class relationships by a seemingly pre-
ordained force: humanity’s relationship with nature, its appropriative ‘metabolism,’ and the 
historical way in which humans have created the capacity to create wealth out of this 
relationship. Under the discipline of capital, and following the politico-legal and cultural 
embedding of the social relations between the owners of property and those without, 
‘exploiters across all historical experience have sought to consolidate their privileged access 
to society’s wealth by symbolic and material means of power.’40 Both Cox and Van der Pijl, 
whilst stressing the importance of civil society movements, educational structures and 
behavioural socialisation in hierarchically organised public and private corporations, also 
appear to delineate relatively stable ‘fractions’ of class, and accordingly derive the norms and 
values that are held by the leading political-economic elites as rooted in the culture of capital 
accumulation.  
 
Van der Pijl in particular stresses the importance of the discipline of capital, its historical 
emergence and its imposition upon society as an apparently autonomous force which it owes 
to the twin processes of ‘commodification and alienation, the breaking of community 
bonds.’41 As a force that atomises community life into an alienating life-world of individual 
economic subjects forced to sell their labour in open competition, it is from the outset beset 
with the problem of resistance, which Van der Pijl claims can occur on three ‘terrains’: i) in 
original accumulation, the process in which the commodity form is imposed on social and 
productive relations and capital turns into a autonomous social force, ii) the production 
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process, whereby the ever greater quest for exploiting labour leads to the gradual 
subordination of ‘human autonomy and creativity’ by expanding value, and iii) the process of 
social reproduction which is subjected to the requirements of capital accumulation.
42
 Despite 
the opportunity for oppressed social agents to engage in these terrains of resistance, it appears 
that there is an a priori structure in which this is possible, that being of the discipline of 
capital. Van der Pijl clarifies this, whereby the discipline of capital ‘means that behind the 
veil of commodity relations, the technical labour process is subordinated to the process of 
value expansion of valorisation.’43 Furthermore, because this process is reliant on human 
labour power as a ‘material input of the process of capitalist production and accumulation,’ 
this ‘contradictory unity requires a constant reimposition of the capitalist discipline on the 
human reality, comparable to stamping the commodity from on the product as such.’44 This 
disciplining historically and concretely occurs through the guise of industrial capital, and 
tends to be articulated at a moment of ‘national concentration’ of industry and labour, 
whereby both the proletariat and the capitalist classes become ‘susceptible to corporatism,’; 
that is, the point in which the state becomes involved in the maintenance and reproduction of 
capitalist social relations, or ‘to sustain the structures of socialisation growing up around this 
generation of industry.’45 
 
In the same way in which Van der Pijl articulates hegemony as a process by which specific 
class interests become articulated and legitimised as ‘general interest,’ Cox, when speaking of 
‘factors that affect consciousness,’ intimates at aspects of society and social relations which 
produce particular typologies of class consciousness, whereby elite interests are 
consensualized through non-violent means of control. As an intimation, rather than a causal 
explanation, there ought to be sufficient theoretical space to allow the category of class to be 
de-linked from the production of consciousness and subjectivities of late capitalism. This is 
important for neo-Gramscian IPE, as it places Gramsci’s own vision of hegemony to 
superlative importance. Cox speaks of hegemony as ‘meaning more than the dominance of a 
single world power...it means dominance of a particular kind where the dominant state 
creates an order based on ideologically on a broad measure of consent, functioning according 
to general principles that in fact ensure the continuing supremacy of the leading state or states 
and leading social classes but at the same time offer some measure or prospect of satisfaction 
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to the less powerful.’46 The problematique emerging from this particular idea of hegemony is 
therefore a delicate and potentially subversive process of control,  whereby the ‘supremacy’ 
of political-economic elites is reproduced whilst simultaneously ensuring the acquiescence of 
subordinate classes, and thereby staving off the supposed inevitably of social uprising or 
revolution that  might dismantle the apparatus of power of those dominant political-economic 
elites. However, it also requires a closer inspection of the fractioning of ‘class’ and the 
moment of control itself. 
 
“Concepts of control are frameworks of thought and practice by which a particular world 
view of the ruling class spills over into a broader sense of ‘limits of possible’ for society at 
large. Adding the dimension of (international) politics and (transnational) class struggle to... 
[the] ‘mode of regulation’, a concept of control strategically articulates the special historical 
interests of a historically concrete configuration of classes and states with the management 
requirements of the order with which those interests are most immediately congruent.”47 
 
The above quotation regarding the concept of control, one of the most coherent and 
encompassing of the neo-Gramscian genre, showcases that the ‘spilling over’ of ‘frameworks 
of thought and practice’ is the ‘moment’ in which the neo-Gramscian concept of control 
solidifies into a broader process of consensualization, gradually filtering downward through 
hierarchically structured class society and across the terrain of a transnationalized capitalist 
world. It is at this ‘moment’ that the central contention of the thesis asserts itself; that the 
‘concept of control’ does not necessarily require a co-ordinated, strategic articulation, nor 
that the ‘concrete’ configuration of classes and states are even necessarily fully aware of their 
own configuration. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter regarding the 
configuring of classes and class consciousness, in the United States during the early 20
th
 
century, the era in which both Fordism crystallised as a distinct political-economy and 
witnessed the rise of the an American mass culture, class alliances and formation, as 
considered from the experience of Western Europe, remains an elusive one, with seemingly 
‘unnatural’ alliances between leading capitalist businesses, younger advertising and public 
relations professionals, and avant-garde artists producing a particular and historically 
American aesthetic of capitalist realism.
48
 The importance of this is that whilst it can be 
claimed that there were indeed general interests that could be strategically co-ordinated 
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between business and advertising, the role of artists and cultural producers remains 
problematic for neo-Gramscian theorisation, because it was their techniques and styles that 
were responsible for the galvanising a culture of mass consumption. Yet in their own words, 
they positioned themselves outside the capitalist political-economic and in some cases even 
made manifestos against the encroaching marketization of social and cultural life.
49
 Their 
concerns appear as neither one embedded in the pecuniary ethics of early 20
th
 century 
American capitalism, nor any particular sympathy for the plight of the disenfranchised and 
marginalised classes (as opposed to more vocal reform movements). Rather, artists 
influenced by Western European modernist and avant-garde art were seeking to grasp, 
through their work, the potentialities and antagonisms that they perceived in the rapidly 
modernising and urbanising processes as they unfolded in early 20
th
 century America. A 
typical example would be Charles Sheeler, a pioneering American photographer and 
academically trained painter who was personally associated with the New York Dadaists. 
Regarded as one of the key figures in imagizing ‘Machine Age America,’ Sheeler was 
employed by Henry Ford to undertake mural photography and paintings of the new River 
Rouge plant, and his paintings American Landscape and Classic Landscape in 1930 and 1931 
are considered to be paradigms of the meeting between art and industry. 
50
 Yet this ‘moment’ 
symbolises much more than the visualisation of a grandiloquent industrial project; in his 
dealings with both Ford and the creative agency that employed him in the first place, it 
tellingly provides an insight into the troubled encounter between different social groups, and 
the synthesizing of their respective visions of society in the nascent phase of the Fordist era. 
Smith argues that in this particular case, it showcases an encounter of a large company 
‘revolutionary in its productive and organisational forms, yet conservative in cultural matter 
and ambivalent about the demands of public image and consumerism,’ with a ‘tiny band of 
New York avant-garde artists.’51 This example is just of many that led to a perpetual and 
symbiotic relationship, a patronage of the arts and culture by ruthless capitalist corporations 
who had been the object of the artists scorn and a wilful manifestation of the very atomising 
processes of society that the avant-garde had made pretences to incubate themselves from. 
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By means of intuitive and illustrative reflection, we may therefore contemplate, for example, 
what mechanisms of control made it possible for leading political-economic elites in the 
United States to maintain their positions of domestic hegemony during the crisis of the Great 
Depression of the 1930s and circumvent almost any meaningful challenges to those positions 
of power, despite the presence of a restive and numerically large industrial proletariat? The 
contention of this thesis is that a configuration of emergent, or nascent social classes, located 
in relatively new industries of the commercial arts, and new media forms in radio, 
advertising, cinema and photography, with varying degrees of ‘concrete’ class consciousness 
contributed to aestheticiszng the ‘control’ of capitalist political-economy. Furthermore, their 
ideas, some of which were contradictory and antagonistic with those value and norms held by 
leading political-economic elites, were in some way integrated, absorbed and re-shaped the 
articulative processes of hegemonic control, bringing forth what Terry Smith calls an 
‘iconology of American capitalism.’52  
 
1.3 Hegemony, Culture and the Frankfurt School 
 
The Frankfurt School, and particularly The Culture Industry thesis of Theodor Adorno and 
Max Horkheimer, remain in the social sciences one of the key critical interventions in 
understanding the relationship between culture and political economy. As a narrative, it 
unravels a corrosive tale of the relentless instrumentalization and commodification of all 
areas of social and cultural life. This frightening depiction of an ever-encroaching totality of 
administered capitalism is encased in a critique of the development of mass culture in the 
early to mid 20
th
 century; how it suffocates the potentialities for emancipatory transformation, 
and perhaps most relevantly, how social agents become increasingly incapable of realizing 
the atomized, re-ified reality they encounter. Themes of instant gratification, mass persuasion 
and mass reproducibility of lowbrow culture are all addressed, and leaves one with the sense 
that power from the top, and its deceptive capabilities (those intimated by Bernays) have 
scaled such heights, that the final domain of personal freedom- leisure- is itself now subjected 
to the same principles and norms of exchange value. As such, the Culture Industry addresses 
the question of hegemony indirectly, speaking to the way in which societies and social groups 
become saturated with dominant norms and values, and how the colonization of their free 
time and space by a mass culture industry lays bare the inescapable condition of working 
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classes in advanced capitalist societies that have undergone a transition to the bureaucratic, 
corporate kind that is typified by the managerial revolution, the rise of Taylorism and ideas of 
efficiency and rationality and a debilitated sense of progress.  
 
“The culture industry, which involves the production of works for reproduction and mass 
consumption, thereby organising ‘free’ time, the remnant domain of freedom under capital in 
accordance with the same principles of exchange and equivalence that reign in the sphere of 
production outside leisure, presents culture as the realization of the right of all to the 
gratification of desire while in reality continuing the negative integration of society.”53 
 
In essence, Adorno’s central argument in The Culture Industry implies a correlation between 
the achievements of effective integration under Fascism and liberal democratic states; the 
culture industry’s triumph of repressive unification did for liberals what was achieved 
through direct political control under Fascism. In addition, there is a clear theoretical 
connection with The Dialectic of Enlightenment- i.e., the very same rationality which 
provides for humankind’s emancipation from the bondage of mythic powers and allows for 
progressive domination over nature, engenders, through its intrinsic character, a return to 
myth and even more absolute forms of domination. The feature of Enlightened reason which 
accounts for this reversal is its identification of rationality/understanding with the 
subsumption of the particular under the universal. Amongst the socio-ideational 
consequences of this, Adorno (and Horkheimer) prioritise ‘instrumental’ reason as 
disregarding the intrinsic properties of things- the properties that give each thing its sensuous, 
social and historical particularity, for the sake of the goals and purposes of the subject (c.f., 
Bernays). Unequal things become treated as equals (through commodity equivalence) and 
objects are subsumed under the unreflective drives of the subject. The purpose of this 
subsumption is to allow for conceptual and technical mastery. When instrumental reason 
becomes considered to be the whole of reason, then the possibility of cognising the particular 
in its own right becomes occluded- and without this possibility, the reason which was to be 
the means to satisfying human ends becomes its own end, thereby turning against the true 
aims of the enlightenment: freedom and happiness.
54
 
 
Accordingly, Adorno argues that the culture industry as an effective phenomena in capitalist 
society depends on removing the thought that there is any alternative to the status quo; 
pleasure being the flight from the last remaining thought of resistance; the liberation 
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promised by amusement is ‘freedom from thought and negation’:55 ‘The culture industry is 
the societal realisation of the defeat of reflection, the realisation of subsumptive reason, the 
unification of the many under the one.’  
 
The ‘schema of mass culture’ refers to the culture industry’s own schematizing, or pre-
forming of experience; particularly with regard to the collapse of the difference between 
culture and practical life, Adorno argues that this is the false aestheticization of the empirical 
world, ‘and aestheticization of empirical life that does not transform it in accordance with the 
ideals of sensuous happiness and freedom but rather secures the illusion that empirical life 
realises those ends ..’56 
 
In the course of a content analysis regarding an Astrology column of the LA times, in an 
essay The Stars Down to Earth, Adorno demonstrates that the claims of the culture industry, 
while representing an increasingly more integrated and oppressive scheme of capitalist 
totality, still requires the cognizance and interpretation of individual and group agency for its 
affects to be understood and manifested as coherent, rationalised behaviour. For example, the 
mere fact that the vast majority of people in the advanced capitalist world watch television or 
Hollywood movies is not a direct indictment that agents have completely lost the capacity for 
reflection- i.e., it is possible to see through the manipulation at work and sustain a critical 
distance from it. What Adorno argues is that complete subservience and deception is not 
necessary for the culture industry to succeed- ‘the triumph of advertising in the culture 
industry is that consumers feel compelled to buy and use its products even though they see 
through them.’57 
 
The surface rationality of the common sense advice offered by the column correspond to a 
premise that is located within the thesis of the Dialectic of Enlightenment- that where rational 
self-interest (an axiom a priori of the Enlightenment) as normally understood is pushed to 
extremes so as to become irrational- the historical fate of reason. The success of the astrology 
column- what Adorno calls ‘secondary occultism’- is based on readers receiving and 
interpreting information that is provided through the medium of a largely institutionalised, 
objectified and socialised form of the everyday life- the newspaper (which in itself bears the 
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responsibility for engaging society with truth-content of their organisation, governance and 
direction).
58
 In part, it is its distance from seriousness that allows the reader of the column to 
trade in ‘common-sense’ without neither sacrificing the claims of rational evidence and 
reflection (hence keeping natural science in its sacrosanct place), nor demanding anything 
approaching religiosity. Hence, astrology’s survival into the culture industry is premised on 
its alienation from experience, playing on people’s scepticism and disbelief, conversely 
engendering belief and obedience amongst certain people. 
 
David Gartman argues that the driving principles of mass culture that Adorno identifies 
derive from the ‘demand for compensation by the working classes, originating in the 
alienating conditions of labour.’ In other words, the de-humanizing conditions of production 
that accompany the path to mass production and standardization are compensated by the mass 
consumption of culture as a ‘form of exercising a freedom and sociality denied in the act of 
capitalist production.’59 Gartman’s argument resonates here with Benjamin’s idea that the 
mass reproducibility of artworks and cultural artefacts provide subordinated social groups 
and classes with the idea of a freedom (to consume art and culture) that had been historically 
denied and out of reach. I will argue in Chapter 2 that Benjamin also intimates that this newly 
realized freedom can likewise produce new forms of political consciousness that may not 
necessarily be revealed in organized political action (for example, Lukacs’ insistence that 
transforming the production of art in accordance with realist principles would afford a new 
role of cultural producers within the structure of a Communist party). 
 
Nevertheless, Adorno asserts that the culture industry intentionally seeks to integrate its 
consumers from above, fusing the ‘old’ and the ‘familiar’ into a new quality60 
 
“The expansion of the role of competing life-styles, the permeation of these styles into the 
home, the pervasiveness of music, the way in which products have become a direct extension 
of their advertising image, all these phenomena take a closing of the gap between the culture 
industry and everyday life itself, and a consequent aestheticization of social reality.”61 
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It is at this point- the ‘consequent aestheticization of social reality,’ where I would depart 
from Adorno. Rather than assuming that the culture industry- organized, articulated and 
channelled downward from above- is a false reflection of the everyday life, Gartman points 
towards thinking about this process as refracting the antagonistic and contending cultural 
values between different social groups, allowing practices and ideas emerging from ‘below’ 
to infiltrate and transform the very values of the dominant.
62
 In other words, the historic 
‘moment’ of hegemony that is embodied by the mass culture industry for the first time 
produces the possibility that subordinate social groups actually have a say in the form of 
culture they wish to consume. The ‘New Negro’ movement and the Harlem Renaissance- 
though not covered in this thesis- typify moments in the 1920s where marginalised social 
groups not only gain an avenue of disseminating their cultural practices and ideas (made 
possible only by mass reproducibility), but are able to gain political leverage in the form of 
middle-class white constituencies who supported and consumed their products.
63
 This is not 
to say that race relations suddenly were overturned overnight; but that the very existence of a 
vocal and locally (in New York) recognized authentic African-American art must say 
something about how mass reproducibility can open up political, social and cultural 
potentialities that were hitherto unthinkable (particularly in the context of the explicit racism 
of American organized labour movements in the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries
64
. 
 
Adorno’s conceptualizing of the culture industry is, of course, tempered with the 
philosophical and political sensibilities of his European background, and whilst this thesis 
does not intend to be in any way a critique of his work, the manner in which he seeks to 
differentiate ‘technique’ in works of art versus works of the culture industry serves to 
illustrate a lack of historical understanding of the development of the arts in the United 
States; that is to say, its 19
th
 century history of being simultaneously receptive to the high art 
(and indeed the categories of what makes something aesthetically ‘pleasing’) of Western 
Europe and its stern, austere vernacular art that developed through the progression of the 
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nation from the Eastern seaboard to the Pacific.
65
 As Alexis de Tocqueville identified ‘In 
What Spirit the American Cultivate the Arts,’: 
 
“They prefer books which may be easily produced, quickly read, and which require no 
learned researches to be understood. They ask for beauties self-proffered and easily enjoyed; 
above all, they must have what is unexpected and new. Accustomed to the struggle, the 
crosses and the monotony of practical life, they require strong and rapid emotions, startling 
passages, truths or errors brilliant enough to rouse them up and to plunge them at once, as if 
by violence, into the midst of the subject.”66 
 
This historical conditioning of the reception and consumption of cultural objects in the 
United States appears to prefigure the rise of artistic modernism, with a focus on the shock of 
the new and pursuit of styles that spoke to the vernacular grammar of what was still a 
disconnected society of settlements. The integration of communications and transport 
networks following the Civil War meant that by the opening decades of the 20
th
 century, a 
sense of ‘national’ culture outside the prevalent Custodian vision could develop for the first 
time; again it is under conditions of mass reproducibility of culture that this becomes 
possible.
67
 
 
As such the key criticism I would have with Adorno and the Frankfurt School is the 
continuous attempt to define and separate ‘authentic’ art on the one hand and the kitsch, re-
ified products of the mass culture industry on the other hand. Leo Lowenthal, in the essay 
‘Historical Perspectives of Popular Culture,’ suggests that ‘popular culture,’ is ‘spurious 
gratification,’ as opposed to ‘art as a genuine experience as a step to greater individual 
fulfillment.’68 Lowenthal suggests that what art allows the individual to do is to ‘appreciate 
what they once worshipped as beautiful,’69 and therefore to experience beauty is to ‘be 
liberated from the overpowering domination of nature over mankind.’70 The question that is 
left beginning is if there is any possibility for individuals to experience a ‘beauty,’ under a 
socio-economic system that prioritizes the domination of mankind over nature? The 
authenticity of artworks, dissipated by mass reproducibility and trampled over by the mass 
                                                 
65 Kouwenhoven, John Atlee Made in America: The Arts in Modern Civilization, New York: Doubleday & Co., 
1948, pg. 12 
66
 ‘In What Spirit the American Cultivate the Arts,’ Alexis de Tocqueville, in Mass Culture: The Popular Arts in 
America, Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White (eds.), pg 33 
67
 Carroll, Peter and Noble, David The Free and the Unfree: A New History of the United States, London: 
Penguin, 1977, pg., 112 
68
 ‘Historical Perspectives of Popular Culture,’ Leo Lowenthal, in Mass Culture: The Popoular Arts in America, 
Bernard Rosenberg and David Manning White (eds.), pg 50 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Ibid., pg 52 
42 
 
culture industry, remains the point of reference for the Frankfurt School authors. Taking cue 
from Walter Benjamin’s The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Chapter 2 
will argue that appreciation of ‘beauty,’ divorced from the 19th century bourgeois parameters 
of what constitutes aesthetic pleasure, undergoes a reform under conditions of artistic 
modernism and socio-economic modernization, and holds particular poignancy in the case of 
the United States- a nation, according to John Atlee Kouwenhoven, whose appreciation of 
‘beauty,’ is anchored in the simplicity of tools, design and engineering71; that is to say, a 
nation whose appreciation of ‘beauty,’ lies not in the fine arts, realist literature and classical 
music of 19
th
 century Europe, but in the grandeur of the Brooklyn Bridge, the skyscraping 
audacity of the Chrysler Tower and the immediate imagization of everyday life pioneered in 
the photography of Alfred Stieglitz and Charles Sheeler.
72
 It is the uniqueness of this- traced 
back to Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson’s appreciation of beauty in the grid 
designed avenues of early American town planning, in the certainty provided by 
mathematical calculation and ‘simple’ ordering,73- that we find the power of advertising 
imagery on the one hand- the ultimate ‘dialectic’ image that traces back through history and 
peers forward into the future
74
- and the ‘rational’ and ‘scientific,’ approached to market 
research and public relations.  
 
However, in order to capture this power- which appears to have a ‘dialectic’ character that 
veers from the rational-scientific to the aesthetic- it is necessary to reconsider the conditions 
of political economy in which these images, objects and perceptions of beauty are produced 
and consumed. As already explained in section 1.2, the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony 
which attempts to interrogate the conditions in which dominant norms and values saturate 
society to set the parameters of ‘common sense,’ focuses only on the production side of this 
coin, anchored in Fordism. I would now like to return to David Gartman and the concept of 
Sloanism, and why for neo-Gramscian international political-economic theory this can 
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expand the range of relationships, ideas and practices that are co-ordinated in critical 
analysis. 
 
1.4 Sloanism and Mass Culture 
 
The story of Henry Ford’s rise, the standardization of mass production in the River Rouge 
Plant, the Five-Dollar Day, the Pinkerton Strike-breakers, the pacification of workers through 
Ford’s sociological department, the integration of trade unions, and historical specificity of 
the New Deal. These will all be familiar to those acquainted with the concept of Fordism and 
the way in which neo-Gramscian theory used these as the building blocks to analyse 
American power following the liberal-welfare compromises at Bretton Woods. 
 
Yet when explaining that power- the hegemony of capital in international political economy- 
the sense of how ruling political-economic elites reproduce themselves over time, and how 
their ideas and values became dominant, entrenched and expanded spatially, there is scant 
attention paid to the style in which the norms and values of that elite operated. I believe the 
key lies in re-tracing the precise period from which US hegemony began its ascent, and 
David Gartman offers a compelling narrative and critical interrogation of the role of Alfred 
Sloan, chairman of General Motors and Ford’s principal rival at the time of the launch of the 
Model T.  
 
Sloan’s response to the success of the Model T was to introduce stylistic and technical 
obsolescence into the manufacturing of GM automobiles. The latter refers to mechanical 
aspects of the automobile’s functioning that were designed to wear out- in short to bring 
problems to the consumer that would require the purchase of another car. The key, however, 
is the introduction of stylistic obsolescence; ornamental features of the automobile designed 
to go out of fashion, to be eclipsed by newer features that would ‘appeal,’ aesthetically, to 
both pre-existent and prospective car owners. By doing so, I argue that Sloan was responsible 
for the introduction of perpetual consumption, that is the continual purchase of the same 
product (or least a product that has the same use) based on perceptions of style and taste. One 
only has to think about the Apple Corporation in the 21
st
 century, its range of electronic 
products and the rate at which each of these products is re-branded as an updated model 
(approximately every 18-24 months).  
 
44 
 
Sloan tapped into the idea of mobility that in America sits uneasily with the idea of class 
organization. The question is then, in what kind of social conditions could a company such as 
General Motors ‘create’ the desire for people to want to buy the same product over and over 
again? I propose that it is in conditions i) where the ‘products’ of a mass persuasion complex 
become consumable to the mass, ii) where the ‘sense’ of social mobility co-exists with but 
ultimately eclipses class-based political organization, iii) where sufficiently diverse artistic 
styles facilitate a particular sense of individuality upon consumers. 
 
As such, whilst acknowledging the importance of Fordism and the idea of power being rooted 
in relations of production
75
 Gartman showcases a ‘mirror-image’ of power being refracted in 
the relations of consumption. He argues that Gramsci’s insights in ‘Americanism and 
Fordism’ understands Fordism not just as the innovation (if not revolution) of production 
methods, but also to the new mode and standard of living which necessarily accompanies 
them.
76
 This ‘standard of living,’ I will argue in Chapter 4, is a part of a broader iconology of 
American Modernity capitalism, one that is designed, imagized (particularly through the 
medium of photography), disseminated through an interaction with styles and values that do 
not necessarily emerge from the capitalist political-economic elite. And whilst the 
consumption patterns of working classes changed after the introduction of the five-dollar day, 
the motor of that change is the idea that consuming certain goods or products fulfills the 
sense of mobility and makes emulation and aspiration of styles perceived to be ‘higher’ 
graspable for the working classes for the first time.
77
 Gartman, in the process of criticism of 
the French Regulation school, suggests that the lack of attention to the aesthetics of political 
economy and emphasis on the logics of systemic reproduction results in scant attention being 
paid to how and why the working classes and growing white collar class were persuaded in a 
relatively short period to actively participate in the mass consumption market.
78
 
 
Assumptions regarding systemic reproduction and institutionalised regulation allude to the 
appearance of commodities being dictated by the necessities of mass production alone, with 
manipulative advertising rendering them satisfactory for consumer wants- what Gartman calls 
‘functionalist aesthetics.’ However, this ignores the innovations in product design and short-
term profitability strategies, including superficial distinction, product hierarchy, planned 
                                                 
75
 This is particularly in Robert Cox (1996) and Mark Rupert (1995) 
76
 Gartman, David Auto Opium: A Social History of Automobile Design, London: Routledge, 1994, pg., 9-12 
77
 Ibid., pg. 24 
78
 Ibid., pg. 18 
45 
 
obsolescence and stylising ornamentation- for which the foundation of mass consumption 
becomes the aesthetics of change and diversity, stimulating consumer demand sufficient to 
maintain high-volume mass production. 
79
 
 
Gartman also provides a nuanced criticism of Adorno’s Culture Industry. As stated in the 
Introduction, if we understand culture as historically serving as ‘a repository of human needs 
that are not fully realised within a given form of society- art, music, literature and crafts 
having provided an outlet for the free, self-determining activity that human beings needs’80 
(as active, productive and creative beings) but are denied by the class structure of society, 
then culture can thus serve a critical function in society by reminding people of those needs 
unjustly denied them and holding out promise of future fulfillment.  
 
Gartman argues that the central tenant of the Critical school is that the utopian function of 
culture is all but eliminated in advanced capitalism with the rise of mass culture, which 
rather than serving as a repository of human needs, turns into an ideological adaptation of 
human needs to the requirements of capitalist mass production..
81
 
Due to the dehumanising rationale behind the profit motive in the era mass production, and 
its associated constraining of human freedom through the control of capitalist agents, people 
find refuge from the realm of production into the private realm of consumption in the home. 
The key transformation however, is that rather than recuperate meaningful autonomy and 
individuality and participating in culture within their already constrained time, ‘victims’ are 
pursued by the logic of reification in the form of consumer products and prevents culture 
from providing the critical negation of capitalist work.
82
 
 
The emergence of the ‘culture industry,’ then, marks a significant and eventually societal- 
wide transformation in the way in which individuals comprehend and augment their own 
needs. The depiction of people being ‘chased’ by this capitalist behemoth, being led into the 
deception of the mass consumption market may seem exaggerated, but it is only via this 
device that Adorno and Horkheimer avoid their own fears of producing a reified critique. The 
culture industry supposedly provides people with leisure commodities and services to 
alleviate people’s dehumanising experience; but since the production of these cultural goods 
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is governed by the same logic of reification as in other forms of mass production, the culture 
industry also turns out standardised, dehumanised products that reinforces capitalist social 
relations at the very same time that it is supposed to provide a route of escape. Mass 
consumption is then the prolongation and ideological reinforcement of capitalist mass 
production.
83
 
 
However, despite the focus of the aesthetics of the product as a means of entrenching the 
logic of reification into the mass consumption market, Gartman highlights the limitations of 
Critical Theory on two aspects; firstly. the potentiality for resistance is seen to be precluded 
by the ideological integration of needs to the requirements of mass production, hence 
debilitating social change as people are largely satisfied with their state of domination, 
perhaps even complicit with it.
84
  
 
“Consumer complacency has so thoroughly gripped the masses that the traditional Marxist 
idea of class struggle is rendered a conceptual relic.”85  
 
Secondly, the depiction of a total suppression of real human needs through the medium of the 
emergent culture industry leads us to conceive of this transformation as one of the continual 
manipulation of the passive masses by conspiratorial elites, which distorts the historical 
process by which mass consumption arose and became adjusted to mass production. By 
emphasizing the permanent passivity of the working class in the processes and structures of 
the culture industry, Adorno and Horkheimer negate the historically contingent role the 
working class had in shaping the Fordist regime of accumulation, one that even they could 
analyse retrospectively as a protracted class conflict.
86
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1.5 Class Consciousness and Social Practices in the US 
 
“The undertow is changing, the tide is at the turn. It is disquieting or inspiriting, according to 
one’s prejudices, to observe the extraordinarily slow shifting of sympathy in matters 
industrial, during the past twenty-five years, toward the side of the worker.”87 
 
“Class formation needs to be understood not only as a social struggle, but as a conceptual 
struggle, one in which men and women elaborated and defended competing visions of class 
relations.”88 
 
Aside from the 6% polled by Eugene Debs in the 1912 Presidential election, as candidate for 
the Socialist Party, organized labour as a political force in the United States has been 
perceived to have a negligible impact upon the mainstream political arena. Consciousness of 
working class solidarity is assumed to have been undermined by a number of reasons 
anchored in the American ‘exceptionalist’ school of history. Tangible and lived social 
cleavages over race and immigration after the Civil War in particular are mooted as 
explanations of why no nationally coherent idea of an American working class emerged, in 
what was arguably the most advanced capitalist nation at the turn of the 20
th
 century. To put 
it a different way, why was it in the nation where the exploitative relationship between capital 
and labour seemed most stark, where the socio-economic upheaval engendered by capitalist 
modernization produced the largest gap between a small wealthy elite and the masses, was 
there not even the slightest inclination of revolutionary fervour, or even a nationally 
organized political force capable of disrupting the rule of the political-economic elite? 
 
In Minding the Machine: Languages of Classes in Early Industrial America, Stephen Price 
argues that In the 1830s, there is evidence to suggest that ‘class’ in the US was understood in 
a sense closer to the Marxian concept; Seth Luther in An Address to the Working-men of New 
England, on the State of Education and on the Condition of the Producing Classes in Europe 
and America characterised the ‘factory system of production’ as inhumane and underpinned 
by avarice. Speaking about the context of mechanization of textile mill industry in New 
                                                 
87
 ‘Class Consciousness,’ Vida Schutter, in The Atlantic Monthly (1911, 107:3), pg. 321. Accessed from Hathi 
Trust Digital Library Holdings: The Atlantic Monthly. 
http://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015030109881;size=75;view=image;page=root;seq=331;num=32
1 
88 Price, Stephen Minding the Machine: Languages of Class in Early Industrial American Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2004, pg., 27 
 
48 
 
England, he pointed to the long hours of work, rigid work rules, use of child labour and use 
of corporal punishment.
89
  
 
The structuring material conditions for the variance and debate about the nature of class were 
the gradual and uneven move from familiar forms of household and craft production to 
mechanized ones. Luther used explicit and oppositional language of class to depict American 
society as it transformed into a machine based civilization, highlighting that the most salient 
divide in the world of work was between the ‘producing classes,’ and those who 
‘monopolized wealth.’ Within years, working class journeymen had formed trade unions and 
radical craft unions to challenge what they saw as the inequities of the emerging industrial 
order. As such, there was a point where the discourse of class was the most important 
‘moment’ of political organization and acts of collective resistance.90  
 
Yet of course, there existed a group- most notably the authors of the North American Review- 
that whilst understanding the disruptive nature of mechanization. ‘Rather than inscribing 
inequality, mechanization tended to undo hierarchies of old and make it possible for everyone 
to improve themselves and their lot.’91 Price’s question is this: how did members of a nascent 
middle class manage to promote and defend their social authority in the face of troubling and 
divisive questions about work and mechanization? 
 
His answer is that class formation was not so much located in the material conditions of the 
workplace, but in a broad, popular discourse on mechanization, one that occurred in 
movements and activities that were for the most part on the periphery of more traditional 
notions of industrialization, for example educational movements such as the mechanic’s 
institute movement and manual labour school movement, health reform activities.
92
 
 
Price’s overall argument is that American men and women who were coming to perceive 
themselves as middle class in the decades before 1860 consolidated their authority and 
minimized the potential for class conflict in part by representing the social relations of the 
industrial workplace as necessarily co-operative rather than oppositional
93
, and organizes a 
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three-level framework of understanding the character and meaning of class and class 
consciousness in the United States: 
 
1) There is the ‘making of class,’ the forging of social relations under factory conditions, 
the role of the machine in dehumanizing workers, and the hierarchized division 
between the producers of wealth and the accumulators of wealth. 
2) There is class as the comprehension of social relations; the discursive battle to 
establish whether the issues generated from the ‘making of class’ are translatable into 
meaningful political contests. I.e., is the actual political battlefield to be constructed 
around the class divisions emerging through industrialization. 
3) The ‘gap’ between the material reality of a hierarchically class divided society and a 
society conditioned on the idea of political equality is supplemented by the rise of a 
powerful, persuasive discourse from the nascent American middle classes that 
analogously correlated the exploitative social relations between the proprietors and 
wage-workers with i) the ‘head,’ and the ‘hand,’ ii) the ‘mind’ and ‘body,’ and iii) the 
‘human’ and ‘machine.’94 
 
In other words, Price contends that the relationships between proprietors/managers and wage-
workers became one conditioned by the idea that wage-workers needed managers; a 
relationship that needed the careful nurturing of mutual respect, for the sake of each other’s 
safety in the factory, and in society more broadly. In light of this, I would argue that this 
conditioning laid the ground for the ideals and discourses of upward mobility and emulation 
that prevailed towards the end of the 19
th
 century- that is to say, the respect afforded by 
workers to their managers in a framework of hierarchical co-operation, opened up the desire 
for workers to emulate the styles, ideas and values of their managers. 
 
Martin Burke argues that ‘class’ as a term in America suffers from consistent contradiction. 
Distinction between political ‘classes’ is often not recognized because of the power of the 
idea of political equality. However, socio-economic class categorization is recognized in 
public discourse at the end of the 19
th
 century, at least in an occupational manner; ‘capitalists, 
landlords, merchants, professional men, farmers and laborers.’95 The essential ‘conundrum’ 
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of class in America rests on the problem with politically encoding class with discernable 
characteristics. ‘Labor,’ the ‘proletariat,’ and ‘working class,’ prove to be the most difficult 
and antagonistic terms in public discourse through the 19
th
 century- and an ‘elastic one under 
which any number of social fallacies may be hidden.’96 Coleman and Rainwater likewise 
argue that in modern industrial society, the extremely elaborate divisions of labour which are 
interpenetrated by political and economic institutions render the pinning down of ‘class’ as a 
category with discernable, shared interests nearly impossible without sacrificing potentially 
non-‘reward’ interests that cut through, intersect and reshape class lines (for example, the 
way in which they find reward through the consumption of certain products, the maintenance 
of particular lifestyles and adherence to/emulation of cultural tastes).
97
 
 
Coleman and Rainwater suggest that individuals can belong to many, potentially antagonistic 
social groups, with no necessary correlation between relative standing to the three Weberian 
hierarchies of class, status and power with individuals having ‘multi-dimensional 
relationships’ to others even within each of the three systems of division. Thus whilst we can 
broadly inculcate social characteristics, values and interests to the ‘managerial class’ in order 
to bring structure to the way in which we understand how this group operates and negotiates 
the domain of resources and rewards with other social and political groups, we at the same 
time lose the intra-class nuances and contradictions that contribute to the shaping of that 
broad perspective in the first instance.
98
 For example, whilst both a departmental manager of 
an insurance company and account executive of an advertising firm may both be a part of the 
lower rung of the ‘managerial’ class- accepting the norms of corporate management 
practices, guidelines as well as the tangential requirements of profit-making- their cultural, 
social ideals and practices outside the domain of workplace may be oppositional or 
completely detached; the insurance company manager may be less inclined to keep up with 
the latest trends in design and art, or be in tune with the potentials of media and 
communications, as an advertising executive would have to as both part of their job as well as 
their habitation within a ‘cultural’ industry that keeps a keen eye on the latest trends and 
styles in art, fashion and techniques of artistic/cultural creation and dissemination. Affecting 
their perception of themselves as well as others, Coleman and Rainwater suggest that the 
consciousness of culture can easily override a class consciousness that is anchored in the 
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workplace or in perceived harmonious social networks created through traditional class 
positions. Furthermore, they argue that even within an organization, the stratification and 
sophisticated compartmentalization of work tasks that takes place under managerial, Taylorist 
style corporate reform leaves the potential for multiple fracturing within the same industries: 
 
“The arena of competitive struggle between unequal powers that characterizes class, defined 
as a group sharing common interests, is perhaps better conceived as an ecology of games 
than as a simple stratification. Class mobilization and class alliances are perhaps better 
understood as complex and shifting political struggles than as set battle pieces.”99 
 
The example of the early 20
th
 century showcases clearly this perspective; whilst ‘traditional’ 
battle pieces are certainly present, the authors fail to adequately suggest precisely the 
‘ecology of games,’ through which this conflict is both played out within as well as providing 
meaning to the terrains of conflict. Taking into account Price’s account of the discursivity of 
class discourse in the United States, the suggestion is that late 19
th
 century debates over 
mechanization and the antagonistic, oppositional concept of class emerging from real 
practices gradually received its ‘containment’ within a broader discourse of inclusive class 
relationships which simultaneously stressed the co-operative elements of class and social 
order as well as the achieved political equality ascribed by the constitution. 
 
“The Great Depression furnished the most ironic experience of all. Despite a cataclysmic 
collapse of the productive system and the economic class war that the crisis unleashed , the 
political battlements of American capitalism held firm. Indeed it can be argued that the 
hegemony of the political system was reinforced and extended during this period.”100 
 
The above quote emphasizes the key motivational issue for this thesis; what were the 
conditions of class relationships in the United States that allowed the ruling elites in the US to 
circumvent destabilizing challenges to their leadership during the greatest crisis in capitalist 
history? Given the actual long lineage of labour organization in the United States (Davis 
argues that the 1828 foundation of the Philadelphia artisans can be counted as the first 
definitive instance of a ‘Labour Party’101). In Prisoners of the American Dream, Mike Davis 
provides a nuanced and sensitive historical account of the role of working classes in the 
American political economy. He argues that there is a highly developed working class 
consciousness in the US, but it is defined by mass political abstentionism- non-engagement 
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with the principal political system, acknowledgement that their interests and aspirations are 
historically anchored outside the prevailing norms of American politics. The ‘atomized’ and 
‘mute’ protest of modern American workers were not only due to the lack of independent 
party of the proletariat. How can the country that invented the Labor party and May Day lack 
such a nationwide political organization for the working masses, he ponders?
102
 
 
Early fascination with an American development of working classes- by Marx, Engels, Lenin 
and Trotsky- posited that its political organization would fold out according to ‘objective’ 
laws of historical development; that its ‘immaturity, ‘was put down to transient (i.e., 
temporary, conjunctural and ready to be overcome) factors that would also later be used to 
create the historiographical terrain of ‘American Exceptionalism,’ that is the role of the 
‘frontier,’ continuous immigration, the fusion of agrarian-democratic ideologies with petty-
bourgeois property, international hegemony of American capital. These supposedly transient 
conditions- which ended with the completion of the frontier, the restriction on immigration, 
the triumph of corporate monopoly over small capital and the decline of US capital’s lead in 
world industrial productivity- would allow the real permanent historical determinants arising 
out of the structure of the capitalist mode of production to emerge more coherently, with 
systemic economic crisis (manifest as social crisis during the Great Depression) generating a 
widespread class struggle whose violence would be the springboard for political action 
through the existent bourgeois-democratic institutions of American politics which had 
(during the period of transient conditionality) been an obstacle to working class politics.
103
 
 
Yet the Debs adventure of 1912 remains the high-point of working class politics in the US (at 
least if we are to understand working class agency purely in terms of its translation into 
successful political struggle); Mike Davis argues that what happened to socialism in the US 
amounts to a ‘fratricide,’ reflecting the profound and often unique constellations of social, 
cultural and politics-economic antagonisms that corroded the labour movement in the US in 
the early 20
th
 century.
104
 
 
As such, the traditional Marxist portrayal of ‘proletarian immaturity,’ cannot fully realise the 
concrete and historical transformation of American society as a process of class struggle, with 
                                                 
102
 Ibid., pg 2 
103
 Ibid., pg. 11-15 
104
 Ibid., pg. 20 
53 
 
over-riding objective historical law-analysis standing in the way of assessing the ‘relative 
permanence of the decisive sociological or cultural features that have historically 
differentiated the United States.’105  
 
Davis shifts attention to another branch of ‘exceptionalism,’ rooted in liberal metaphysics, 
where the uniqueness of American history is located in the absence of a feudal structure or 
‘the ubiquity of job culture.’106 The lack of feudal class struggles and relative security of the 
Lockean world-view meant that the political incorporation of the proletariat was predestined 
in the US; the ‘socialist’ consciousness of Europe is as such a result of the industrialization 
within the parameters of an emergent bourgeois order that retained relics of feudalism- the 
US, being borne as a bourgeois society, apparently lacked the necessary tensions to produce 
the kind of socialism that emerged in Europe, with principles of social and political equality 
enshrined from the outset,
107
 and argument that Gramsci himself was particularly prescient at 
understanding: 
“America does not have 'great historical and cultural traditions' ; but neither does it have 
this leaden burden to support . This is one of the main reasons (and certainly more important 
than its so-called natural wealth) for its formidable accumulation of capital which has taken 
place in spite of the superior living standard enjoyed by the popular classes compared with 
Europe”108 
 
Davis argues that both the orthodox Marxist and American exceptionalist schools make a 
mistake in the terms of reference through which class or class consciousness might be 
understood in the US; whilst Marx et al were correct to affirm the central role of class 
struggle in the shaping of American history, the classics ‘tend to underestimate the role of 
sedimented historical experiences of the working class as they influenced and circumscribed 
its capacities for development in succeeding periods.’109 This idea of the historical 
sedimentation of historical experience is something which Gramsci notes as ‘common 
sense.’110 
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Therefore Davis’ key point is there is a qualitatively different level of class consciousness 
and intra-class cohesion in the US- a consolidation between the working class and American 
capitalism- in comparison to the advanced social-democratic formations that were 
consolidated in Western Europe after the Second World War. The ‘trajectory’ of class 
struggle in the US highlights ‘epochal’ conflicts between capital and labour during periods of 
economic crisis, with each periodic resolution of these collisions being new ‘structural forms 
that regulated the objective conditions for accumulation in the next period as well as the 
subjective capacities for class organization and consciousness.’111  
 
Davis conceptualizes this process as one of continuous (but by no means assured) 
generational defeats of the working class, each disarming it in some vital aspect. Whereas in 
Europe, working classes became politically incorporated through the agency of labour reform 
(in the sense that their relationship to capitalism is mediated and regulated by collective, self-
formed institutions at political, economic and cultural levels), the lack of collective 
institutions or ‘totalizing agent of class consciousness (i.e., the party)’ in the US meant that 
its working class was integrated into American capitalism its ‘negativities of internal 
stratification,’- privatization in consumption and disorganization vis-a-vis political and trade 
union bureaucracies.
112
 
 
In the political realm, general levels of enfranchisement were already three quarters of all 
white males in New England by 1750, and by Andrew Jackson’s second term in 1832, 
property qualification had disappeared in all but four states. As such, popular sovereignty- 
which required a century long struggle of the working class males of Europe- was already the 
pre-existent ideological and institutional framework for America’s industrialization and 
proletarian development.
113
  
 
Another important distinguishing point between the US and Europe was the actual class 
composition that assumed leadership of the democratic movements. With the US beginning 
its independent national existence as a democracy, its leadership was dominated without 
challenge by political representatives of the bourgeoisie- those sedimented patterns of liberal 
thought and practice inherited from 17
th
 century England perhaps securing the political power 
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of private property as national interest. The ‘historically specific configurations,’ of large 
merchants, bankers, big capitalist landowners or planters and industrialists was therefore in 
an ironic sense the only genuinely classical revolutionary-democratic bourgeoisie in world 
history, in the sense that unlike the political ascent of other bourgeoisie, the American 
bourgeois did not have to rely on auxilliary ‘plebian’ wings to defeat aristocratic reaction.114 
  
Davis locates the reason for this in the nature of the American bourgeois-democratic 
revolution; rather than one pitted against decaying feudal relations, it was a ‘unique process 
of capitalist national liberation involving, in the period, from 1760 to 1860, a multi-phase 
struggle against the constraints imposed by a globally hegemonic British capital on the 
growth of a native bourgeois society.’115 
 
1.6 Public Relations, Propaganda and Social Control: Establishing the Parameters 
of Mass Persuasion 
 
In Mark Rupert’s neo-Gramscian reconstruction of the symmetries of global power, he 
locates the transformation in production taking place in the United States at the end of the 
19
th
 century and beginning of the 20
th
 century as a key moment from which a subsequent 
analysis of the neoliberal hegemonic bloc of the contemporary period can historically 
progress. In particular, Rupert identifies in previous chapters the importance of American 
Labour Organisations in the post-war reconstruction settlements, in what he essentially 
argues represented a historical accommodation of labour as a section in a broader arc of 
capitalistic ideology. In particular, agreements and conciliations of US Labour facilitated the 
Marshall Plan and Bretton Woods agreements that emphasised trade, capital accumulation 
and social prosperity as tenents of its purpose.
116
 
 
However, there were of course concrete social and material changes that allowed this 
accommodation of American labour, or the ‘Politics of Production,’ into key international 
agreements that would shape the international political economy over the period from 1945-
1973; particularly the cementing of the US in the institutionalised neoliberal world order. 
                                                 
114
 Ibid., pg 17 
115
 Ibid., pg 20 
116
Rupert, Mark Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1995, pg. 59 
56 
 
Rupert’s central contention is that: ‘the asymmetrical power of American statesmen, 
capitalists, and labour leaders within the neoliberal world order was to a great extent based 
upon the ideological frameworks they developed and the social relations they constructed as 
they created a mass production, mass consumption society in the US.’117 In other words 
Rupert argues that retrospectively channelling the configurations of contemporary global 
power and world order through a Gramscian lens cannot be undertaken successfully without 
pausing to consider how that change, and the configuration of actors and interest behind that 
change, occurred in the first instance. Rupert therefore traces the rise of this historical bloc 
(which appears in the post-war environment as an internationalised formation) to domestic 
transformations in the labour process and particularly the creation of an economy based on 
mass production of goods, the expansion of the domestic and foreign market to sell these 
goods, and the rise of mass consumption of these goods to successfully buoy the US economy 
and crystallise the forces that would eventually internationalise after the second world war. 
 
As such, Rupert’s construction of hegemony- and therefore the ability of political-elites to 
secure a spontaneous moment of consent- is rooted in assumptions of productivist ideology 
and the key compromises and strategies of control between capital and labour within the sites 
of production itself- namely the mass production factory. However, it is the contention of this 
thesis that the very same ‘moment’ of consent requires a mirror-image focus on the 
ideologies of consumption that culturally legitimate such an epochal transformation of 
capitalist society. This ‘focus’ requires us to take a closer inspection at the avenues and 
channels available in society that can capture and articulate this moment of consent- and it is 
here that we turn to the ‘Propaganda’ of Edward Bernays 
 
 
Defining ‘propaganda’ for Bernays is an exercise in replacing subjectivity with objectivity; a 
plea for the neutralisation of a word that has been damaged through its semiotic skewering by 
the national European governments and agencies involved in the latter part of the First World 
War. Following the establishment of propaganda as a healthy means by which those 
soothsayers in society attempt to disseminate some ‘truth’ that has been miraculously 
revealed to them, Bernays defines propaganda as: 
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“..a consistent, enduring effort to create or shape events to influence the relations of the 
public to an enterprise, idea or group.”118 
 
 
The utilisation of propaganda as a means of spreading and garnering positive public opinion 
exists through the creative facilities in society; whether it be business and government, or 
healthcare and charity. Due to the pervasiveness of propaganda in this time of mass urban 
society (e.g., the Improvement of the Condition of the Poor of New York must use 
propaganda for its purposes to make people understand and believe that their project is a 
necessary good for the whole), the phenomena of a genuine social, but not necessarily 
homogenous, consciousness can come to fruition in a state of constant affection by the mental 
pictures created through propaganda; for even audio propaganda is garnered to produce a 
particular depiction that is realised in mental-visual cognition (particularly if visual and audio 
propaganda are co-ordinated). In all, propaganda is a tool; a device to maintain rule, and in 
the case of the expanding consumer market in the US, a means by which to expand and 
reproduce the socio-economic system, though this is not explicitly called for nor imagined by 
Bernays. The First World War was a watershed moment in the use of propaganda and 
recognition by a heterogeneous ruling class of its advantages in organising society to their 
cause and beliefs. 
 
“The manipulators of patriotic opinion made use of the mental clichés and the emotional 
habits of the public to produce mass reactions against the alleged atrocities, the terror and 
tyranny of the enemy”119 
 
But the use of propaganda evolves in peace time; what Bernays deems as ‘new’ propaganda 
takes account not only of the individual and mass mind, but the very anatomy of society, its 
group formations and interlocking loyalties. Indeed, the very ‘taste’ of society, or certain 
sections of it are also receptive to the propaganda of an articulated effort to change and 
manipulate fashion. The fetishistic aspect of this has a natural relationship with commodity 
and its use-value; but modern propaganda allows this phenomenon to expand beyond the 
individual to larger formations 
 
Bernays argues that because the manipulating processes take place on a variety of levels, e.g., 
the vertical relationships between economic and financial advisors, politicians, local 
community leader and taxpayers, or the horizontal relationships between fashion designers, 
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manufacturing houses, advertising agencies and the consumer. Because of the increasing size 
of ‘the masses’ and the complexity of the socio-political and economic system (which as we 
have already noted, are way too complex for the average citizen to understand), the co-
ordination of propaganda itself becomes a specialised labour, involving a concentration of 
resources and information in the hands of the few, at the behest of the ‘invisible government.’ 
This gives rise to a new cadre, and the birth of the public relations industry, interpreting 
enterprises and ideas to the public and crucially, interpreting the public to the enterprises, 
corporations and government.  
 
However, the rise of this specialised cadre at a particular historical juncture in the 
development of US society has much to do with the way in which the nation state (as a 
concept) developed from a protracted seizure of power from a post feudal elite to the 
management class that mediated the interests of the burgeoning capitalist economy with an 
articulated national identity. Whilst the national state developed initially from a premise of 
liberty and equality whilst in practice concentrating social co-ordination and power within a 
few, tight-knit social classes (political idealist, lawyers, capitalists, old aristocracy), the 
development of mass urban literate society rendered this tenuous, contradictory relationship 
between ‘the democratic nation’ and hegemony of social order increasingly to exposure as a 
vacuous, deceptive phenomena. Hence, at a ‘moment’ when society reaches this critical mass 
of potential rebellion (against the deception of a hegemonic class), the necessity for 
propaganda becomes even more pertinent; if the increasing complexity of modern life 
necessitates making the actions of one part of the public (the dominant socio-economic class) 
comprehensible to another part of the public (the masses), then this requires a dependence of 
organised power upon public opinion. In sum, the stability of governments and hegemony of 
an ever-exposed socio-economic order in the age of mass urban capitalism depend upon an 
acquiescent public opinion for the success of their efforts- in short they and their actions need 
social legitimation through the mechanism of liberal democracy. 
 
I would argue that whilst Bernays does not specifically address the strategies of propaganda 
as an aesthetic issue, he nonetheless points towards forms of media- ‘advertising slogans,’ 
‘editorials,’ ‘trivialities of the tabloids,’ and ‘platitudes of history,’ that were turning towards 
the sentimental and emotional avenues of capturing the public attention during an era of 
disorientating transformation. Typifying Bernays’ approach, by contextualizing these 
aesthetic frames within ‘published scientific data,’ he recognised the power of the idea of 
59 
 
science- and the determinedness of ‘fact’ that it provides for public consumption. The key 
point here is that Bernays persists in using the banner of science, psychoanalysis to bring 
some legibility and social acceptance to strategies of mass persuasion that are intrinsically 
deceptive and organised around capturing the sentimental and emotional ‘hooks’ that people 
develop; a grand posture is developed that simultaneously negotiates both the private, 
personal insecurities of a society increasingly self-judged on fashion, tastes and assumptions 
of mobility as well as variant discourses of American history (and by association, the 
American ‘character) that celebrate its triumphant entry into the early 20th century and 
gradual rise to the apex of international power; in short, using historical discourses as diverse 
as Manifest Destiny, Jeffersoniansim, etc, to create a ‘Beautiful’ and ‘Sublime’ vision of 
American destiny. 
 
 
In ‘The Psychology of Public Relations,’ Bernays describes the attitudinal aspect of the 
burgeoning profession of propaganda. Mass psychology is different from individual 
psychology, but man in group has specific, discernible, scientifically comprehensible features 
that are amenable to manipulation and control through understanding of motivations and 
impulses; hence if we understand the mechanism and motives of the ‘group mind’- here a 
clear reference to the masses- it becomes possible for the invisible government to control and 
regiment it. 
 
Bernays emphasises that due to man’s gregarious nature, in social life there is practically (for 
the purposes of the propagandist) no distinction between the individual and mass psychology- 
so that whilst an individual, when making a decision (Bernays uses the example of a man 
choosing what stocks to buy) may believe that they are making independent, even rational 
choices, their judgement is in fact a ‘mélange of impressions’ stamped on the mind by outside 
influences which unconsciously control the thought process. He cites a study from Trotter 
and Le Bon- that the group mind does not think, but has impulses, habits and emotions. The 
first impulse is to follow the example of a trusted leader. When a trusted leader is absent, the 
second impulse of the group mind is to think in terms of clichés or images which stand for a 
whole group or experience. Hence the role of the propagandist is orientated around 
manipulating or reshaping old and new clichés to swing a whole mass of group emotions. 
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“The psychologists of the school of Freud re-iterate that people’s thoughts and actions are 
compensatory substitutes for desires which they have been compelled to suppress. An object 
is not desired for its intrinsic worth or usefulness, but because the subject has unconsciously 
come to see in it a symbol of something else”120 
 
In this, Bernays suggests that the object- whether that be a physical commodity, or a cultural 
artefact or action (say a visit to the theatre)- becomes imbued with aesthetic properties that 
represent something about the individual’s feeling towards his or her society. Remarkably 
close to the Marxian concept of ‘commodity fetishism,’ I will use in Chapter 2 in liaison with 
Walter Benjamin’s essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction that in the 
United States the specificity of both mass reproducibility and mass persuasion was to link the 
triumph of the idea of social mobility with the fashions and tastes of classes or social groups 
perceived to be higher. Walter Lippmann similarly addresses these concerns in Public 
Opinion- a more sceptic analysis of the rise of public opinion and propaganda, and the 
dangers they possess for the health of American democracy. 
 
Lippmann, like Bernays, shows sensitivity to the difference between the ‘private’ and the 
‘public’ self; in particular he remarks that the latter is ‘stage-managed’ by forces outside 
personal control.
121
 These forces are involved in the creation of a mental environment of 
symbols and perceptions; again like Bernays, Lippmann’s experience in the Committee for 
Public Information exposed him to the highly stylized American wartime propaganda, 
causing him to conclude that ‘the only feeling that anyone can have about an event he does 
not experience is the feeling aroused by his mental image of that event.’122 
However, during peacetime, social symbols become fragmented, as political ideals such as 
national unity in the face of an enemy are of less importance in the everyday life. Lippmann 
notes that as a result, ‘symbolic pictures are no less governant of behaviour, but each symbol 
is far less inclusive because there are so many competing ones.’123 
 
Drawing on his analysis of behaviour in both war and peacetime, and the looming affect of 
social symbolism and public opinion, Lipmann identifies a common factor; that is the 
insertion between man and his environment of a pseudo-environment
124
 (i.e., the pictures in 
our heads). Behaviour is a response to the pseudo-environment, and presumably conditions 
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the manifestation of that pseudo-environment at a ‘mass’ level, i.e., when many people 
exhibit similar behaviour, continuously, to the same constructed (and re-ified) pseudo-
environment. However, the consequences of that behaviour ‘operate not in the pseudo-
environment where the behaviour is stimulated, but in the real environment where action 
eventuates.
125
 Behaviour here means not just physical action, but also thought and emotion 
(i.e., responsive)- and is a contributory factor in the maladjustment of people from their 
pseudo-environment  to their real material environment. In any case, Lippmann argues that 
any potential ‘adjustment takes place through the medium of fictions.126  
 
Hence, to what extent does a technological tool of control, such as propaganda, public 
relations and advertising, entrench the ‘medium’ of fictions even more deeply within society, 
facilitating the composite ruling class to reproduce itself through appeals to a variety of 
emotive fictions? It is argued that the sophistication of propaganda techniques and its 
incorporation into networks of mass production and mass consumption  deepen the 
medium of fictions and increase the conceptual distance between the pseudo-environment 
and real material environment. Furthermore, this ‘conceptual distance’ is a real, lived space 
of socio-cultural practices and ideas that at the very least facilitate the potential for counter-
hegemonic or emergent politics to affect or influence prevailing and dominant hegemonic 
values. This ‘site,’ then- which from the ideas of the Lockean Heartland introduced by Kees 
Van der Pijl I propose is the very development of Civil Society in advanced capitalist 
nations
127
- ‘domesticates’ transnationally circulated ideas of artistic modernism, giving rise to 
an ‘authentic’ aesthetic vision of American national culture, promulgated and spread rapidly 
by co-ordinated and integrated systems of mass persuasion. 
 
“In fact, human culture, is very largely the selection, the rearrangement, the tracing of 
patterns upon, and the stylizing of… ‘the random irradiations and resettlements of our 
ideas.’”128 
 
The above quote begins the basis of Lippmann’s justification of propaganda- particularly the 
assertion that the ‘fictions’ of environment that he speaks of are to a lesser or greater degree 
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created by men themselves. Like Bernays, Lippmann envisages a social and political world of 
such complexity that it exceeds the rational competency of comprehension by the average 
citizen. In addition, its ‘fleetingness’- here taken to mean its rapid transformation and 
potentially disorientating sense of antagonisms and contradictions- requires a stronger mind 
to absorb and explain the subtleties that lie beyond the pseudo-environment of the mental 
picture and characterise the proceedings of the real material environment. The real 
environment (which in any case is understood within the confines of the pseudo-
environment) must be reconstructed into a simpler model before it can be managed, meaning 
that before action has even taken place, the subject is ‘two abstract levels’ detached from 
material reality. 
 
“The analyst of public opinion must begin then, by recognising the triangular relationship 
between the scene of action, the human picture of that scene, and the human response to that 
picture working itself out upon the scene of action.”129 
 
This summarises the two-level abstraction that public opinion (and public relations) experts 
must grasp and act upon in accordance with who they are seeking to advice, and for which 
purposes the advisee needs that information for. This thesis argues that essentially, the 
information (or pictures) garnered by public opinion expertise augments the ability of a ruling 
class order to effectively manipulate the domain of these pictures in order to reproduce itself 
over time, entrench its norms, visions and discursive power into the fabric of social relations, 
and successfully circumvent the potentialities for subversion or counter-hegemonic 
destabilisation through a ‘rephrasing’ mechanism, that being an aesthetic domain (socially 
specific) which is malleable enough to reform itself into another picture. However, if we 
consider the particularities of class structure- or more relevantly the mobile sense of class 
consciousness- in the United States, we can further amplify the sense how hegemony actually 
‘plays out’ under such conditions of mass persuasion. In particular it will be argued that the 
ability of public opinion makers to do what they do is enhanced by the integration of non-elite 
artists and technicians into the mass persuasion industries. Therefore what might appear as a 
‘top-down’ manipulation, is actually a more circular transition of ideas and practices from 
variant and antagonistic social groups, bringing the final, aestheticized form of hegemony a 
grammar that can speak to the multitude in a vernacular already understood, as well as point 
towards future forms of style that likewise associates itself with the idea of class mobility. 
Raymond Williams, I argue in the next chapter, confronts this problem successfully by 
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imagining hegemony as a dialectic circulation of ideas, styles and practices between residual, 
dominant and emergent cultures, and the social groups that embody those cultures. 
 
1.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has reviewed the literature of key issues relevant to the ‘aesthetics of hegemony’ 
in the United States. These include questions of culture, political economy, persuasion and 
power. Despite these works speaking to the problematique of the thesis outlined in the 
Introduction, they all ‘miss’ the moment of hegemony that occurs under Sloanism. 
 
The Frankfurt School perspectives provide a rich source of thinking about the issues of mass 
culture and political economy, but it has been argued that their focus on the totalizing aspects 
of capitalism leaves little role for subordinated social agents to make meaningful changes to 
their society. Furthermore, their attempts to delineate ‘authentic’ art from the products of the 
mass culture- an attribute shared by many cultural commentators- prevents an analysis of 
what meanings individuals might derive for emancipatory possibilities. In other words, by 
portraying almost every aspect of mass culture as a ‘functional’ aspect of the administered 
capitalist world, the reader is left with the impression that all culture only serves to deepen 
the logic of capitalism at a psychological level. There is certainly merit in this perspective- 
for it brings forth questions about how people apprehend their cultural environment in ways 
that may bring legitimacy to the system. But by dismissing the tastes of the masses and 
aspirations that might be created within the structures of mass culture, there appears almost 
no possibility of individual or social groups to break free or contribute to the transformation 
of this totalizing form of capitalism. The next chapter aims to redress this balance by arguing 
that the theoretical tools provided by Walter Benjamin and Raymond Williams provide more 
space for meaningful cultural transformation from subordinate groups- cultural 
transformations that subsequently affect the overall ‘arc’ of hegemony. 
 
Shifting the terrain of neo-Gramscian analysis from ‘Fordism’ to ‘Sloanism,’ it has been 
argued, is necessary in order to fulfill the promise of capturing the ‘hegemonic’ moment. 
David Gartman’s analysis of the history of automobile design provides some respite from the 
overpowering depiction of mass culture provided by the Frankfurt School. He argues that the 
Model T of Henry Ford represents a culmination of resistance and challenges from working 
and lower middle classes to turn the automobile from an elite marketed and designed product 
to a ‘utilitarian’ one. As such, one of the key symbols of the ‘American Way of Life,’ the 
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automobile, should be analysed in terms of its design in order to grasp its social importance. 
By doing this, the aesthetics of mass culture are not ‘functional’ aspects of capitalism, serving 
only to congeal and veil power relations, but the moment in which challenges and 
compromises between classes are ‘consensualized.’ However, Gartman does not address the 
systems of mass persuasion that might make this consensualization possible. In other words, 
the apparatuses through which hegemony can be formulated and articulated through- such as 
the media, or advertising, are not addressed. The next chapter will demonstrate that Walter 
Benjamin’s focus on mass reproducibility in The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical 
Reproduction can provide theoretical ways to conceive of the role of mass persuasion 
industries in this respect. 
 
The Marxist concept of class, it has been argued, lacks the necessary fluidity to capture the 
dynamism of social transformation in the United States. It has been shown in this chapter that 
despite the presence of organized labour in the United States, ‘class consciousness’ has also 
co-existed alongside discourses of social mobility and less antagonistic relationships with 
managers and capitalists. Whilst Mike Davis’ analysis explains the ‘missed’ opportunities for 
national labour organizations to have a meaningful impact on American politics, it missed the 
quest for mobility that the exact ‘exceptional’ conditions in the United States provided for the 
working class. As such, Davis does not interrogate the means by which working classes 
looked to raise their status to lower-middle or middle social classes. And like other Marxists, 
Davis remains anchored in a European conception of class that arbitrates ‘consciousness’ as a 
function of the deceptive qualities of capitalism. The next chapter will present the theory of 
Raymond Williams’ as a way of addressing the cultural meanings that are generated through 
political-economic transformation, and how this impacts in the interplay of norms, values and 
interests between different social groups.   
 
Finally, the ‘deceptive’ qualities of capitalist power are addressed by Bernays and Lippmann. 
Both of these authors, who worked in the Public Relations industries, address the emergent 
medias of mass persuasion and their relevance for American society. Like other 
commentators of their circle, they were fearful of an ‘awakening’ mass society. Bernays in 
particular outlines strategies for an ‘invisible’ government to maintain their power. These 
strategies include the mobilization of national media outlets, the use of ‘fear’ in order to 
legitimate social control, and the use of the latest fashions, styles and tastes to make ruling 
class interests ‘popular.’ These strategies appear to fulfill the idea that capitalist power is 
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driven from above, using art, science, technology and media to falsify consciousness amongst 
the masses. Yet like the other works covered in this review of literature, the ideas of Bernays 
and Lippmann render non-elite groups hopeless in their ability to transform or influence 
structures of power.  
 
The next chapter will then outline the key theories and concepts that restore a sense of social 
agency to non-elite groups. Beginning with the insights of Antonio Gramsci. It will also 
endeavour to provide the ‘aesthetic’ as a more durable category in which this agency can be 
‘captured’ by political-economic analysis of Sloanism. 
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Chapter 2 
Theories and Concepts: Hegemony, Consent and Aesthetics 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter establishes the key theoretical tools and concepts that will be used to analyse the 
processes of hegemony in the United States between 1900 and 1930. The previous chapter 
established a number of deficiencies in the key literature of this period. The following areas 
will be addressed in terms of which processes, social agents and ideas an ‘aesthetic’ approach 
to political economy can contribute to an understanding of hegemony. 
 
Of particular importance is shifting the terms of analysis of this period from Fordism to 
Sloanism. The introductory chapter and review of literature (Chapter 1) establish that 
Sloanism differs from Fordism in placing mass consumption as central to the process of 
hegemony rather as a corollary to mass production as exists in Marxist literature. This shift 
involves placing greater emphasis on the social agents that contribute to the style and design 
of the consumer goods. It also therefore opens up the space for the introduction of counter-
hegemonic ideas and practices, drawn particularly from artistic modernism in the early 20
th
 
century. Sloanism also prioritizes brand differentiation, and the ideals of upward social 
mobility. As such  a theoretical framework of Sloanism requires a certain amount of ‘fluidity’ 
in thinking about social classes and class consciousness. This means that the transformation 
of social desires, tastes and styles is more central than the stability of class values, norms and 
interests. 
 
Re-situating a heuristic neo-Gramscian framework in the Sloanism therefore requires 
sensitivity to the mediums of dissemination values. Integrating the role of art and culture- 
fundamental to the introduction of mass advertising and commodity design that Sloanism 
prioritises- also requires a re-reading of Gramsci to re-examine those elements of art and 
culture present in his writings that can contribute and fulfill the broader arc of neo-Gramscian 
critique.  In other words, in what ways discourses and ideas- even ideologies- circulated 
around society, within social classes and amongst the masses. It must pay closer attention to 
the white collar social group as well, given that a Sloanist political-economic formation 
depicts this class as the most prominent constituency for politicians and business leaders alike 
to ‘pitch’ their directive roles in society towards. This chapter will demonstrate that the neo-
Gramscians do show a sensitivity to the transforming nature of class and the cultural values 
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that can be ascribed to them at different historical junctures. But by keeping the 
categorization anchored in the domain of production, alternative or counter-hegemonic social 
groups outside the realm of the factory (in the case of workers), the attempt to draw out 
values and norms of non-elite becomes limited. Values and norms of the elites are assumed to 
filter down towards subordinate social groups through the pressures generated by labour-
capital compromises. Outside the factory site, layers of management and the rise of 
bureaucratic cadres at a state level are addressed in terms similar to the ‘management 
revolution’ in the corporate world: the creation of new, specialized roles of administrative 
and bureaucratic middle management are depicted as functionaries of capitalist interests. The 
danger here is ascribing this ‘bureaucratic’ mentality to other social groups that also 
contributed to the hegemony of capital, such as those in the advertising industry. 
 
As such, the neo-Gramscian framework of hegemony retains aspects of a ‘base-
superstructure’ model of culture and political economy, with an impression given that the 
‘spontaneous’ moment of consent occurs via a dissemination of ‘norms’ and ‘values’ from 
social agents at the apex of political-economic order. It suggests, in the vein of Gramsci, that 
to grasp the hegemonic moment, the interplay of values, norms and interests of different 
social groups should be addressed. Yet it never quite fulfills that promise. Instead, we are left 
with the nebuleuse of power, as depicted by Robert Cox, a distant constellar power of agents 
and institutions detached and hidden from the view of the rest of society.  
 
In order to address this issue, theoretical tools of ‘cultural’ Marxists will be explained to 
show how this missing moment in neo-Gramscian analysis of political economy can be 
addressed. Firstly, the work of Antonio Gramsci will be compared to draw out the ‘moment’ 
of hegemony in cultural terms. Lukacs argued for a return to realism in artistic production to 
showcase the plight and exploitation of workers. This would address the re-ification of class 
consciousness of working classes, providing an aesthetic of anti-capitalist struggle from 
which the Communist parties of Europe could mobilize working masses. Gramsci, on the 
other hand, as argued by Renate Holub
130, argues the case for a ‘forward-looking’ cultural 
politics, sensitive to the idea that working classes were unlikely to be consuming the products 
of ‘high culture’ as favoured by Lukacs. 
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The enduring relevance of Walter Benjamin’s essay, The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction is then assessed. Benjamin’s essay highlights the demise of the 
authenticity of the artwork under conditions of mechanical reproduction. Crucially, however, 
Benjamin also suggests that the very fact that cultural products are available and graspable by 
subordinate, non-elite groups for the first time has consequences for the socio-cultural order. 
Whereas before, aesthetic criterion of judgement was the preserve of a cultural elite, the mass 
availability of cultural artefacts and mass reproducible artwork takes away power from the 
elite. This is because the ‘common man’ is now free to manipulate and ascribe meaning to 
culture due to the system of mass reproducibility. As such the ideas of freedom and 
emancipation are pre-figured through the collapse of the old cultural order. It suggests that 
political struggles can be fought in the domain of culture as well as in the ‘mainstream’ 
political arena. In these terms, Benjamin’s work is a key contribution to the idea of Sloanism, 
based as it is on a continual requirement to inject commodities and consumer goods with 
cultural meanings. In the United States, the cultural idea of upward social mobility will be of 
particular relevance. 
 
In order to address this, the framework of hegemony outlined by Raymond Williams will 
show that hegemony is a contestable terrain of cultural and aesthetic values. Williams argues 
that the ‘hegemonic moment’ is a form of power in which dominant or ruling elites are 
influenced by ‘residual’ and ‘emergent’ cultures. These can be counter-hegemonic in nature. 
They can provide a new grammar of vocabulary of power for elite whilst at the same time 
integrating the norms and values of counter-hegemonic ideas and practices into the overall 
matrix of political-economic power. It requires a constant sensitivity towards previous forms 
of cultural order and new ones emerging from ‘below.’ In the context of early 20th century 
America, the breakdown of Victorian ideals of culture held by a ‘Custodian’ class is initiated 
by the emergence of modernism, which itself lent the styles, techniques and practices of the 
mass consumption industry. 
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2.2 Returning Gramsci to the Neo-Gramscian School 
Whilst the neo-Gramscians established hegemony as a key concept for critical international 
political economy, it is important to return to the writings of Antonio Gramsci in order to 
extrapolate his nuanced understanding of power processes between contending social groups 
that showcase the important of culture, art and literature in mediating these relationships. For 
if hegemony helps to explain how ‘large groups of people continually acquiesce to, accept 
and sometimes support governments- and entire social and political systems- that continually 
work against their interest,’131 and we accept that the role of advertising art and dissemination 
through media, then we must gain a fuller understanding of how these roles are arbitrated in 
civil society and apprehended in culture. In other words, the distinct power of hegemony as a 
concept opens up the possibility of the acquiescence of subordinate groups being facilitated 
through ideas that are outside the immediate political register. 
 
Furthermore, Gramsci’s cultural writings provide insight into the role of art, theatre, literature 
and journalism, and the role they play in embedding certain norms and values amongst social 
groups. As argued earlier, the relevance of Gramsci in understanding early 20
th
 century 
America lies in how ruling elites managed to gain ‘consent’ during a period of potential 
restive labour upheaval. Re-visiting Gramsci in the same period of Rupert’s Producing 
Hegemony can showcase how his cultural writings  as well as re-worked concepts of 
hegemony, historic bloc, civil society, passive revolution and the social function of the 
intellectual can help us more fully grasp the importance of mass persuasion in realising the 
spontaneous moment of consent outside of the immediate domain of production and 
representative politics. To put it a different way, Gramsci offers insights in to the nature of 
political-economic power as‘..the concrete relations between social classes and political 
representation and the cultural and ideological forms in which social antagonisms are fought 
out or regulated and dissipated.’132 
 
Gramsci wrote that ‘The realization of a hegemonic apparatus , in so far as it creates a new 
ideological terrain , determines a reform of consciousness and of methods of knowledge : it is 
a fact of knowledge, a philosophical fact.’133 The ‘hegemonic apparatus,’ in the early Fordist, 
according to Rupert, ‘was made possible, and its contours shaped, by the development of 
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mass production practices and productivist ideologies.’134 Furthermore, these contours were 
shaped by ‘socio-political struggles…waged on a terrain defined by, the fundamentally 
contradictory nature of liberal capitalist social formations.’135 Rupert’s analysis showcases 
particular struggles waged within the site and relations of production- particularly between a 
more traditional unionism and an emergent set of Fordist practices that showcased a 
paternalistic relationship between management and workers. This issue, of attempts to 
mediate a relatively harmonious relationships between management and workers for a 
common benefitial goal, has been explored in Chapter 1. What needs to be demonstrated, 
however, is the role of ‘common sense,’- one that Rupert identifies with ‘Americanism.’ The 
‘common sense,’ of subordinate groups appears to give way to productivist ideologies rooted 
in the trajectory of American industrial development from the end of the Civil War onwards; 
and Gramsci himself appears to substantiate this as ‘.. Hegemony here is born in the factory 
and requires for its exercise only a minute quantity of professional political and ideological 
intermediaries’136 
Yet this hegemony is also subjected to a dual counter-offensive, in the form of the cultural 
expression of higher wages, as well as the restiveness entailed by labour as a result of 
mechanization and de-skilling. Fordism, accordingly, requires a channeling of this restiveness 
and wage increase in more ‘rational’ ways, as ‘..American industrialists have understood all 
too well this dialectic inherent in the new industrial methods. They have understood that 
'trained gorilla' is just a phrase, that 'unfortunately' the worker remains a man and even that 
during his work he thinks more , or at least has greater opportunities for thinking, once he has 
overcome the crisis of adaptation without being eliminated: and not only does the worker 
think, but the fact that he gets no immediate satisfaction from his work and realises that they 
are trying to reduce him to a trained gorilla which can lead him into a train of thought that is 
far from conformist”137 
It appears then, that any spontaneous moment of consent is also constituted by counter-
hegmeonic impulses. Rupert argues that these impulses to overcome alienation in the site of 
production are ultimately counter-acted within the factory site itself. Ford’s sociological 
department, and the introduction of new layers of management to discipline and monitor the 
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workforce are correctly understood as means of further enhancing control over workers, and 
over time internalzing their consent to exploitative capitalist social relations. 
However, as Chapter 4 will show, this period is also one in which artists and cultural 
producers inspired by radical left wing ideas sought to redress this relationship. As such, it is 
poignant here to consider the function of the ‘social intellectual,’ as Gramsci saw it, to 
understand how culture and art form a serious domain in which counter-hegemonic practices 
are formed and mediated, and how any understanding of the broader arc of capitalist 
hegemony in that period must consider that ‘..the relationship between the intellectuals and 
the world of production is not as direct as it is with the fundamental social groups but is, in 
varying degrees, 'mediated' by the whole fabric of society and by the complex of 
superstructures, of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the 'functionaries.’138 Furthermore, 
the mass persuasion industry of advertising, public relations and media, would develop styles 
and techniques that were commensurate with those being produced by ‘intellectuals’ from 
anarchist and socialist enclaves like Studio 291 and the Ferrer Centre. Reknowned American 
writers like John Dos Passos and Malcolm Cowley likewise contributed to socialist 
magazines such as The New Masses, yet found themselves also articulating particular 
expressions of American national identity that resonated with elite interests in a period of 
social and economic instability.  
I argue in Chapter 5 that figures in the public relations industry like Edward Bernays were 
crucial in creating the linkages between a) marginalised intellectuals that were in a process of 
creating either an emergent or counter-hegemonic culture in their own private work, and b) 
advertising and public relations campaigns designed to influence politics, the economy and 
the spread of public information. Terry Smith shows how a photographer like Charles 
Sheeler- trained in the anarchist Ferrer Centre in New York- went on to imagize Ford’s iconic 
River Rouge plant. The iconological aspect of hegemony is thus rooted in the ability of elite 
groups to appropriate cultural producers who then inscribe capitalist iconology with the 
styles, techniques and content derived from their counter-hegemonic training and inspiration. 
In commodity design- as evidenced by the influence of Bauhaus on household goods
139
- a 
transnational circulation of ideas and values began to influence the visual and popular culture 
of an emerging capitalist modernity in the United States. The task then is to see whether 
Gramsci’s writings on culture can in some sense re-animate a neo-Gramscian reading of early 
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20
th
 century America with the vitality and importance of art and culture to the processes of 
hegemony. 
David Forgacs notes that.. ‘in his notes on popular culture Gramsci tends explicitly to 
privilege written over spoken or visual cultural forms like radio and film, even though the 
latte r were becoming increasingly important in the 1930s. This may be attributable in part to 
a widespread tendency in Italy at that period to identify culture largely with the written 
word.”140 It is therefore worth re-iterating that though Gramsci remained highly sensitive to 
developments in the United States, he brought to his writing structures of thought that were 
anchored in his own experience of time and place, and evades the developing processes of 
mass consumption, advertising and Sloanism more broadly. However, his cultural 
theorisation, was nonetheless sensitive to the manner in which material changes in society 
and economy could bring about ‘a wholesale transformation of people’s conceptions of the 
world and norms of conduct analogous in function and scale to the Protestant Reformation in 
the sixteenth century.’141 Moreover, with regard to those who were capable of producing this 
wholesale transformation, Gramsci understood the decisive nature of mass production society 
in terms of ‘the mode of being of the new intellectual can no longer consist in eloquence, 
which is an exterior and momentary mover of feelings and passions, but in active 
participation in practical life, as constructor, organizer, 'permanent persuader' and not just a 
simple orator.’142 We can detect traces here, of a society being ‘persuaded’ by new 
intellectuals, constructing and organising systems of thought, and perhaps anticipating the 
rational ideals that encompassed the advertising and public relations industry in their 
perception and strategies for persuading an emergent mass society. What we cannot account 
for, however, is the role of ‘feelings and passions’ that likewise play a role in system of mass 
persuasion. A Sloanist framework of political-economic analysis suggests that it is precisely 
those ‘feelings and passions’ that can be inscribed into hierarchical systems of commodity 
marketing. 
David Gartman’s prioritisation of a Sloanist framework crucially suggests that the 
development of strategies of planned obsolescence and brand hierarchisation was in part a 
response by Sloan to working class American demands for access to automobiles that were 
marketed at an income group that was higher than their own. “If social classes do not exercise 
power directly but through political and cultural intermediaries, then the role of these 
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intermediaries - the intellectuals - in maintaining and reproducing a given economic and 
social order (in the exercise of hegemony) , is of decisive importance. In order for the 
working class to challenge that existing order, and become hegemonic in its turn without 
becoming dependent on intellectuals from another class , it must create 'organic' intellectuals 
of its own.”143 
Artists from the Ashcan School, like Robert Henri, set about dismantling the cultural 
hegemony of late 19
th
 century ‘Custodians’ through provocative exhibitions as well as 
teaching his students that experimentation with form, content and materials were more 
important than the figurative imitations of Academy sanctioned art. We might think of 
cultural producers and artists like Robert Henri as social intellectuals attempting through 
culture to challenge the given norms and values of ruling elites and their preference for 
‘traditional ideas of culture.’ 
Yet at the same time, public relations practioners like Edward Bernays represented another 
kind of social intellectual, a direct auxiliary of the capitalist, who “creates alongside himself 
the industrial technician , the specialist in political economy , the organizer of a new culture , 
of a new legal system, etc.”144 
 
As such we can see that the spontaneous moment of hegemony does not arise simply through 
the directive role of elite groups, but requires us to understand the interplay of forces between 
social intellectuals who are in auxiliary service to capitalists, and those who are attempting to 
create a counter-hegemonic culture of resistance. These issues will become clearer in 
Chapters 4 and 5, where examples of both sets of social intellectuals will substantiate this 
claim. For now, it will be instructive to see how those practioners of public relations- social 
intellectuals who are 
145
formed in connection with all social groups, but especially in 
connection with the most important social groups, and they undergo more extensive and 
complex elaboration in connection with the dominant social group.’ 
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2.3 Gramsci, America and Fordism: Shifting the Terrain of Political Economy into 
Culture 
 
“The moment of hegemony involved both the consensual diffusion of a particular cultural and 
moral view throughout society and its interconnection with coercive functions of power.”146 
 
At an early stage of the emerging mass production society in the US, writers such as Walter 
Lippmann and Edward Bernays showcased elite concerns about the harmful potentialities 
inherent in new media forms and the increased access people in everyday life would have to 
wide ranging national and global events. Lippmann in particular was sensitive to the idea that 
news reporting and public relations information (which he calls propaganda, at a time when 
the word did not carry the negative connotations of manipulation which it inherited following 
the Nazi and Stalinist regimes) distorted the ‘true’ (read: rational) nature of events and 
occurrences in society, instead helping to facilitate the ‘pictures in mens minds’ as a means of 
securing any meaningful understanding of society. In other words, the onset of the new mass 
communications age, rather than being an opportunity for an improvement in people’s 
rational knowledge about society and thereby re-energising the quite fragile state of 
American democracy, was instead contributing to the deception of public, holding back key 
information about politics, economy and culture, and creating sublime images of American 
life and international society (particularly prevalent in the wartime experiences of the 
Spanish-American War and World War One) that were papering over the very real problems 
existent already, creating new problems, and exacerbating existing fault lines between 
different groups vying for a stake in the new wealth being generated under the aegis of 
Fordism. Whilst both Lippmann and Bernays remained ambivalent about subordinate social 
groups, Gramsci himself showed remarkable prescience in his attempt to grasp the 
significance of the rise of Fordism and its consequences for revolutionary potential. Adam 
Morton argues that for Gramsci, the ‘moment of hegemony’ included the function of 
intellectuals (and we might include cultural producers and artists as well), and the role played 
by their ideologies as consensual instruments of the intellectual and moral leadership in 
relation to material conditions: 
 
“An integral concept of the state is central to understanding the moment of hegemony 
involving leadership and the development of active consent through social relations of state-
civil society.”147 
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The active reproduction of norms and values, their dissemination and the channels by which 
consent can be achieved, in the concrete historical period of study, is for Gramsci the 
relationship between state and civil society. Here, civil society is to be understood as a 
particular configuration that is historically rooted in the ‘liberal’ or ‘Lockean’ conception of 
state-society complexes, which as Van der Pijl argues is firmly rooted in the Anglo-American 
sphere, and solidifies in the United States prior to its independence from Britain. As such, the 
US and Britain are regarded as exemplars of the development of civil society, made possible 
due to particular conceptions of private property as existing in those society due to the 
presence of the vibrant early mercantile classes that were responsible for co-ordinating 
transatlantic trade, further emboldened by the Protestant settlement of the 13 colonies and the 
ideational structures the settlers brought with them.
148
 
 
For the purposes of this section, ‘civil society’ should be conceived of as an arena or site of 
contestation whereby the generation and norms, values and practices can take place without 
the overbearing influence of a state (as say, in ‘Hobbesian’ state-society complexes). As such, 
it should be regarded also as a site where counter-hegemonic strategies and ideologies can 
take shape and re-shape those of the dominant, hegemonic classes. Raymond Williams 
presciently argues that the key to unlocking the moment of Gramscian hegemony in the 
advanced capitalist west is to attune the presence of both ‘residual’ and ‘emergent’ cultures 
alongside that of the hegemonic culture (which Williams labels the ‘effective and dominant 
culture’).149 Williams believes that it was Gramsci’s intention to conceive of hegemony as a 
typology of power that presupposes the existence of something which is genuinely total, not 
‘secondary nor superstructural in the way ideology was thought of in Marxist theory.’150 
Hegemony is something that permeates to such a depth, and saturates society to such an 
extent that it constitutes the ‘limits of common sense,’ and thus corresponds to the ‘reality of 
social experience much more closely than any notion derived from the formula of base and 
superstructure.’151 
Likewise, Gramsci believed that whilst hegemony can constitute a central system of 
meanings of practices, meanings and values, it is not a static system, and to understand a 
dominant and effective ‘hegemonic’ culture requires pursing the real social processes upon 
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which that culture is constantly indebted to: those processes of incorporation and 
transmission. In other words, we must recognise in developed civil societies such as the 
United States, the notions of ‘hegemony’ and ‘control’ must be augmented by an 
understanding that subordinate, marginalised or residual cultures can be integrated into as 
well as re-shape the broader arc of the hegemonic process, in both the content of its 
articulation and the style of its dissemination.  
 
“...the alternative meanings and values, the alternative opinions and attitudes, even some 
alternative sense of the world, which can be accommodated and tolerated within a particular 
effective and dominant culture.”152 
 
These alternative and oppositional cultural forms can be drawn from both ‘residual’ and 
‘emergent ‘cultures. Very simply, the residual cultures refer to experiences, meanings and 
values drawn from previous social formations that ‘reside’ and continue to be practices, and 
in some cases remain inexpressible in terms of the dominant culture. Emergent cultures on 
the other hand are more complicated because they suggest that new meanings and values, 
new significances and experiences are constantly being created within the dominant culture. 
Gramsci’s allusion was to suggest that in societies with a developed civil society, ‘there is an 
earlier attempt to incorporate them [emergent cultures], just because they are a part- and yet 
not a defined part- of effective contemporary practice.’ As such, at any given point within 
civil society, the hegemonic culture is in an antagonistic but practical contestation with both 
residual cultures that tie it to the past, and emergent cultures that suggest or predict future 
social formations; and both residual and emergent cultures suffer varying degrees of 
incorporation.  
 
As the next chapter will demonstrate, the United States under conditions of emergent Fordist 
political economy as well as the expansion of new media forms, was situated in an ideal 
position for the leading political-economic elites to incorporate and absorb both the residual 
19
th
 century culture of the formerly dominant Custodian class as well as emergent cultures 
from younger social actors, though often drawn from the same class, were fractured by inter-
generational conflicts over cultural meanings in a number of domains including art, 
historiography, the role of women and African-Americans. The ‘gilded age,’ as John Dos 
Passos demonstrates throughout his writing (most notably in Manhattan Transfer and The 
42
nd
 Parallel) foreshadowed trends such as greater acceptance of marginalised African-
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American culture, increased familiarisation (and disturbance) of new and unique metropolitan 
cultures, whilst simultaneously incorporating the cultural conservatism and ‘self-made’ ethics 
of the Custodian era.  
 
In any case, Gramsci’s key contribution was to highlight avenues through which the leading 
political-economic classes could mobilise new techniques to grasp more coherently 
‘emergent cultures,’ particularly of the working classes. His research into Ford’s sociological 
department and the efforts taken to ‘de-sexualise’ workers and engineer a productivity-
orientated consensus amongst them is just one of many avenues that became opened up 
during the early 20
th
 century in America through which a precarious hegemony could 
continue to be exercised in the face of widespread demographic and cultural transformation. 
The next section will argue that as a result of the rise of new media coupled with the 
‘incorporation’ of modernist art and ideas, we can theorise the process of hegemony, control, 
and more broadly the transformation of capitalist social relations in terms of Aesthetics.  
 
2.4 The ‘Space’ for Aesthetics 
 
Aesthetics should be considered centrally to the neo-Gramscian notion of hegemony, as it 
offers a dialectic portal for interrogating the very ‘norms’ and ‘values’ that supposedly 
anchor dominant social formations and the elite power that lays behind it. It glimpses (or 
‘refracts’) power not as an definitive, organized structure through which we can discern the 
values and norms of leading or dominant social groups within that structure, but rather as a 
totality whose depth permeates social relations to such an extent that it sets the limits of 
‘common sense,’ and the parameters of discourses related to social transformation and/or 
revolution. In other words, by providing theoretical and epistemological space for the role of 
emotion, sentiment, the arbitration of culture and arts during periods of economic 
rationalization and socio-cultural transformation (as is the case with the United States 
between 1900 and 1930), we may more fully realise the importance of residual and emergent 
cultures that are either counter-hegemonic or radical in their form and/or content.  
 
Precisely because aesthetics is necessarily involved with the articulation and appraisal of 
ideas of beauty, sublimity, revulsion and disgust, this chapter aims to demonstrate that 
understandings of the key ideas of progress and civilization, have from the mid-19
th
 century 
onwards been articulated either implicitly or overtly as characterisations of the society and 
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economic system that produces a particular culture. This perspective is seen at first most 
clearly in the work of John Ruskin and William Morris in Britain during the mid to late 
Victorian period, who argued for the harnessing of modern, industrial, machine-led 
production by working classes in order to both i) recover the sense of loss of craftsmanship 
and artisanal input brought about by technological innovation and de-skilling and ii) create an 
ideal-type society through proper design. It is these twin-set of concerns- recovering the role 
of the working man and restoring a sense of dignity and pride to his labour and mobilising 
the technological developments in industry to create, produce and design an ideal, ‘beautiful’ 
society that lay at the heart of a succession of transnationally anchored art-in-industry 
movements from the late 19
th
 century. The Art Workers Guild established in 1884 in Britain, 
followed by the The Society for Arts and Crafts (1897) in the United States and the Deutsche 
Werkbund (1907) were such organizations that primarily focused on handicrafts and 
architecture, and were all heavily influenced by the work of Ruskin and Morris, and are all 
considered forerunners to the Bauhaus School, who under the leadership of Walter Gropius 
initiated a more politically-charged project to work on the concept of design unity- unity of 
form and function. Furthermore, these organizations and the ideas they fostered were 
reactions against the over-ornamentation of late Victorian handicrafts, associating it the crass 
materialism and ‘conspicuous’ consumption of that period. As such, the overall legacy of 
‘art-in-industry’ and the critical contemplations and design projects of these sometimes 
radical practioners was to elevate the form of cultural artefacts and their design/production 
process as potential arbiters of social relations during a period of intense political-economic 
transformations in advanced Western capitalist societies of the time; transformations that 
reflected both the advancement of industrial planning as well as the increasingly fractured 
social or class relationships that underpinned them. 
 
In what ways, then, is capturing culture an important arbiter of social relations? In the context 
of early 20
th
 century United States, the thesis is fundamentally arguing that social 
relationships were arbitrated in an aesthetic manner that sat alongside as well as bypassed 
seemingly more orthodox means of class control.  
 
The neo-Gramscian theorization of this process, as I have outlined in section 1 of this 
chapter, makes clear that the Fordist political-economic complex was based on a series of 
compromises and concessions between capital and labour resolved internally in the 
production process itself. That is to say, the long path to full mechanization and completely 
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standardized, interchangeable production witnessed a gradual de-skilling of the worker, 
whose alienation was to be compensated by increased wages and access to the rising mass 
consumption marketplace. In this way, American capitalist leaders, manifested most 
obviously in the figure of Henry Ford, successfully controlled antagonistic class conflict 
already present in the United States since the 1860s (before the onset of the Great Depression. 
The consolidating model of controlling class conflict pioneered by Henry Ford would then go 
onto become a cornerstone of Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal Programme which also more 
fervently embraced on a national-scale the kind of industrial planning associated with the 
developments made at the River Rouge plant
153
. As such, hegemony in this respect appears to 
operate as a well negotiated consensus between capital and labour, with disruption and 
conflict further ameliorated through institutions such as Ford’s sociological department to 
monitor worker’s behaviour and condition. 
 
However, another crucial aspect of the emerging Fordist Political Economy was the growth 
of mass consumption as an increasingly everyday phenomenon for white collar social groups 
in the United States. The maintenance and expansion of this marketplace can be intuitively 
explained by the growth of both advertising and public relations- and the rise of mass 
persuasion complex that intertwined the creative and artistic fashioning of national 
advertising with developments in broadcast and print media. In order for this process to 
unravel successfully, David Gartman argues that an aesthetic dimension should be appraised, 
in other words the search, in political-economic terms, of those forces that galvanized the 
mass consumption market, what made it a culturally legitimate site of playing out class 
antagonisms and achieving perceived socio-cultural advances.
154
 In particular, the idea of 
achieving social mobility, became synonymous with an aspirational materialism that 
celebrated emulative consumption as an aesthetic measure of individuals or families (or even 
whole groups) ability to rise through that ladder of mobility. The following chapter will deal 
in more detail about the shifts in the class structure in American Society concomitous to the 
rise of Fordism that fostered this sense of aspirational materialism, in particular the numerical 
rise of the ‘White Collar’; a perceived social group whose occupational roles (mainly taking 
their places in the lower and middle sections of the managerial hierarchy that accompanied 
the Taylorist and Fordist transformations), who were thought to hold the ‘average’ values and 
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interests of the ordinary American citizen. Their ‘demands’ in the marketplace for more 
accessible and cheaper household goods that in the mid to late 19
th
 century would have been 
considered luxury items reserved for the consumption of the ‘leisure classes,’ are seen to 
‘enact’ the process of both modern advertising and political-economic public relations 
 
 
2.5 The Lineage of Marxist Aesthetics: Lukacs and Gramsci  
 
“The construction of the aesthetic artefact is inseparable from the construction of the 
dominant ideological forms of modern class society, and indeed from the whole new form of 
human subjectivity appropriate to that social order.”155 
 
Marxist theorisation and critique of aesthetics begins in earnest with the publication of Georg 
Lukacs’ Theory of the Novel (1920) and History and Class Consciousness (1923). In these 
texts, Lukacs had two primary theoretical goals; firstly, to galvanise the Marxist analysis of 
culture, its relation to the transformations in production and the social relations of production, 
and the way in which culture could be used to embed the political-economic project of 
ascendant bourgeois groups; and secondly, to organise a theoretical perspective of aesthetics 
that could ‘characterise the constitution of particular relationships between the truth of 
artwork and falsity of everyday thinking.’156 As such, it should be noted that Lukacs’ theory a 
priori assumed that the socio-economic conditions of capitalism generated a false 
consciousness amongst working class individuals, and impacted detrimentally on their 
ideational and organisational capabilities as the revolutionary subject of socialism. In the 
context of the perceived ‘failure’ of Communist Party-led revolution in the advanced 
industrial Western European countries during the crisis years of the First World War, Lukacs’ 
theory can be read as an attempt to mobilise hitherto unheralded sections of society into the 
project of re-invigorating the Western European revolution. Specifically, Lukacs elucidates 
on the potential role that artists and writers could play in re-orientating the consciousness of 
working class groups back towards revolutionary ideals, as opposed to the acquiescence to 
the bourgeois nation-state that had been demonstrated throughout the First World War.
157
  
 
This, I would argue, is the first key Marxist elucidation of the role of culture and the arts in 
social revolution after the effects of industrial modernization (to put Fordism in a different 
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way) could be ascertained first hand in the context of the brutality of the mechanized First 
World War.
158
 For the purposes of this theory chapter, Lukacs’ key contribution was to 
elevate the role of artists and social agents involved in the creative industries in terms of what 
kind (i.e., form) of art and cultural artefacts should be produced in order to transform the false 
consciousness of working class individuals and groups. As such, it highlights the agency of 
social groups outside those that appear to have a more direct interest in the maintenance of 
the capitalist system. What Lukacs does not confront, however, are indeed the very values 
and norms that these cultural producers would bring with them in terms of transcending the 
‘false consciousness of everyday thinking’; rather, his specific contribution was to advise the 
writers of the period to embrace the literary realism of mid-to-late 19
th
 century authors. 
Lukacs rejected the modernist art and literature of the 1920s because he believed it incapable 
of artistically reproducing the total view of the tensions and contradictions accompanying the 
teleologically necessary transformation from one society to another. With the modernist focus 
on the shock of the new and the breakdown of the old order, Lukacs advocated a judgement 
of literary texts that could evoke or mirror-image the struggles of society: 
 
“Authentic literature…is that which reproduces the essentials of reality, which for Lukacs, in 
the twentieth century, means the decline of capitalism and the class that carried it forwards, 
the bourgeoisie, and by inference, and of necessity, the rise of an emergent world historical 
class, the proletariat.”159 
 
Nevertheless, Lukacs opened up a number of concerns- the issue of re-ification, the fetishized 
consciousness of ‘everyday thinking’ and the  subject’s false reflection of reality that can 
only be overturned (or politically challenged) through the ‘truth’ content of the artwork that 
directly contrasts that falsity through a ‘totalizing perspective that draws essence and 
appearance into a unity.’160 These concerns together addressed what a number of Marxist and 
critical theorists would subsequently interrogate: the representation of reality as it appears at 
the social surface. At stake, according to Lukacs, was the manner in which class relationships 
could appear as ‘normal,’ at the ‘surface level,’ and particularly how the leading or dominant 
classes could articulate their capitalist power interests as interests of the general society. 
Moreover, the ability of leading elites to create and maintain a politico-ideological 
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representation that falsifies working class consciousness (and thus articulate their interests as 
general interests) is transferred to the domain of culture, and the production of artworks and 
cultural artefacts.
161
 History and Class Consciousness, then, can stand not only as a 
theoretical elucidation on the role of culture and art in socialist revolution, but also as a 
statement of praxis, almost a ‘call to arms’ to the artists and cultural producers of the day to 
use their talent and creative intuition in artistic reflection to ‘totalise the essence and 
appearance to expose the fundamentally distortive nature of the fetishized appearance,’162 and 
adhere to principles of literary realism which allow the ‘pertinent preconditions and 
motivations out of which the consciousness of the characters arises and develops.’163 
 
Whilst this thesis does not interrogate the modernist literature of early 20
th
 century America, 
the ‘cultural objects’ in focus that were produced by the advertising and public relations 
nexus have been described by Michael Schudson as broadly following the tenents of 
‘capitalist realism,’164 an idealized and stylized depiction of everyday life, that through 
analysis of people’s fears and insecurities in their daily habitat, re-created a vision of 
American life in the way it ought to be.
165
 In relation to Lukacs’ advocation of art that 
depicted the reality of working class life and a perspective that would unravel the re-ified 
class power relationships of hierarchically organised bourgeois capitalist society, the 
‘capitalist realism’ developing in the American Advertising industry tended to focus on the 
key demographic and occupational backgrounds that were presumed to ‘carry in their values 
and aspirations the mass way of American life.’166 As such, I would argue that whilst the 
focus of Lukacs’ realism was the consolidation and political organization of working classes 
(through a new consciousness that eclipses the re-ified, surface level manifestation of 
capitalist power relations), the capitalist realist aesthetic developing in the advertising 
industry focused on the emulative aspirations of an emergent white collar, lower-middle class 
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demographic whose unique place at the time was to be both scorned by traditional working 
classes and often mocked by the pre-existent upper-middle and elite classes.
167
  
 
Siegfried Kracauer makes a similar observation about white collar workers in Weimar 
Germany- the ‘salaried masses,’168 with no traditional political party representing their as yet 
undefined interests, rejecting the contemporaneous organized working class (in both radical 
and conservative trade unions) as well as being rejected by the pre-existent middle classes. 
Kracauer’s unique ‘montage’ of these office-based workers in Germany highlights a number 
of key issues that would become central to The Culture Industry thesis of Theodor Adorno 
and Max Horkheimer, such as their political and cultural ‘homelessness,’ their sense of drift, 
lurking anxieties (which remained unexplored during his period of study), but most 
importantly their susceptibility to what he deems ‘distraction industries,’; the cinema theatre, 
kitsch novels, and household department stores.
169
  
So whilst Lukacs believed a return to the tenents of literary realism would transform the re-
ified consciousness of the working masses, he failed to confront the actual social class or 
group that was coming into being- the white collar lower-middle classes- and how they might 
receive and interpret such realism. In the case of the United States, the aesthetic of capitalist 
realism instead fostered the sense of emulation and aspirational materialism that would be 
advertised as the ‘American Dream.’ A dream it might still remain, but crucially by 
integrating the very real and lived desire of lower-middle classes to ascend the ladder of 
social mobility
170
 into the imagization of early 20
th
 century American life, the artists and 
writers of the time provided the techniques and styles that underpinned the aesthetic of 
capitalist realism. As such, the Lukacsian account of Marxist aesthetics, concerned as it is 
with the production of artworks, and primarily the content of artworks, fails to address the 
reception of artwork, alternative meanings that might be discerned from them, or indeed how 
antagonistic ideals drawn from residual or emergent cultural values might co-exist or even 
combine with each other to aesthetically embody individuals’ or groups’ political aspirations. 
As I will argue in the next chapter that primarily those political aspirations in the United 
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States were more concerned with mobility rather than class consolidation
171
 and in this sense 
both Gramsci and Benjamin provide a less structured but more intuitive and creative way of 
thinking about the role of art and culture during the era of mass production. Whereas Lukacs 
rejected Modernism, Gramsci shared with modernist artist the concern of how artworks and 
cultural artefacts are received. I will argue in the next section of the his chapter that Benjamin 
extended this even further, but for now it is worth  engaging with Gramsci’s own thoughts. 
 
Firstly, Gramsci grounded his analyses in the context of the gradually diminishing role of 
artisanal and skilled producers and the rise of replaceable, unskilled mass production through 
machine technology. Renate Holub argues that Gramsci believed that Lukacs’ focus on ‘high 
literature,’ as a means of transforming revolutionary consciousness and the role of writers in 
their historic role in the world revolution was missing the point and uniqueness of the early 
Fordist period; the writers Lukacs would have adhering to literary realism would not be read 
by the disadvantaged social classes in any case, and the proletariat as it existed in the early 
20
th
 century were already showing a preference for serialized novels, trivial literature, pop 
novels, detective novels, and ‘kitsch in general.’172 
 
“In an era that increasingly facilitates the reproducibility of literary and cultural texts, and 
thus the mobilization of systems of signification in the individual act of reading, Lukacs’ 
concern with a realistic, denotative depiction of reality, with its positing of a consuming 
rather than meaning-producing reader, seem not ahead but behind the times.”173 
 
As with Raymond Williams, both Gramsci and Lukacs- and the Frankfurt School- aimed at 
re-established a genuine sense of dialectical interplay between the base of economic relations 
of production, and the superstructure of the social relations of production. Questions of 
‘culture’ had figured somewhat evasively in the Marxist canon, with many writers relegating 
the role and production of culture as a consequential manifestation of whatever the economic 
base required for its reproduction over time. The differences for Holub are that Lukacs 
organises his thoughts on realism and modernism as a part of an ‘overall philosophical and 
aesthetic system.’ Gramsci on the other hand, approached the literary sphere as a part of an 
overall project and in relation to it- a ‘philosophy on praxis.’ At a more basic level, Lukacs 
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dogmatic, though well meaning concerns about underscoring the revolutionary or 
transformatory potential of literacy realism appears as a conservative approach, assuming 
familiarity with a canon that was established during the era of high national romanticism and 
broadly focused on bourgeois society and its agents. Lukacs ultimately set out to write a 
definitive theory of Marxist aesthetics, whereas I think Gramsci is more attuned to the 
relationship between aesthetics and culture and political economic transformation. More 
importantly, he perceived the problem that arises in conceptualising this relationship as an 
active process, where cultural matters and leitmotifs that are mobilised to bring about a 
heuristic apparatus of praxis are in danger of already being redundant in the social sphere, 
either through absorption into the hegemonic norms of the time, distortion through that same 
process or engagement with groups, and finally being excised altogether. As such, I believe 
Gramsci envisioned a form of political economy and state power that was a careful mediation 
between the pressures being generated ‘from below’ (that is, the economic configurations of 
production) and the multifaceted cultural context, where the realms of ideas, ideologies, art, 
tradition and international cultural influence co-existed and shaped new meanings. This 
interplay is a vital step forward from previous Marxist attempts to grasp the cultural question, 
and removes the inertia of hegemonic power as conceived in the Coxian sense, which appears 
to manifest ‘from above,’ and distilled through a variety of ideational and institutional 
branches into a consensus-forming structure of social relations from which there appears little 
or no room for antagonistic or counter-hegemonic social agents ‘from below’ to transform 
those consensus forming structures. 
 
2.6  The Relevance of Walter Benjamin  
 
“In ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction (1935)’ Benjamin suggests that 
the end of the particularly rich forms of experience that inform the works of Goethe, Marx 
etc., actually signifies the possible advent of revolutionary radical political change. This is 
because in the age of mechanical reproduction works of art do not need to be performed live 
or experienced as unique and original.”174 
 
The loss of ‘aura,’ and the termination of the an authentic experience of artwork forms the 
bases of Benjamin’s essay The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, and 
similar to the position of Marcuse, points to ‘aesthetics as a form of noninstrumental 
cognition.’175 Accordingly, Benjamin believes that the mode of reception under conditions of 
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mechanical reproduction opens up the possibility- a unique historic moment- that the ‘weight 
of tradition,’ becomes transformed, and begins to sever the relationship between the cultural 
elite and the masses. Denoting a transfer from authentic experience to the ‘shock,’ Darrow 
Schecter argues that for ‘Benjamin it is a shock accompanied by realisation that humanity has 
entered into a phase where hierarchy is no longer the necessary price of survival.’176 
 
There is revolutionary poignancy of Benjamin’s analysis for the potential of the masses to 
overthrow the weight of history. When we consider how this might apply in the United 
States, it is important to note that in a society where the discursive strength of the idea that 
the nation was born by throwing off the shackles of class domination and traditional 
hierarchy,
177
the ideals of political emancipation- ‘rights of franchise, expression, assembly 
and representation,’178 and therefore the terrain of political-economic contestation itself must 
be considered according to the historic formation of American society. Whilst Benjamin’s 
idea that ‘adaptation of human perception to industrial modes of production and 
transportation, especially the radical reconstruction of spatial and temporal relations,’179 may 
strike resonance in all societies undergoing the modernizing transformations of the early 20
th
 
century, the specificity of the American experience lies in the differentially articulated class 
relationships that developed during the course of the 19
th
 century. As such the 
‘democratization of expertise which upsets the traditional hierarchy between author and 
reader/viewer,’180 that is initiated by systems of mass reproducibility in the arena of culture 
and visual arts may indeed transform the experience of artworks into a ‘shock,’ but in the 
United States this shock is accompanied by a moulding of culture into precisely the 
‘democratic’ form that had been the promise of American history.181 The images produced 
and reproduced during this period were of course not just the artefacts of ‘high culture,’ but a  
range of new forms from cartoon strips, photojournals and advertising tableaux that infused 
modernist styles and techniques with a cross-section of pre-existent ‘fables of abundance,’ 
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that reinforced the idea that economic scarcity had been transcended.
182
 Furthermore, the very 
upsetting of traditional hierarchies taking place within the relationship of producer and viewer 
had their counterpart in the breakdown of cultural hierarchies between the Custodian espousal 
of Western European, academy-trained and anointed artistic styles and the Modernist/Avant-
garde onslaught that disrupted the cultural hegemony of the Custodians at a national level 
following the Armoury Show of 1913.
183
  
 
As such the resonance of Benjamin’s idea that reproducibility of art and culture for the study 
of hegemony in political economy is not so much the transforming relationship between 
producer and viewer itself, but the implications this has for the social agents’ comprehension 
of the social and political-economic system itself. In its most emancipatory rendering, 
‘Benjamin’s acute sensitivity to the political possibilities offered in periods of historical 
transition,’ and his rejection of ‘historicist notions of linear time in favour of a messianic 
vision of time in which moments of truth from the past, present and future are distilled and 
intersect,’184 showcases a surprising theoretical concomitance with the unfolding practices of 
a Sloanist political-economic formation in which the rise of a complex of mass persuasion 
issues particular creative industries such as advertising the task of producing and designing 
the images necessary to cultivate the emulative and aspirational values amongst the public. 
These images drew in both style and content from 19
th
 century American discourses of 
abundance and prioritised a vision of the American as independent, in control of their destiny, 
and imbued with the ‘pioneer spirit’ of the hard-working, fearless and ‘straight-talking’ 
characters that carried out the taming of the continent and the manifest destiny of white, 
Anglo-Saxon Protestant settlers.
185
 Yet they were also infused with a sensibility of modern, 
consumption-orientated capitalist values, correlating the social desire for economic mobility 
with a vision of commodity accumulation and stylistic emulation with an ‘authentic’ 
American culture.
186
 Finally, the techniques and styles mobilised to galvanise the imagization 
itself were borrowed from early, experimental modernist and avant-garde artists, whose focus 
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on ‘shock,’ individuality and freedom from cultural hierarchy both socially legitimized the 
expansion of market values.
187
 Here we therefore witness a tripartite ‘integration’ from the 
past, present and future in the iconology of a Sloanist society, which as Benjamin poignantly 
elucidates: 
 
“In the dialectical image, the pastness of a particular epoch is always also “things as they 
always have been.” As such, though, at times it comes into view only at a very specific epoch: 
that is, the epoch in which humanity, rubbing its eyes, suddenly recognizes the dream image 
as such. It is at that point that the historian takes on the task of dream interpretation.”188 
 
So for Benjamin, this period of mass reproducibility, the ‘opening’ up of culture, its 
availability to the masses, and the variety of potential different meanings they might derive 
from this new world is akin to waking up from a dream, to be confronted only by a series of 
dream like ‘dialectical images,’ that confront the memory of the past and the chaos of the 
present simultaneously, allowing the residual values and ideas of the past to co-exist, no 
matter how antagonistically, with those values of the present and the intimations of the 
future: 
 
“It isn’t that the past casts its light on the present or the present casts its light on the past: 
rather, an image is that in which the Then and the Now come into a constellation like a flash 
of lightning. In other words: image is dialectics at a standstill. For while the relation of the 
present to the past is a purely temporal, continuous one, the relation of the Then and the Now 
is dialectical- not development but image, leaping forth.”189 
 
It is important to note however a common thread that runs through Lukacs, Gramsci and 
Benjamin; that is the subject of ‘emancipation,’ the working classes, remain for them rooted 
in the consolidating model of class that was particular to the experience of Western European 
working class movements. That is to say, the terms of ‘progress,’ for this class remain 
straight-jacketed in a conception of social hierarchies in which ‘freedom,’ and 
‘emancipation,’ requires an overthrow of the prevailing system, preferably for Lukacs and 
Gramsci under the guise of a Communist Party.
190
 The values of this organized political 
agency are assumed to be counter-hegemonic, without confronting the potentiality of those 
values changing other than being subjected to the re-ified value of the culture industry. They 
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do not confront how the mass reproducibility of art may impact on the emergent white collar 
classes, nor particularly what the mediums of this reproducibility might lend to the 
maintenance of power. What Benjamin does offer, however, is the way in which potentially 
antagonistic ideals of culture and art can be reconciled in the ‘dialectical’ image and how 
people could derive new meanings- even a new language of social transformation through 
this process: 
 
“The creative process...consists of an unconscious animation of the archetype and of its 
elaboration into a complete work. The shaping of the original image is to some extent a 
translation of it into the language of the present..Therein lies the social significance of art...it 
brings those forms to the surface, that the spirit of the age most lacked. The nostalgia of the 
artist retreats from dissatisfaction with the present until it reached that primal image in the 
unconscious that serves...to compensate for..the one-sidedness of the spirit of the age. His 
nostalgia seizes upon the image, and as he brings it..into consciousness, the image changes 
its shape until it can be adapted by contemporary man to his own context.”191 
 
In this way, the ‘common’ man is free to manipulate and imbue with meaning the images he 
now has access to in a system of mass reproducibility.
192
 What I would like to stress here 
however, is the potential reading of artworks alongside a dominant culture that in the early 
20
th
 century appeared to be drifting rapidly towards those of what the Frankfurt School would 
deem as ‘instrumental,’- that is the increasingly rationalized and mechanized system of 
production and its ancillary counterparts in the managerial revolution (bringing specialization 
and compartmentalization of knowledge) and the social sciences. Critical theories of political 
economy tend therefore to surmise these rationalizing tendencies as exemplar forms of social 
and political-economic control. The departure point for this thesis is that those processes were 
also dialectically rendered through an aestheticization of the political-economic system that 
maintained its viability and legitimacy through the creation of an iconology that celebrated 
values that were not necessarily the pecuniary, accumulative values of the dominant capitalist 
classes. Rather, the transforming social structure of the United States- particularly the rise of 
a numerically dominant white collar social group as well as those drawn from elites who 
were more at ease with the ‘beat and tempo of modernity’ than their parents- witnessed an 
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intersection of contending ideas and values, broadly implicated in the responses to 
modernization and urbanization; some of the more politically charged groups (such as the 
‘anarchist’ modernists of Studio 291 and the Ferrer Centre as I will show in Chapter 4) even 
articulated their responses in terms of a critique of capitalism itself.
193
 
 
In this way, it is useful to turn to the thought of Raymond Williams. Williams reflects on 
hegemony as process of power so deep and inescapable, one that sets the limits of ‘common 
sense.’ However, as with Benjamin, they both recognize the political and social potentials 
opened up by new forms of artistic and cultural practices, that the idea of ‘common sense’ 
itself is under a permanent stress of being overcome. Williams is also more specific about the 
way in which we can understand this process through a re-configuration of the way in which 
cultural values intertwine with changing structures of social hierarchy. By identifying the 
existence of ‘residual’ and ‘emergent’ cultures alongside that of the seemingly dominant, he 
shows that the mutual interplay of these values affect and re-articulate one and another. I 
would go one step further and suggest at a unique juncture of political-economic history- the 
rise of Sloanism in the United States- the hegemony of a ruling class did not rest solely upon 
the carrying through of their dictats and creating a broad consensus within society through 
rationalized manipulation of mass persuasion complex, but rather the way in which 
discordant and sometimes oppositional values from social groups and classes outside the 
dominant came to affect that hegemony. Furthermore, this process helped to both articulate 
and legitimate what both C. Wright Mills and David Gartman have identified as a desire for 
mobility that emanated from the working classes and lower-middle classes. Finally, the rise 
of the mass persuasion complex itself, with a mixture of highly instrumentalized Public 
Relations campaigns, technical developments in media on the one hand, and a celebration of 
the ‘new’ and ‘modern’ through the integration of modernist artistic movements and focus on 
fashion-styles and individual tastes witness an intertwining of the supposedly ‘rational’ 
transformation based on calculation, planning and utility-based decision making and a highly 
sentimentalized, emotive aesthetic based on particular expression and judgments on fear, 
disgust and beauty. 
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2.7 Raymond Williams: Re-configuring Agency in Hegemony 
 
If Benjamin’s key contribution to the theoretical framework of this thesis is the way in which 
mass reproducibility severs traditional cultural hierarchies in favour of a potentially new 
phase of human political history (one in which the terms of emancipation and progress are 
derived through the ‘shock’ of cultural liberation), Raymond Williams’ appropriation of the 
Gramscian notion of hegemony allows us to take a closer inspection at the manner in which 
‘values’ and ‘norms’ are arbitrated by different social groups. His heuristic framework 
appears on the surface quite simple and intuitively obvious, yet as I am arguing for this thesis, 
it holds a particular resonance for the way in which critical IPE analyses the processes 
involved in the legitimization of power in political-economic formations, and the classes that 
issue dominance over others through consensus creation. Whilst the Frankfurt School appear 
to maintain (without confronting the issue directly) that this consensus is maintained through 
a totalization of the culture industry and instrumentalization of all aspects of knowledge, 
Williams offers a more nuanced approach that includes the real, lived practices and ideas of 
counter-hegemonic groups in the creation of that consensus, subsequently altering the 
configuration of the norms, values and socio-cultural attitudes of the ‘hegemon.’ 
 
To begin with, Williams understands hegemony as something that is genuinely total, rather 
than secondary or superstructural; furthermore, the idea of hegemony as deeply saturating the 
consciousness of society goes beyond the notion of totality in the sense that it emphasises the 
facts and practices of domination, allowing theory and practice to rescue the notion of human 
social agency.
194
 In this sense, a theorist of hegemony needs to be fully attuned to the rate and 
experience of social change- to detect those forms and practices that contribute to the 
‘saturating’ of individual and collective consciousnesses. For Williams, the failures of 
Marxist cultural theory reflect an epistemological focus on epochal questions rather than 
historical ones, meaning the drive of cultural theorization in Marxist and Critical theory 
focuses on main ‘transition’ points (say, from the feudal to capitalism, or Fordist to Post-
Fordist). In this way, Williams argues that Marxist cultural theory has been left bereft of how 
different ‘moments’ in these phases transform the architectures of power. Furthermore, 
epochal focused theorization gives no weight to how the values or norms of leading or 
dominant classes transform themselves in a non-instrumental way (i.e., what values are suited 
                                                 
194
 Williams, Raymond Problems in Materalism and Culture: Selected Essays, London: Verso, 1980 pg. 37 
92 
 
best to continue the over-arching project of deepening and extending capitalist social 
relations).
195
 
 
Williams' reconstruction of hegemony begins with identifying a ‘central system of practices, 
meanings and values,’ that are effective enough to resist complete overhauling: 
 
“It is a set of meanings and values which as they are experiences as practices appears as 
reciprocally confirming. It thus constitutes a sense of reality for most people in society, a 
sense of absolute because experiences reality beyond which it is very difficult for most 
members of the society to move, in most areas of their lives.”196 
 
However, this ‘central system’ is not static, and we can only actually understand the 
dominant and effective culture if we understand the real social process upon which it is 
constantly indebted to; the process of incorporation. The education system is regarded as the 
key agency of the ‘transmission’ of a dominant culture, embedding norms from an early age. 
At a theoretical and historical level, this process is facilitated by the selective tradition; that 
which within the terms of an effective dominant culture is passed off as ‘the tradition,’ ‘the 
significant past.’197 Here, the selectivity itself is the point. We might think of it as akin to the 
editing process in 20
th
 century media, the ability to conceal information, ideas, facts, different 
visions, rendering only what can be seen as significant or real. 
 
Thus, from an entire spatio-temporal area of past and present, certain meanings and practices 
are allowed emphasis and celebration; others are negated, neglected or excluded. Even those 
which are carried through to attain contemporary significance are subject to the 
reinterpretation and dilution of the dominant culture, to the extent that they support or at least 
not contradict that culture. The ‘effective and dominant’ culture that Williams speaks of, 
then, are the terms and conditions of the Hegemon, but should be understood primarily as in a 
perpetual state of transformation and re-shaping. Whilst it provides the lexicon of what is 
possible in the realm of ‘common sense,’ it must also be sensitive to emergent and residual 
cultures that provide its antagonisms and contradictions. What is important to understand is 
that it is not an imposed ideology- for if it were, it might be more easily identifiable and easy 
to throw off its shackles. As hegemony is continually active and adjusting, as it reaches, 
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selects, organizes and interprets our experience, we must recognise “the alternative meanings 
and values, the alternative opinions and attitudes, even some alternative sense of the world, 
which can be accommodated and tolerated within a particular effective and dominant 
culture.”198 
 
In this respect the idea of hegemony and the social agents it requires for its maintenance as a 
lived experience rather than abstract concept is considerably broadened out, and indeed 
makes the matrix of inter-linking relationships between these groups seem more confusing. 
However, as noted in the previous paragraph, it also shows that ‘dominant’ forms of political-
economic practices and the ideational anchorage in which it gains socio-cultural legitimacy 
are not imposed from above in a coherent project of class rule (even though it might manifest 
as a co-ordinated bid for control), as suggested by Edward Bernays in Propaganda. Rather, 
that ideational anchorage must be considered as a site for the contestation of cultural and 
political-economic values. This contestation must also take into account the historically 
specifically moment when the ‘masses’ begin to be confronted by leading political-classes. 
Their power to transform prevailing norms appears to be made redundant by the schematic 
laid out by Bernays (who belittles them as ‘rubber stamps,’) and the more rigid, orthodox 
base-superstructural models. Rather, if we take Benjamin’s theory of mechanical 
reproduction of artwork as the point in which the wider public (working classes and white 
collar classes) become an important political and cultural constituency, we witness politicians 
and capitalists alike having to ‘delve’ down below, to search their aspirations, their stylistic 
preferences and their political voice. This is demonstrated in David Gartman’s Auto Opium 
and in the case study presented on Edward Bernays’ work on the election campaign of Calvin 
Coolidge in the final chapter. 
 
“Indeed it is significant in our own period how very early this attempt is, how alert the 
dominant culture now is to anything that can be seen as emergent.”199 
 
Alternative and oppositional forms to hegemony are most commonly drawn from what 
Williams designates either ‘residual’ or ‘emergent’ cultures. Williams claims that in the case 
of ‘residual’ cultures, experiences, meanings and values drawn from previous social 
formations ‘reside’ and continue to be practised, and remain inexpressible in terms of the 
dominant culture. The most obvious case of residual cultures is religious values within the 
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first capitalist societies. Williams somewhat confusingly contends that ‘most religious 
meanings and values’ have already been incorporated into the dominant system, ignoring the 
way in which they might have helped shape the form of that dominant system from the 
outset, whilst also maintaining that some religious meanings continues to remain outside the 
dominant culture and thus residual. Emergent cultures are more complicated because they 
suggest that new meanings and values, new significances and experiences are constantly 
being created within the dominant culture. Therefore, ‘there is then a much earlier attempt to 
incorporate them, just because they are part- and yet not a defined part- of effective 
contemporary practice.’200 
 
Therefore at any given point within society, the dominant and effective culture- the culture of 
the hegemon- is in an antagonistic but practical contestation with both residual cultures that 
ties it to the past, and emergent cultures that suggest or predict future social formations 
(something which I argue is increased by the grasping of cultural ‘equality’ facilitated by the 
mechanical reproduction and mass availability of culture). Both residual and emergent 
cultures suffer varying degrees of incorporation into the dominant cultures, and Williams 
understands this as primarily a temporal relation. Some cultures remain completely outside 
the realm of hegemony, to be discarded, frowned upon, and most likely forgotten. Others are 
incorporated at different rates, some as obviously antagonistic, others so completely and 
assuredly that it is difficult to recognise that neither their antagonism, nor the historical 
struggle that makes it now so natural- I would argue that the role of African-Americans in 
capitalist advertising is just one example.  
 
For Williams there is a real difference between alternative and oppositional forms of culture, 
that incubate meanings and practices in a different way to how they are understood by the 
mainstream or from how they might be eventually re-interpreted by dominant and hegemonic 
forms. ‘Alternative’ in this sense refers to ‘finding a different way to live and wishes to be 
left alone with it,’ whereas ‘Oppositional,’ is whereby one ‘finds a different way to live and 
wants to change the society in its light.’ It is akin therefore to individual or small-group 
solutions to social crisis and those solutions that belong to political and ultimately 
revolutionary practice.  
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We can nonetheless understand the perpetuation of residual cultures, produced by earlier 
social formations where certain real meanings and values were generated, and which continue 
to thrive because they ‘represent areas of human experience, aspiration and achievement, 
which the dominant culture under-values or opposes, or even cannot recognise.’201 With 
regard to emergent cultures, on the other hand, requires a non-metaphysical and non-
subjectivist explanation which bears on the process of persistence of residual practices. It is 
the narrative of how new classes and class consciousness forms. 
 
In practice, the concrete historical moment that unravels during the rise of Sloanism- as 
opposed to thinking about the same moment in terms of Fordism- produces a number of 
contending residual and emergent cultures that contribute to the stylization or iconology of 
Sloanism. The next chapter will give precedence to the Custodian cultural hegemony of the 
mid-to-late 19
th
 century as the key residual culture that intersected with an increasingly 
rationalized, managerialized, production-consumption focused dominant culture. The 
‘emergent’ cultures will prioritize the modernist and avant-garde movement whose anti-
hegemonic and progressive impulses began to eclipse Custodian norms and gradually 
embraced by the dominant classes in industries that required their styles and techniques to 
reach out to the public, and the final chapter will focus more clearly on the advertising and 
PR industries as exemplars of the mass persuasion complex in which the hegemony of 
Sloanism made itself manifest. 
 
 
2.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to provide the theoretical tools necessary to interrogate the 
‘aesthetics of hegemony’ in the United States. It has shown that though the neo-Gramscian 
oeuvre fails to confront the issue of aesthetics as a way of thinking about hegemony, there is 
sufficient theoretical space to do so. The key areas in which this is possible is i) to shift the 
analysis to Sloanism, ii) to be more fluid in the ascribing ‘norms’ and ‘values’ to individuals 
and social groups, and iii) to take more account of the industries and agencies of mass 
persuasion that lend hegemony a distinct power in early 20
th
 century America. 
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Marxist writings on aesthetics and culture showcase a concern for the production of artwork 
and cultural artefacts and what these might do to conceal or reveal social antagonisms. 
Lukacs’ theory of aesthetics is directed to producing artforms that are relevant to the social 
struggle of working class, whereas Gramsci’s sketchy cultural theory points forward to 
embracing modernism as a way of de-falsifying worker consciousness. Crucially, they both 
highlight the role of artistic and cultural producers in the formation and maintenance of 
hegemony. Gramsci also opens up ways of thinking about the consumption of art and culture 
in the terms of the securing of consent in hegemony. 
 
Walter Benjamin and Raymond Williams provide the theoretical tools in which neo-
Gramscian theory can more fully grasp the aesthetic dimension of hegemony. In The Work of 
Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, Benjamin regards the era of mass reproducibility 
as one presenting cultural challenges to received norms and values. This is because for the 
first time non-elite groups have access to art and culture that was previously the preserve of 
Custodian elites. The very fact of having this access represents for Benjamin a qualitatively 
new period of history. Non-elite groups are in no way obliged to consider art and culture 
through the same criterion of aesthetic judgement, and therefore can imbue art and culture 
with their own meanings and values. Accordingly, products of mass culture do not act as 
functional aspects of the capitalist economy, but are considered as artefacts that hold 
emancipatory meaning in a society conditioned by discourses of upward social mobility. As 
such, things like status, style and fashion represent aesthetic ‘markers’ of success in mounting 
challenges to 19
th
 century hierarchies of social order. In other words, it gives neo-Gramscians 
to consider more centrally the idea of moving upwards through the social ladder, and to think 
about emulation and material aspiration themselves as political and social action.  
 
Williams provides the neo-Gramscians with a more fluid and dynamic framework of class 
relationships. Williams argues that ‘hegemony’ is not just about the filtering of elite ‘norms’ 
and ‘values’ downwards through society. Rather, residual and emergent cultures collide with 
dominant cultures, providing new grammars and practices of articulating, visualizing and 
maintaining hegemony. This is important in the context of early 20
th
 century America when 
there is a diversification of the structure of society, with new social groups contributing their 
ideas and practices alongside ‘residual’ attempts to keep aspects of the old order in place in 
an era of transformation. 
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As I will aim to elucidate in chapters 3 and 4, the uniqueness of the United States experience 
lies precisely in the intersection of i) the transformation of the idea of cultural hierarchy 
within the US,  ii) the aestheticization of domestically rendered discourses of mobility and 
stylistic emulation, iii) the transnationalization of artistic styles and techniques that emanated 
from counter-hegemonic social groups as responses and mediations to the apparent deus ex 
machina of modernity and iv) the embryonic co-ordination of a mass persuasion industry that 
tied these processes together and reconfigurated the ability and form of hegemony in an 
iconology of Sloanism. 
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Chapter 3 
 
The Transformation of Class and Class Consciousness in the United States 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter demonstrated the tools provided by both neo-Gramscian political-
economic theory and cultural Marxism to analyse the hegemony of Sloanism. By paying 
attention to the shifting terrains of cultural and aesthetic contestation as outlined by the work 
of Benjamin and Williams, this chapter will show how transformation in the structures of 
class and class consciousness in the United States provided the socio-cultural potential for 
Sloanism to hold meaning and power during an era of transformation. 
 
Specifically it will show that throughout the 19
th
 century, a discourse of upward social 
mobility co-existing uneasily with more direct political class-based organization. This holds 
relevance for the concept of Sloanism, because the market strategy of brand differentiation 
and a hierarchy of product styles were aimed at ‘capturing’ this sense of mobility. To put it a 
different way, it was not so much that Sloanist policies created a cultural sense of upward 
mobility and emulative aspiration, but rather that these discourses of mobility already existed 
in American society and themselves shaped the rise and legitimization of Sloanism. 
 
In order to capture this consciousness of mobility, the chapter will begin by assessing the rise 
of the mass society in the United States. Specifically, it will trace the rise and influence of 
white collar workers. The numerical rise of the white collar class disrupted 19
th
 century 
expectations of a clear division of society between entrepreneurs and wage workers. 
Furthermore, they carried with them a set of contradictory socio-cultural values and 
aspirations. These values and aspirations, whilst in some way anchored in the capitalist 
celebration of private property and private accumulation, were also surmounted by changing 
cultural mannerisms, expectations of social mobility, transforming ideas of art and literature, 
access to education, as well inherited social ideas of religiosity and Victorian moralism that 
held sway after the Civil War. As such, the problematique arising for neo-Gramscian theory 
is in what ways this class can be captured by a framework of Sloanism. Were the white collar 
groups particularly susceptible to the stylistic hierarchization of commodities? In what ways 
were they susceptible, or indeed contribute to the systems of mass persuasion that arose in 
early 20
th
 century America? How did their values, aspirations and cultural values interact 
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with other social groups? Moreover, what were the cultural meanings they ascribed to massly 
reproducible artwork as intimated by Walter Benjamin? 
 
It will be argued that the white collar social groups distanced themselves from manual labour 
groups and during the 19
th
 century worked towards achieving goals of upward social 
mobility. The poignancy of Sloanism is then how this could be realized in the domain of 
consumption. The idea that one could be seen to be moving up the ‘ladder’ of social 
hierarchy through the consumption and appreciation of particular styles, fashions and tastes 
resonates strongly with the white collar classes. But who provided the criterion of what 
styles, fashions and tastes represented this upward  movement? 
 
It will be argued that the key to unlocking what styles and cultural tastes contributed towards 
the hegemony of Sloanism is the aesthetic contestation between a ‘Custodian’ class and an 
emergent generation of individuals who began to embrace modernity and the styles 
associated with artistic modernism. This aesthetic contestation- an intra-class as well as inter-
generational one- shows how Williams' schematic of hegemony played out at the turn of the 
20
th
 century. The ‘Custodians’ represent a residual culture from which particular norms and 
discourses of American character were drawn by the mass persuasion industries. Likewise, 
the groups of individuals that embraced modernity, despite their counter-hegemonic impulse, 
provided an emergent culture based on individual selfhood and self-fulfillment that were the 
hallmarks of the Sloanist political-economic formation.  
 
As such, this chapter seeks to interrogate precisely the fracturing of social classes and groups 
and how their ideas, values and norms over the conditions of American society at the time 
influenced the birth of a paradigmatic political-economic structure, and how the contribution 
of non-hegemonic groups eventuated the hegemony of that structure. In keeping with the 
theoretical nuances offered by Raymond Williams and Walter Benjamin, the proposition here 
is that the socially acceptable ideals of upward mobility and individual freedom became a 
fundamental part of the capitalist fabric and dispersed potential class antagonisms; this is 
achieved through the rise of mechanically reproducible cultural artefacts that allowed 
working and middle classes to consume those products and characterise and think of 
themselves apart from class. The operationalization of techniques of mass persuasion, 
however haphazard, provided the sense that they were being asked and being included in the 
process of America’s national maturation as an economy and political power. Gartman’s 
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tracing of the design history of the automobile, for example, shows how the needs and 
aspirations of salaried workers (blue collar or white collar) were fundamental to the re-
shaping of car design from the carriage style, chauffeur-driven vehicles of the late 1890s to 
the utilitarian inspired Model T Ford after the First World War. Whereas Ford himself was at 
the beginning to rest upon this model, believing it to be the perfect socio-economic solution, 
offering stylistic simplicity and harmony. Alfred Sloan, chairman of General Motors and 
chief rival of Ford, is for our purpose more relevant as he introduced the concept of stylistic 
obsolescence to the GM range, differentiating products aimed at different perceived social 
groups and integrating an aspirational model of advertising and marketing to achieve market 
dominance. 
 
This chapter will therefore argue that despite a breakdown of Custodian cultural hegemony, 
their power and values were strong enough to be retained as a ‘residual’ culture that 
permeated and legitimated certain aspects of the new era of mass persuasion. Edward 
Bernays’ management of Calvin Coolidge, and his depiction as a simple, obedient, temperate 
and hard-working man of the people carefully walked the line between elevation of the 
Custodian character whilst appealing to a residual ‘folk’ sensibility that was thought to 
capture middle class ‘plainspeak’ and values of piety and sobriety. It will also argue that the 
emergence of the American Modernists as a somewhat unintended cultural force, first 
challenging the norms and values of the Custodian set in a wide array of issues from 
historiography to aesthetic judgement, and then their uneasy mobilisation into the structures 
and institutions of mass persuasion. As such this chapter seeks to fulfill the theoretical claims 
made in Chapter 2, that a ‘aesthetic’ approach to understanding hegemony can account for 
the discordance and contradictions in the formation of values and norms, and how those 
contribute to the ‘power’ of the American way of life. 
 
3.2 The Emergence of the ‘Masses’ 
 
“The white-collar people slipped quietly into modern society. Whatever history they have had 
is a history without events; whatever common interests they have do not lead to unity; 
whatever future they have will not be of their own making. If they aspire at all it is to a 
middle course...and hence to an illusory course in an imaginary society. So before an 
adequate idea of them could be formed, they have been taken for granted as familiar actors 
of the urban mass.”202 
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C. Wright Mills argues that the emergence of the white collar worker as a mass political-
economic and cultural phenomenon is one of the defining features of the early 20
th
 century 
American socioscape. Their unexpected numerical rise not only disrupted 19
th
 century 
intellectual expectations of a clear division of society between entrepreneurs and wage 
workers, but also carried with them a set of often contradictory socio-cultural values and 
aspirations. These values and aspirations, whilst in some way anchored in the capitalist 
celebration of private property and private accumulation, were also surmounted by changing 
cultural mannerisms, expectations of social mobility, transforming ideas of art and literature, 
access to education, as well inherited social ideas of religiosity and Victorian moralism that 
held sway after the Civil War. 
 
This ‘class’ of people, moreover, were cemented in their general indistinguishability by their 
terms of reference; the ‘middling sort,’ the ‘people,’ the ‘public,’ the ‘masses.’203 Variously 
pitted either as a modern branch of the traditional working class, or as a ‘lower’ offshoot of 
the pre-existent petit-bourgeois strata of American society, their early emergence as reflected 
in serious literature saw them as ‘subjects of lamentation,’ and in popular or kitsch writing as 
‘targets for aspiration.’204 Yet for all their ‘living out in slow misery his yearning for the 
quick American climb,’205 the white collar as a social class or group were pinpointed by both 
politicians and corporate strategists from the late 1890s for their assumed fungibility in both 
the polling booths and the marketplace. It was precisely the imprecise characterization of this 
social group that caused public relations consultants, market researchers and advertisers to 
believe that the white collar carried with them a ‘mass’ way of life in the era of rapid social 
transformation, revealing in their behaviour and choices the psychological themes that 
characterised the early 20
th
 century American epoch. If the spectacular 19
th
 century economic 
growth of the United States had discursively furnished the nation’s ideational superstructure 
with the paramountcy of the ‘free entrepreneur,’ then the opening decades of the 20th century 
witnessed ‘the decline of the free entrepreneur and the rise of the dependent employee...the 
American scene has paralleled the decline of the independent individual and the rise of the 
little man in the American mind.’206 
 
                                                 
Stromquist, Shelton Reinventing “The People”: The Progressive Movement, The Class Problem and the Origins 
of Modern Liberalism, Chicago: University of Illinois, 2006, pg. 10 
204
 Wright Mills, C White Collar: The American Middle Classes, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002, pg. xiiii 
205
 Ibid., pg. 4 
206
 Ibid., pg. 13 
102 
 
 
It is into this ‘melting pot’ of transforming social classes and changing understanding of 
social hierarchies that this chapter seeks to address the aesthetic of an emergent Sloanist 
political-economy. The importance of the aforementioned white collar group is their role in 
supporting the structures of mass consumption, their embodiment of the ‘American Dream,’ 
and the sometimes elusive passages of upward mobility, which continue to feature as 
distinguishing (if somewhat journalistic) expressions of the contemporary global political 
economy.  
 
Their ‘condition’, as so pitifully unravelled in the character of Willy Loman in Death of a 
Salesman, showcases on the one hand, an externally buoyant confidence in their personal 
abilities and attributes and perpetual desire of upward mobility. On the other, the character’s 
introverted emotional despair, gradual disintegration of familial relationships and ultimate 
failure to climb the social ladder poignantly reminds us of the themes of alienation, mistrust 
and disorientation that the public relations and advertising industries instrumentalized as 
‘hooks’ to capture the attention of both voters and consumers, in political campaign strategies 
and nationwide marketing from the 1920s onwards. Arthur Miller created his disquieting 
portrayal of the American ‘everyman’ in 1949, by which time the entirety of the nation’s 
political machine was dedicated to capturing the attention of the ‘middlin’ sort,’ and the mass 
consumption market had sufficiently expanded so that its advertisements and insignias 
adorned the highways and main streets of every American town and city. In Babbit, Sinclair 
Lewis sketches this future ubiquity as it is in the process of emerging, and traces through the 
protagonist the mindset of the white collar worker in 1922: 
 
“It was the best of nationally advertised and quantitatively produced alarm-clocks, with all 
modern attachments, including cathedral Chime, intermittent alarm, and a phosphorescent 
dial. Babbit was proud of being awakened by such a rich device. Socially it was almost as 
creditable as buying expensive cord tires.”207 
 
It is this mentality- one where the individual organizes his or her understanding of life around 
the supposed qualities that the commodity brings- that is the underpinning of the Sloanist 
political-economic formation and the social forces that allowed its proliferation and 
deepening in American society. The social and ideational transformations that facilitated this 
began after the Civil War, and in the Gilded Age that followed until the depression of the 
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1890s, the co-existence of ideas of the ‘simple life’ on the one hand and the lure of wealth on 
the other decisively began to weigh towards the latter. ‘Big business, big labor, big cities, big 
farms- all were quickly becoming the norm rather than the exception.’208  
 
“Universal literacy was supposed to educate the common man to control his environment. 
Once he could read and write he would have a mind fit to rule. So ran the democratic 
doctrine. But instead of a mind, universal literacy has given him rubber stamps, rubber 
stamps linked with advertising slogans, with editorials, with published scientific data, with 
the trivialities of the tabloids and the platitudes of history, but quite innocent of original 
thought.”209 
 
Edward Bernays’ revealing passage on the ‘mind’ of the common man demonstrates one of 
the more extreme and openly patronising attitude to the rise of the ‘masses’ during the period 
leading up to the Great Depression. Imbuing the masses with a general character of such 
uselessness, Bernays places on this apparently new social class the vulnerability and 
susceptibility to manipulation by the mass persuasion industries of advertising and public 
relations. Mobilizing the entire media apparatus- from traditional newsprint and books
210
 to 
the newly available forms of cinema newsreel and radio- Bernays highlights the role of 
‘invisible’ leaders of American society; non-elected and non-accountable members of a 
shadowy group who have steered the country through its early industrialization and placed 
the United States on the brink of global leadership in economy and international affairs 
following the First World War.  
 
His plea, or treatise, towards this invisible government
211
, was for them to enthusiastically 
grasp the reins of the mass persuasion apparatus as a means of both a) enhancing their 
directive role in American society- that is to say, to set the parameters of social and cultural 
judgement, and to incubate their values of profiteering as legitimate values of the society as a 
whole- and b) veiling their characters and personnel from that very society, in order to bypass 
cultural and socio-political resistance against the demands from below- whether those were 
Debbs’ inspired Socialist platform of nationwide working class organization, or the political 
and economic pressures generated by the Progressive movement. Bernays’ own personal 
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belief that this was necessary for the smooth functioning of American democracy paralleled 
widespread concerns of elite groups about the role of the masses and the public, reflecting 
long-standing Hamiltonian fears of mob rule. For him, the key to circumventing their 
potential anger and violence was to reach into their subconscious aspirations and use the 
findings of psychiatry and public relations research to re-articulate the values of the elite so 
they fitted in smoothly with those perceived values and interests of the masses and the public.  
 
More than anything though, Bernays vision offers a compelling and explicit justification of 
critical and Marxist explanations of hegemony; the idea that in a democratic society which 
relies on certain cross-class alignments, tools of consensus-formation (such as the education 
system) became vital in the maintenance of elite class power, in order to disseminate their 
values and make them appear ‘normal’. As such, the explanation of the advertising and PR 
industries in this manner tends towards the idea that they are tools of the capitalist elite, 
relentlessly pursuing every domain of life that can be commoditised and sold, and over time 
acting as an auxiliary branch of US-based but transnationally mobile capital whose success 
can be read and viewed in the very expansion of both mass consumption society as well as 
the enduring symbols of American marketing and advertising that is globally pervasive in the 
current era. In the Coxian rendering of neo-Gramscian theories of hegemony, the PR and 
advertising industries therefore act as a key node and platform where elite norms and values 
undergo a public and international re-articulation, augmented by phrases, symbols, 
suggestions and visualizations that appeal to ideals of an aspirational, upwardly mobile life 
that can be judged according to the products and fashion styles individuals choose to uptake.  
 
Bernays’ ideas of incorporating theories of individual and mass psychology into Public 
Relations speak to an era where the parameters of mass persuasion began to broaden and the 
instruments of dissemination became more widespread, usable (or receivable) and ‘normal’ 
across the country. The ability to send political messages through radio broadcasts and adorn 
‘main street’ billboards with nationally-syndicated marketing and advertising campaigns 
therefore provided the American political-economic elite with a rapid means of cutting 
through the disconnected islands and locales of American towns and cities, helping to nurture 
a sense of modern, 20
th 
century American national identity amongst the white collar classes 
C. Wright Mills identifies as the political-economic constituency that concerned the elites the 
most. Bernays recognised this as an opportunity to mobilise the distrust, fear and anxiety he 
presumed lurked within individuals, and turn public relations strategies into campaigns that 
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offered a palliative for these middle class worries. This transformation of political 
campaigning is matched by transformations in the advertising industry that began to play on 
people’s fears- of being judged unfavourably in terms of fashion, taste and lifestyle- and 
produced adverts that intimated what the individual would be without the particular 
product.
212
 In both the political and market arenas therefore, we see a movement towards 
directing information and images towards the white collar, with marketing strategies being 
differentiated according to different income groups following the Sloanist introduction of 
stylistic obsolescence and in-house brand competition (see the example of Sloan’s General 
Motors campaign in Chapter 5). 
 
But what makes the ‘white collar,’ or the ‘middling sort’ so vulnerable to PR and advertising 
industries? C. Wright Mills argues that editorial manipulation and professionalised image-
making drew upon pre-existent American discursive and aesthetic hooks that celebrated the 
‘long tutelage to the soil,’ and the ‘courage, creativity and resourcefulness,’ that followed 
from it. Furthermore, by bringing into the public domain images and idealisations of 
characters, Mills asserts that the public audience simply could not know the people they want 
to talk about or become like (e.g., in advertising). As such, advertising provides ‘glimpses of 
types that can be frozen into the language in which they see the world’: 
 
“Even when they meet the people behind the types face to face, previous images, linked 
deeply with feeling, blind them to what stands before them. Experience is trapped by false 
images, even as reality itself sometimes seems to imitate the soap opera and the publicity 
release.”213 
 
Two of the most important discourses drawn from 19
th
 century America that characterise the 
aesthetics of Sloanism are a) ‘Manifest Destiny,’ and b) ‘Fables of Abundance.’214 Both of 
these were re-imagined for the early to mid 20
th
 century American mass audience to include 
visualised depictions that would culturally legitimate the kind of mass industrial capitalist 
way of life that was conflictually developed after the First World War, including veneration 
for the ‘Captain of Industry’ role model of the late 19th century. A central irony of this 
veneration of public capitalist figures such as Andrew Carnegie and the Rockefeller dynasty 
was that their institutional practices and desire to monopolize power within their industries 
was precisely the drift towards an oligarchic form of competition that was antithetical to the 
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independent, small business ideal that appealed to the middle classes. Manifest Destiny- 
originally an early to mid-19
th
 century belief about the necessity and righteousness of 
spreading the democratic institutions of American society to the Pacific Coast- was 
augmented by the stunning economic growth of the post Civil War period and imbued with 
more global sense of expansionism after the Spanish-American War: 
 
“The far-reaching, boundless future will be an era of American greatness. In its magnificent 
domain of space and time, the nation of many nations is destined to manifest to mankind the 
excellence of divine principles.”215 
 
As such, at the turn of the 20
th
 century, the essence of American destiny- the long, hard 
decades of the ‘long tutelage to the soil,’ became intertwined with pre-existent, almost 
folklorish ‘fables of abundance,’ to aesthetically articulate a vision of America that celebrated 
the domestic completion of manifest destiny (i.e., the continental expansion of the Union and 
total incorporation of contending semi-national entities such as Texas) and the conquest of 
scarcity through the spectacular industrial growth stimulated by organic American capitalism. 
Both of these ideational discourses were illuminated by stressing the unique, exceptional 
character of American society, a fundamentally white, Anglo-Saxon Protestant and male 
rendering of the nation’s relatively short history. This historical explanation, the school of 
American ‘Exceptionalism,’ laboured under the belief in the innate superiority of a 
pioneering, hard-working, free people that settled and made rational sense of the vast, 
untamed virgin lands of the American West, bringing with them the political institutions of 
democracy and the sanctity of the United States Constitution.
216
 If during the 19
th
 century, 
Manifest Destiny helped to justify settlement and conquest west of the Appalachians, to 
destroy and overcome Native American lands, to annex the French and Spanish colonies and 
make war with Mexico to reach the Pacific, then its 20
th
 century version would support 
American corporate dominance in Central America, its semi-imperial control over countries 
like Puerto Rico, Cuba and the Philippines and eventually its reluctant ascendance to global 
power.  
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Similar, the discourses of abundance, of the promise of freedom from scarcity was articulated 
as being achieved through the hard-working, protestant spirit; the great awakenings of the 
early and mid 19
th
 century preached that a solemn, frugal and dutiful life would deliver Eden 
in America. Protestant and evangelical thought, that emphasized personal devotion and 
‘plain-living,’ did not so much abhor the concept of wealth and individual material 
accumulation, but admonished those who turned their accumulated wealth into 
demonstrations of ostentatious materiality.
217
 Yet David Shi emphasizes that despite the 
prevalence of publically articulated ‘spiritual guidance’ that prioritised plain living and 
shunned the role of luxury and symbols of wealth (housing, personal dress, imported 
European styles) as determining the status of people, this co-existed with continual efforts to 
emulate the very fashions of people associated with the decadent aristocracies of the old 
world. Throughout American history, conflicts between leading social groups animated this 
contradiction of a public discourse that celebrated the democratic, plain and equal and lived 
socio-economic and cultural practices that sought the accumulation of material fanfare as an 
expression of social mobility. In the pre-independence period, Shi points to key conflicts 
between Protestant/Quaker organizations and the merchants of Boston, New York and 
Philadelphia; at the turn of the 20
th
 century a similar conflict repeated between those who 
wished industrial America would move in a direction of  ‘Progressive Simplicity,’ and the 
‘captains of industry,’ whose accumulation of wealth had begun to manifest in public 
demonstrations of grandeur, most notable in the form of the skyscraper.
218
 The key point here 
however, is how these groups attempted to articulate their contending visions of American 
life and American character to the rest of society. By the 1920s, the focus of attention had 
changed from the yeoman-farmer-artisan model of Jeffersonian democracy to the urban 
masses, and the assumed chaos that characterised their existence, interwoven with poverty, 
violence and ethnic strife. 
 
C. Wright Mills maintains that this transition to a chaotic urban society in the early 20
th
 
century made easier the regurgitation of discourses and symbols from the 19
th
 century, 
counterpoising historical idealizations upon contemporary surroundings in order to keep a 
connection with a beatified past. The assumed insecurity and internal angst of the masses and 
the urban crowd could be kept in check, utilising sentimentalised renditions of the recent (but 
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not experienced) past in order to legitimize the newer, modern, ‘mass’ phase of manifest 
destiny and fabled abundance; the mass consumption market. As outlined in the theory 
chapter, Benjamin and William’s aesthetic theories point towards understanding cultural 
objects as refracting antagonistic virtues and values as well as political ideals for the present 
or future. Whereas Eagleton understands the cultural artefact as being imbued with the values 
of the dominant classes and ruling elites
219
, the mass nature of early 20
th
 century America 
provides a pivotal moment in which the medias of representation become necessarily engaged 
with the dominated in unique ways; that is to say, relatively new but increasingly prevalent 
forms of cultural communication- whether it be skyscrapers, advertising images or newspaper 
photojournals- contain residual and emergent cultures that coincide with those of the 
dominant. In that sense, manifest destiny and fabled abundance are two legacies of the 19
th
 
century that retained poignancy even during the period of rapid socio-economic and 
ideational change leading up to the Great Depression. This period coincides with the shaping 
of a recognizable, national aesthetic of the American Dream. As Mills points out, the fact that 
the ‘people’ of the early 20th century had no actual experience of the mastery of the continent 
in the previous century, these national images were a ‘sentimental version of historical types 
that no longer exist, if indeed they ever did.’220 
 
The ideal-type that best embodied the twinning of manifest destiny and economic abundance 
was the character assumed to have made it all possible in the first place; the farmer-artisan. 
The ‘values’ of this ideal-type included a ‘magical’ independence from authority and 
repression (reflected in the discursive celebration of limited government, ‘freedom.’), a great 
capacity for hard work, spiritual devotion, frugal living and adaptability. This type had no 
‘master,’ no figure of emulation aside from himself, and therefore had no care for ‘wordly’ 
possessions to distinguish him from other men.
221
 Yet Mills argues that by the time this 
rendition of an ideal-type became edited sufficiently in an era of mass literacy and mass 
circulation of newspapers, the urban landscape had come to dominate the new American 
imagination- the farming population declined, and new social groups contended with each 
other across the pre-existent cleavages and division of race, religion, gender and wealth. 
Accordingly for Mills, the one universal characteristic of American society from the 1920s 
was the ‘levelling influences of urban civilization, the standardization of big technology and 
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the media of mass communication’222 and that 20th century American had emerged with a 
higher degree of social and political-economic discipline than the frontiersman or rancher of 
the 19
th
 century could have ever thought of. 
 
Again, to re-iterate, for the purposes of this thesis, I am not attempting to give a full historical 
account of the emergence of the ‘masses,’ but to interrogate the manner in which aesthetic 
contestations were directed towards them as a means of capturing a relatively new political-
economic and socio-cultural constituency whose presumed lack of secure cultural anchorage 
made them vulnerable or susceptible to consuming the iconological products of Sloanism. 
Into this circulation of styles, ideas and renditions of what it meant to be American, I argue 
that the ‘masses,’ or the ‘people,’ were engaged by different social groups, for different 
reasons and within the prism of the mass persuasion complex were also able to refract their 
own developing, contradictory values into the broader schema. Again taking up Williams’ 
idea of hegemony being shaped by the dialectical interchange of residual and dominant , the 
following ‘ideal-types,’ become relevant for the aesthetics of Sloanist political economy223 
 
Residual Ideal-Type: the independent farmer-artisan model. Celebrated for contributing to 
the mastery of the continent, the values and norms ascribed to this ideal-type are unabashedly 
Protestant; hard work, religious and civil piety, gentle (but not genteel) mannerisms. The 
‘democratic’ character of the US, though initiated by the wealthy and more urbane Founding 
Fathers is supposed to have been transmitted in its purest, most ideal state through these 
figures in the conquest of the West and the fulfilment of Manifest Destiny- no matter the 
reality of lawlessness, violence and spurious exploitation that was also part and parcel of the 
westward expansion.
224
 In terms of the aesthetic grammar that are thought to derive from the 
farmer-artisan, John Atlee Kouwenhoven argues that ‘there was no tradition, no codified 
grammar, of technological design, but only an intuitive sense of appropriate form.’225 In 
political-economic terms, the residual ideal-type harked back to the Jeffersonian model of 
both the American citizen and his conception of a loose federation of states with minimal 
centralized federal power. The values and characteristics of this ideal-type then ‘reside,’ 
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within what I would deem the ‘dominant’ ideal-type that emerged during the Gilded Age of 
the 1880s- the ‘captain of industry.’ 
 
Dominant Ideal-Type: the captain of industry model. Emerging during the Gilded Age of 
the American 1880s, this ideal-type embraces the principles of hard work, frugality and thrift 
of the residual model, and is given additional characteristics that correlate the ascendancy of 
mechanization in the late 19
th
 century. As such, this model is typified by the ‘engineer-
entrepreneur’ character of Fredrick Taylor and Henry Ford; a rigorous dedication to scientific 
principles, their aesthetic grammar is an extension of the vernacular type of the residual 
model. From the domineering skyscrapers of New York, the magnificence of the Brooklyn 
Bridge and the machine-dominated River Rouge plant of the Ford Corporation, the aesthetic 
of an emergent advanced mechanized industrial society prioritizes simple, efficient and sleek 
materials and design, celebrating the ‘making of modernity:’ 
 
“native intelligence and common sense; an intuitive mind which leaped beyond the present, 
and a special engineering talent that combined creativity with practicality, a remarkable 
memory, a missionary’s zeal, and a lifelong capacity for hard work.”226 
 
Despite the wealth accumulated by the captains of industry, and the general belief in 
scientific progress that constituted a facet of their dominant values, they shared on occasion 
the practices of Custodian philanthropy, as witnessed by the numerous endowments upon 
public educational facilities in the late 19
th
 century and early 20
th
 century. Andrew Carnegie 
was one such figure, and in a famous essay originally published in the North American 
Review in 1889 set out his vision of industrial civilization dominated by the few, driven 
capitalist entrepreneur: 
 
“The contrast between the palace of the millionaire and the cottage of the laborer with us 
today measures the change which has come with civilization. This change…is not to be 
deplored but welcomed as highly beneficial. It is…essential, for the progress of the race. 
Much better this great irregularity than universal squalor.”227 
 
As such, though the ‘dominant’ ideal-type can be commonly thought of as being 
characterised by their capitalist values, it is vital to note their contradictory and antagonistic 
social ideas and practices. The dominant ideal-type, I would argue, are the kind of individuals 
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that Bernays’ believes constitutes the ‘real’ government of the United States, and invisible, 
unelected body of industrialist-entrepreneurs. Their power lay in drawing parallels with the 
residual ideal-type even though that society had vanished in reality, and that their own 
business practices were far from the independent capitalist of the early 19
th
 century vision. 
And it is worth considering whether the specific circumstances of the 1900-1920 period, 
where labour unrest grew and challenges to corrupt corporate practice were being highlighted 
by an increasingly restive and moralistic journalist ‘muckrakers’, is what made Bernays call 
for an ‘implicit veil’ to be cast over these supposed ideal-types, so as not to let their 
sacrosanct image be disturbed. 
 
3.3 The Waning of Custodian Hegemony 
 
“Your seniors also find themselves irritated and depressed because modern girls are louder 
and more bouncing than their predecessors, and because their boy-associates are somewhat 
rougher and more familiar toward them than used to be thought well bred.” 228 
 
The above quote in ‘A Letter to the Rising Generation,’ finds us in the mindset of a typical 
Custodian attitude. Steeped in late Victorian attitudes, by the time of writing this letter in 
1911, Ms. Comer’s key concerns are about attitude and manners. Little attention is paid to 
how a mechanizing, urbanizing society affects these attitudes (and as such their critical 
purchase tends to sidestep political-economic issues). Rather she places emphasis on the deus 
ex machina of change and transformation, concluding that ‘the result of this change of type in 
American life and American men is to make life a far harder problem.’229 ‘The world is far 
smaller; it is harder for the individual to live by his own light. The members of the body 
politic are much more closely knit together in the mesh of common interest today than ever 
before.’230 Despite recognizing the broader social changes that might affect the conduct of the 
younger generation, her letter remains both plea and admonishment, bemoaning the ‘external’ 
factors that have caused this situation to be thus: 
 
“Of your chosen pleasures, some are obviously corroding to the taste; to be frank, they are 
vulgarizing...How can anything avail to refine children whose taste in humour is formed by 
the coloured supplements of the Sunday paper, as their taste in entertainment is shaped by 
continuous vaudeville and the moving-picture shows? It may not be actually coarse, but 
inanity, stupidity and commonness are even more potent as vulgarizing influences than actual 
coarseness.”231 
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Likewise, Ms. Comer is at her wits-ends to grasp the pace of change in which this 
generational breakdown has taken place: 
 
“I used to look at a good many members of this rising generation and wonder helplessly what 
ailed them. They were amiable, attractive, lovable even, but singularly lacking in force, 
personality, and the power to endure. Conceptions of conduct that were the very foundations 
of existence to decent people even fifteen years their seniors were to them unintelligible.”232 
 
Furthermore, she berates what she sees as a ‘trend’ of the younger generation to embrace 
ideas of society and government that are antithetical to the ‘equality of opportunity which this 
country was founded to secure,’233 namely those claiming themselves as ‘socialist’ or 
‘Whitmanite.’: 
 
“It may easily happen that the next twenty years will prove the most interesting in the history 
of civilization. Nice lads with the blood of the founders of our nation in your veins, pecking 
away at the current literature on socialism, taking out of it imperfectly understood apologies 
for your temperaments and calling it philosophy- where will you be if a Great Day should 
really dawn?”234 
 
It is interesting to note here, that Ms. Comer, presumably anxious about how the material 
wealth of her own generation afforded those very youngsters the privilege and comfort from 
which they assumed these unworthy characteristics, reinforces the idea that ‘survival’ is 
dependent on those hard-working, frugal qualities that made her own generation so 
successful- and that their sons should fear challenges from social classes below their own: 
 
“When your turn comes, you will be tossed on the scrap-heap, shoved aside by boys who have 
read less and worked more, boys who have thought to some purpose and have been willing- 
as you are not- to be disciplined in life.”235 
 
Ms. Comer’s letter summarises many of the key elements of the breakdown of Custodian 
culture and the transformation of the values and norms that underpinned them within their 
own ‘class.’ Bemused by their embracing of ‘unrefined’ mannerisms, their laziness, self-
indulgence, skewed ideologies and arrogance, she appears worried that the fabric of her 
social class is disappearing before her eyes, ready to be supplanted by the pressure from 
below, the masses, the sons of working class men. This last point is important that it 
resonates with Wright Mills’ conceptualization of the emergent ‘white collar.’ He argues that 
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as a class or social group, they developed in part because of their working parents’ desire to 
see their children move up through the social ladder, to be free of the burden of manual work. 
Mass circuited kitsch literature accorded them as figures of inspiration- aiming to become the 
engineer-entrepreneurs of the dominant ideal type: 
 
“No culture, none of those finer feelings that distinguish the civilized man from the savage 
aborigines of the wilds...No enthusiasm for truth, for bringing light into dark places...Do you 
realize, young man that it is not just a job I’m offering you, it is a great opportunity....a 
splendid opportunity for service and self-improvement. I’m offering you an education 
gratis.”236 (Doc Bingham surveys his prospective young employer, ‘Mac,’ a young working 
class man who has travelled from rural New York to Chicago to find employment in a 
printing firm) 
 
What we can take from this is the following: that the Custodian set, generally imparted with 
values and norms concomitant with late 19
th
 century Victorianism and deriving their ideas of 
culture from a transnational ideal of bourgeois culture are being undercut from ‘below’ from 
working and lower-middle classes, who appear more embracing of the values and norms of 
the ‘captain of industry’ ideal type. The Custodian elite on the other hand, find their own sons 
and daughters adrift- characters who like Anthony Patch in The Beautiful and Damned prefer 
the drinking, womanizing and seemingly aimless voyages to Europe. As Geoff Dyer writes in 
the introduction to the novel: 
 
“Anthony’s attempts at paid employment prove no more successful that his literary and 
intellectual endeavours. To succeed in the world of finance, he realizes ‘the idea of success 
must grasp his mind.’ By comparison the idea of failure seems all-embracing, something that 
will consume and test his entire being.”237 
 
Patch’s grandfather in the Beautiful and the Damned is an exemplar Custodian. Ageing and 
disparaging of the frivolity of his grandson’s life, the old man leaves the world embittered 
that the wealth he helped create was not being put to use in the swinging Jazz age. Leaving 
no dollar to Anthony Patch in his will, his beliefs of hard work, discipline, self-restraint and 
sobriety are disappearing before his very eyes. Anthony’s own views on his grandfather 
likewise reflect this severe intergenerational fracturing: 
 
“Are you any relation to Adam Patch?” 
“Yes he’s my grandfather.” 
“He’s done a lot of good.” 
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“Rot!,’ scoffed Anthony. ‘He’s a pious ass- a chicken-brain.’238 
 
When Adam Patch finally passes away, Fitzgerald intimates a key Custodian practice of that 
elder generation; the merging of an unrepentant industrialism with public philanthropy, 
believing that by sponsoring education, the next generation would behold his values as their 
own- “All the newspapers printed his biography, and two of them ran short editorials on his 
sterling worth, and his part in the drama of industrialism. They referred to the reforms he 
sponsored and financed.”239 Anthony received none of his grandfather’s estate consisting of 
$40 million. 
 
The point of this is to demonstrate the trauma of an intergenerational class fracturing that was 
fundamentally aesthetic in nature; different appreciations of what constituted emotional or 
sentimental experience, forged through the dialectical unfolding of a rapidly industrializing 
society. The irony here is that elder generation who thought themselves as forging the 
abundant wealth of modern America were aghast at how that modern American started to  
negatively affect the tastes, styles and attitudes of their children and grandchildren without 
confronting the fact that the forging and maintenance of that society rested on the elevation of 
principles of individual taste, upward mobility and self-expression through the market, 
leitmotifs that would later be conquered in a more frequently accessed visual iconology. It is 
precisely this kind of antagonism within class and class consciousness that Raymond 
Williams’ model of hegemony confronts; that is to say, how residual, dominant and emergent 
modes collide and coincide to create something new and sometimes unfathomable to those 
who played a part in creating it.  
 
Jackson Lears’ addresses this issue as the ‘antimodern’ impulse of American cultural 
transformation as it was in the process of embracing modernism. “Antimodernism was not 
simply escapism; it was ambivalent, often co-existing with enthusiasm for material 
progress,”240 and casts issue with the way antimodernists sought to make renderable the 
seemingly uncontrollable rate of change in American society through a prism of morality, one 
which neatly reflected the shift in the type of capitalist society- “The older morality embodied 
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the “producer culture” of an industrializing, entrepreneurial society; the newer nonmorality 
embodied the “consumer culture” of a bureaucratic corporate state”241  
 
Furthermore, this intergenerational conflict witnessed a breakdown in the idea of ‘common-
sense,’ the limits of which had been defined and disseminated by the Custodian stock. 
“Antimodernists were not primarily powerful businessmen; they were journalists, academics, 
ministers and literati whose circumstances ranged from the wealthy to the moderately 
comfortable.’ [shared kinship ties, source of income] ‘Old-stock, Protestant, they were the 
moral and intellectual leaders of the American WASP bourgeoisie, who joined their British 
counterparts in shaping a transatlantic Victorian culture and who helped to maintain dominant 
norms and values.”242 This questioning of a complacent faith in progress (the kind espoused 
by the engineer-entrepreneur model) was something also shared by the avant-garde of Artistic 
modernism- which as an emergent culture of the period will be explored in its transnational 
context in Chapter 4. 
 
Lears also suggests that within this transition- from the ‘older morality,’ to the ‘newer 
nonmorality,’ from the ‘producer’ to ‘consumer’ culture was also followed by a shift from a 
Protestant worldview to a therapeutic worldview; one from the promise of abundance (and 
the necessary work required to achieve that) to the promise of instant gratification (if people’s 
immediate needs of survival and reproduction are secured): “For Gramsci, dominant social 
groups maintain power not through force alone but through sustaining their cultural 
hegemony- that is, winning the ‘spontaneous’ loyalty of subordinate groups to a common set 
of values and attitudes. The shift from a Protestant to a therapeutic world view, which 
antimodern sentiments reinforced, marked a key transformation in the cultural hegemony of 
the dominant classes in America.”243 In all of these shifts however, what we see in the US is 
the continual ambiguity of interests, values and styles supported or articulated by the social 
classes involved in capturing some sort of cultural hegemony. With the ever important 
symbols and discourses of early to mid 19
th
 century still at hand to be remembered by the 
older generation, and the future of mass urban cities and urban chaos unraveling (and being 
embraced) by the younger generation, a rapid diversification of styles, preferences and values 
could draw from images and discourses from any period, from any place, and with 
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contradictory values forming the fabric of hegemony. This is why I have tried to stress the 
importance of understanding hegemony as a process through which inter- and intra-class 
aesthetic contestation affects the overall form of hegemony that culturally legitimates a 
particular political-economic formation- in this case the decades leading up to Sloanism. 
 
 
It is useful to grasp the sheer scale of social transformation that these Custodians witnessed; 
as they passed away during the 1920s, the US had became a virtually fully mechanised 
society, electrified and wealthy, ready to takes its place as a leading power in the 
international arena, and produced for the first time a society that would come to be defined by 
its leisure activities and widespread access to those. Similarly, John Dos Passos outlines the 
disorientation felt by the central character of Manhattan Transfer as he struggles to negotiate 
crossing the road full of speeding automobiles on the same spot where just twenty years 
before horse and cart would passed by. These themes, crucial to the historiography of 
American modernisation, are important to us only to the extent that they contextualise the 
emergence of a new generation of elite-educated political-economic leaders, that sought to 
breakaway and reform the ‘norms’ and ‘values’ of the fathers and grandfathers. 
 
Gilbert Ostrander argues that the 1920s witnessed the emergence of a ‘Filiarchy,’; a socio-
political and economic structure led by a group of actors that dispensed with reverence for 
wisdom and tradition and instead sought to re-define their country as new. In current with 
modernisation, they embraced the quicker tempo of social life in the metropolis, adhered to 
religion only to the extent that it facilitated their goals of self-enrichment, and placed faith 
with the contemporary, the modern and science. Likewise, Roland Marchand suggests these 
‘Apostles of Modernity’ were particularly welcomed in new industries that were crucial to 
the expansion of the mass consumption market, such as advertising and public relations, and 
would become crucial in injecting vitality into the arrangement and design of a distinctly 
American capitalism premised on the mass production-mass consumption nexus.  
 
This contestation, peculiar in the sense of it being largely a generational, inter-elite one, was 
one primarily fought over attitude, style, manner and response to social transformations 
occurring during this period. It did not result in political-economic realignment as such 
(though both the Democrat and Republicans accommodated the ‘new’ generation), nor was 
there a broader questioning of the system that produced these transformations. The 
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contestation is most presciently articulated in American literature and periodical reviews, and 
to an extent establish the basis of both ideological and iconological conditions within the 
advertising industry. In the former, notable American literary figures such as John Dos 
Passos, Ernest Hemmingway and Malcolm Cowley revealed, in various ways, concerns close 
to the heart of a younger generation of Ivy-league educated elite- from issues such as moral 
degradation, capitalist greed, disorientating systems of mass transit, the plight of immigrants, 
or the folly of warfare. They form part of a larger group of artists who sought, mostly 
unsuccessfully, to break, or reform the traditions of American artistic production, establishing 
a historiography of authentic American art, as well as an albeit brief Avant-garde that placed 
Greenwich Village at the heart of a movement that aimed to rally against what they saw as an 
increasingly debased, crudely materialistic and superficial capitalist society. Whilst their 
programme would prove to be ultimately fruitless as both anti-hegemonic and anti-systemic, 
enough of their innovations in social attitude prevailed to be absorbed in some respect into an 
expanding market of commodities- fashion is one area where this appears to be obvious; 
literary styles and genre serialisation in newspapers are also an aspect that integrated their 
‘progressive’ attitudes into the social fabric of everyday life in the US. 
 
3.4 The Younger Generation: Embracing Modernity 
 
“Age sometimes sees itself surviving in a sort of earthly immortality of influence, an exquisite 
wraith whose sustenance is human opinion...Age desires not to survive only in an epitaph. 
Age demands that Youth shall be its earthly immortality.”244 
 
Anne Hard, writing an ‘apologia’ for the ‘younger generation,’ is representant of the way in 
which young adults at the turn of the 20
th
 century began to challenge the cultural and moral 
authority of their elders. Rarely were they motivated by ideas of systemic political-economic 
transformation; rather, for people like Anne Hard, the ‘system,’ or ‘way of life,’ was 
embodied by the cultural authority and leitmotifs of their Custodian elders. As such, situating 
and appreciating their own cultural and ethical aspirations can help understand the dialectical 
interplay of ‘dominant’ and ‘emergent’ cultures during a specific period of American history. 
This is turn can provide a better sense of how the ‘aesthetics’ of hegemony began to form in 
early 20
th
 century. The key questions to be asked of the ‘younger’ generation are what their 
emergent culture contributed, and how their aesthetic challenges conveyed certain aspirations, 
values and ideas. Of initial importance is the way the younger generation positioned 
themselves within the developing spaces of American society. As they reached adulthood, 
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they were confronted with what they saw as a new, emergent, urban society. In this ‘melting 
pot,’ they witnessed first hand the diversification of the ‘ethnic’ stock of American society, 
saw new micro-cultures emerging in urban areas, and in some cases rallied against what they 
saw as a crude materialism. 
 
“It is easy to see why Age distrusts us. Broader spaces, fewer interests, beliefs more single, 
combined with a perhaps not less important inheritance of unmixed blood, gave to an earlier 
generation in this country a stability, an unbendable quality which stands as one of the 
supreme monuments to the possibilities of human character. It is little wonder that it hopes 
the worst from a generation born of blended racial strains into crowded areas, multifarious 
occupations and conflicting opinions.”245 
 
For those who failed to adhere to the Custodian model, the emergence of a distinct, urban, 
modernizing culture in the Black neighbourhoods of the major Eastern seaboard cities offered 
a respite and avenue of escape from the predominance of Anglo-American Protestant cultural 
values, and the consensual hegemony exercised by the political-economic class. Endearing 
themselves closer to the disjointed tempos of urban life without the baggage of Victorian 
ideals of character, and more attuned with the contradictions of modernising social energy, 
these ‘ghettoes’ incubated early forms of Jazz and dance that would prove to be pivotal in the 
cultural shifts of modern America from the 1920s onward.
246
 Prizing movement, rhythm, 
mobility, transition over piety, sobriety and frugality, the hallmarks of the younger generation 
in advertising and public relations (and indeed the entertainment industry more broadly) were 
borne here. Their espousal by the wasted and wanton of the Jazz age  was as much also to do 
with the intervention of a genuinely American intelligentsia that rallied against the 
contradictions of Victorianism and the Custodian ideals- these two together shook the 
foundations of Victorianism, and coupled with World War 1, settled as an uneasy coalition of 
progress, liberality, reaction and consensus.
247
  
 
The key to understanding this is not to portray of one faction over another (the younger 
generation against their Custodian elders) but rather how they synthesised and absorbed each 
others' epistemological traits that would eventually serve a common goal after the depression; 
of promoting the necessary aesthetic to sustain a new regime of accumulation, based on an 
ideal of upward economic mobility through consumption. The fact that there could be 
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accommodation at all at an aesthetic level between a conservative Custodian class and a 
younger modernising class was because they were drawn from the same Victorian-era stock, 
responding to ideological and discursive currents that moved as rapidly as the new pace of 
urban life; different actors, anchored to particular conceptions of race, hierarchy, land and 
democracy, contested the social organisation of the emergent society, and who would become 
the dominant voice articulating political, economic and social direction.
248
 
 
Yet in the actual aesthetic challenge against the Custodians, the younger generation focused 
on criticizing the tastes and manners of their elders. They rallied against the ‘stifling’ moral 
constraints of the Victorian age, its sobriety, sense of moral superiority, and articulated their 
challenge in their terms of reference  they understood from their own upbringing. In this, they 
recognized the Custodian viewpoint of maintaining a veneer of dignity and good taste for the 
sake of being recognized as members of a particular social set: 
 
“There are only two conditions which keep formal manners alive. One is the importance of 
the ceremonial..in short, for impressing others in order to maintain a caste or cult. The other 
is an intense in one’s personal dignity.”249 
 
Do these challenges over the mannerisms and tastes of an elder generation represent a 
‘counter-hegemonic’ challenge? In terms of the neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony, it has 
been argued that the theoretical tools do not provide enough space to think about these 
apparently minute, aesthetic contestations as political challenges. Yet the political-economic 
elites of the United States in the 19
th
 century maintained their cultural power through the 
creation, dissemination and maintenance of particular aesthetic ‘markers’ that represented 
their ‘place’ in the hierarchy of social order. The cultural challenge to this order, whilst not 
anti-systemic in a political-economic sense, conveyed emotional and sentimental feelings that 
the Custodian order was in some way repressing the younger generations’ yearning for 
greater expression of individuality. The Custodian ‘values’ on the other hand prioritized the 
conformity of manners and styles in order to maintain the look and virtue of ‘status: 
 
“It is perfectly aware of the genuineness of that greater dignity in its parents and yet it cannot 
help a secret feeling that the old-fashioned manner covered up something just for the sake of 
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the covering. They believed in closed parlors, in heavy hangings at the windows. They 
desired above all that things should ‘look nice.’”250 
 
The younger generation further challenged the Custodians by emphasizing that their elders’ 
focus on particular tastes, mannerisms and styles were in some way ‘false.’ That is to say that 
their values prioritized ‘appearance,’ rather than the actual content of their moral and ethical 
preferences.  
 
“The difference of emphasis, however, which distinguishes the younger from the elder time, is 
that ours is an emphasis not upon form but upon content.”251 
 
As such, the aesthetic challenge initiated by the ‘younger generation,’ focused on the values 
and understanding of society and culture that could be gained through ‘experience,’ and 
stepping outside the ‘closed’ parlors into the dynamism of urban society. Through this 
experience they believed they could transform the strict culture of individual repression and 
find ‘nourishment’ in their surroundings: 
 
“The demand that we shall get our intellectual nourishment from one source is of a piece with 
the demand that we shall get our spiritual nourishment from one source. We are glad that the 
day is gone which believed in only one avenue to culture; we are glad that the day is come 
which believes that in the house of beauty there are many mansions.”252 
 
Through this, the younger generation began to understand the diversity emerging in American 
society, and the multiplicity of challenges emerging as a result of this cultural diversification. 
Moreover, there is a recognition that ‘commerce’ may actually be the reason why the 
different tastes and cultural preferences of diverse social groups began to be recognized.: 
 
“It is, however, confusing to dismiss in a paragraph the total effect of our aesthetic 
surroundings on the younger public, because there is no one public, there are score. Not only 
can we get the rug, the picture, the jewel, the fruit, the bit of lace, - from north, from south, 
from next state, from far country; but there is  also a commercial response to the dramatic 
tastes of every section of the community.”253 
 
The issue arising from this aesthetic challenge to the Custodian order may have been a quiet 
revolution in the transformation in manners and moral outlook. What is important for 
understanding how this contributes to the ‘aesthetics’ of hegemony in early 20th century 
America is the way in which it laid the ‘groundwork,’ for the diversification of cultural norms 
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of different social groups. By issuing a challenge from within the received Custodian order, 
the younger generation show that the ‘norms’ and ‘values’ of elite groups underwent a crisis, 
and demonstrate the pertinence of understanding the instability of ruling elite interests. 
Furthermore, because these challenges were anchored in emotional issues about ‘grasping’ 
the new cultures and modern society, it was precisely characters like Anne Hard that 
embraced the art and culture of new styles such as modernism that also issued artistic 
challenges to received norms and values about aesthetic judgement. This issue will be 
covered in Chapter 4, but for now it might be pertinent to reproduce here Cowley’s eight-
point ‘system of ideas’ that characterised the Greenwich Village attempts at formulating a 
coherent set of practices and ideals. As he remarks of the early 1920s bohemia: “Greenwich 
Village was not only a place, a mood, a way of life: like all bohemias, it was also a 
doctrine.”254 
 
1. The Idea of Salvation by the Child: A bohemian belief that the individual’s special 
potentialities are ‘slowly crushed’ by a standardised society and through ‘mechanical 
methods of teaching.’ As such, this first point addresses the actual socialisation of 
children through teaching, and points toward the formation of dominant social norms 
and values as being deeply embedded in society and the individual from an early age. 
The only way to combat this is to completely change the system and focus of 
education itself. 
2. The Idea of Self-Expression: A belief that each person’s purpose in life is to express 
themselves, or ‘to realize [his] full individuality through creative work and beautiful 
living.’ A statement regarding the manner in which society assigns value and 
individual self-worth. 
3. The Idea of Paganism:  ‘The Body is a temple in which there is nothing unclean.’ In 
the context of a Custodian class who articulated their visions of individual character in 
Christian, or Protestant, terms, the avant-garde put as a central concern the 
overcoming of a archaic moral system that stressed piety and religiosity. 
4. The Idea of Living for the Moment: This can be seen as a crucial, defining feature of 
the Greenwich village avant-garde, and also addressed Gilbert Ostrander’s notion of 
‘Filiarchy,’255 which he defines as the rule of society by the young. In both of these, 
reverence for sagacity and the wisdom of the elders is replaced by a less stable 
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preference to make judgements according to the whims of the present, constantly 
shifting opinions and ideas to keep up with the quickening tempo of modernity. Either 
way, this marks a moment whereby experience is conceived of as living for the 
moment, initiating the gung-ho lifestyles that Veblen had expressed concerns about in 
the ‘Theory of the Leisure Class.’256 
5. The Idea of Liberty: For the avant-garde, this meant that any law of social custom 
designed to inhibit or repress self-expression should be destroyed; it ultimate enemy 
being Puritanism. Self-expression is particularly important here, as early advertisers 
and marketeers were quick to pick up on a social trend that began to privilege the 
‘individual’ as an idea to revolve consumption around. Specifically the notion of 
commodities appealing to self-realised characteristics would become an important 
facet in Motivational Research and the public relations industry more broadly. 
6. The Idea of Female Equality: “They should have the same pay, same working 
conditions, the same opportunity for drinking, smoking and taking or dismissing 
lovers. 
7. The Idea of Psychological Adjustment: A general belief in Freudian ideas of 
individual repression and maladjustment. ‘Adjusting’ to situations accordingly for the 
avant-garde also meant the enthusiastic support for psychoanalytical counselling and 
therapy as a means to achieve a ‘better balance.’ This idea was championed for 
specific capitalist purposes by Edward Bernays. 
8. The Idea of Changing Place: “By expatriating himself, by living in Paris, Capri or the 
South of France, the artist can break the puritan shackles, drink, live freely and be 
wholly creative.” 
 
The ‘manifesto’ of Greenwich Village was a cultural challenge to the received norms and 
values of the Custodian attitudes. Individuals and social groups sought on the one hand to 
detach themselves from the stifling culture of the Victorian era.
257
 It was also an attempt by 
artists to isolate themselves from what they saw and understood as the crass materialism of a 
capitalist society. Curiously, they simultaneously embraced the ‘lowbrow’ cultures of jazz 
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and the emergent intellectualism of artistic modernism.
258
 What they resented in particular 
was the ‘middlebrow’ cultural artefacts aimed at salaried workers in urban environments. For 
those cultural artefacts neither contained the intellectual, ‘authentic’ qualities of modernist 
art, nor the spontaneity and vibrancy of cultures emerging from isolated enclaves such as the 
Harlem Renaissance.
259
 What is important about the emergence of a younger generation 
whose ideals were antagonistic against their elders was the very fact that Custodian norms 
had been challenged from within. The younger generation’s embracement of the ‘rhythms’ 
and ‘tempos’ of modernity, their willingness to count alternative and subordinate cultures as 
virtuous all contributed to the transformation of structures of class consciousness. The ideals 
of upward social mobility, existing throughout the 19
th
 century, suddenly appear realizable as 
the ‘barrier’ of cultural mobility begins to become dismantled. 
 
Yet the list of points in the Cowley’s Greenwich village manifesto were surprisingly close in 
ideals to those espoused by the industries of mass persuasion as they sought to increase 
corporate profitability and increase the consumption of commodity goods. How did an 
‘emergent’ culture as embodied by the younger generation contribute to the lexicon and 
aesthetic of mass consumption? The following Chapter will analyse the historical 
development and tension between an ‘American’ vernacular art and transnationally arbitrated 
circulation of aesthetic criterion for 19
th
 century bourgeois art and early 20
th
 century 
modernism. Though unintentional, counter-hegemonic, alternative and emergent ideas that 
conveyed specific qualities of gender equality, individual self-fulfillment, self-expression, 
psychological adjustment and mobility all became key leitmotifs of the articulation of 
hegemony. Is this because there is something about capitalism that is ready and awaiting to 
‘co-opt’ the latest trends and fashions for its own purposes? Or is it rather that the rise of 
modernist discourses and aesthetic challenges provided a template for the fulfillment of the 
promises of access to ‘abundance’ and ‘mobility,’ that had previously been unrealizable due 
to the strict cultural order of the Custodian era? 
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3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has demonstrated that early 20
th
 century America witnesses a number of 
transformations in the structure of class and class consciousness. The emergence of the ‘white 
collar’ class is of particular importance for an analysis of a Sloanist society because they 
were the class of people that were targeted by politicians, business and advertising. Their 
values and aspirations have been held to be the key to unlocking the power of the ‘American 
Dream.’ Their lack of anchorage in either traditional working classes of 19th century 
bourgeois groups meant that their ‘cultural’ parameters were malleable. C. Wright Mills 
shows that this group of people were fundamentally interested in upward social mobility, and 
used stylistic emulation of ‘higher’ classes to position themselves and climb the social ladder. 
 
Of further importance is the inter-generational contestation between the Custodian set and the 
‘younger generation.’ This ‘contest’ was fought over aesthetic issues, including manners, 
fashions, stylistic and artistic preferences. It also provided the younger generation to proclaim 
the virtue of experience in urban areas, and to embrace the very chaos of modernity that the 
Custodians feared. The importance of the breakdown of Custodian norms is threefold. Firstly 
it demonstrates that any theory of political economy that analyses early 20
th
 century America 
cannot presume stability of ‘norms’ and ‘values,’ of dominant classes. Secondly this chapter 
shows that one way to interrogate how norms and values are challenged from within social 
groups is through looking at the aesthetic challenges facing those groups in periods of rapid 
social and cultural transformations. Finally, in keeping with Williams’ idea of hegemony, it 
shows that despite the eclipsing of Custodian cultural hegemony, enough of their 
conservative values ‘resided’ in society that could be later used and articulated by industries 
of mass persuasion. Therefore the interplay of norms and values showcase the relevance of an 
aesthetic approach to understanding hegemony. Whereas the traditional tools of neo-
Gramscian do not allow an exploration of the shifts in class and class consciousness (aside 
from appearing as functional aspects of a more fundamental change in the production 
system), evaluating the aesthetic challenges within and between classes or social groups 
highlights the way in which Sloanism captured the antagonisms and contradictions about the 
way in which people culturally apprehended their environment and relationships. 
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The next chapter will go onto demonstrate how these shifting structures of class and class 
consciousness were mediated by transformations in artistic and cultural ideas and practices, 
both domestically and internationally. 
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Chapter 4: American Pastoral, American Dream: Culture and Practices 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Having established in the previous chapter that relevant aesthetic contestations that gave 
American society a fluid sense of class and consciousness in the decades leading up to the 
Great Depression, this chapter seeks to contextualise those domestically comprehended 
transformations in a transnational circulation of ideas that sprang from artistic reactions of 
modernity and modernization. I have chosen to isolate those ideas that demonstrate explicit 
and implicit counter-hegemonic attributes to showcase that the aesthetic of hegemony that 
manifests itself in Sloanism was produced and consumed through this circulation of artistic 
and cultural ideas; both those that harked back to the 19
th
 century, and some that anticipated 
the future, with a rising counter-hegemonic avant-garde emerging in New York city. 
 
As such, this chapter will correlate the schema of hegemony as laid out by Raymond 
Williams. In the context of the arising of a mass persuasion complex situated around (but not 
wholly) the Advertising and PR industries, it seems relevant to highlight a further tension 
between what constitutes cultural objects. PR especially demonstrates its force and utility by 
appealing to the claims of science and rationality, whereas the Bernays case study should 
show that in fact it was rather a opportunistic admixture of art, culture, celebrity, pop 
psychology and emergent behavioural theories. This aesthetic of rationality and science, I 
will argue descends from a vernacular culture of American society in the 19
th
 century (some 
call this ‘folk’ culture) that prioritized simplicity and efficiency- from the making of the tools 
itself themselves, to the products of those tools. It is a narrative of how the pastoral settlement 
of the westward expansion, buoyed by discourses of Manifest Destiny and enticed by the 
prospect of creating abundance, detached itself from the prevailing fashions and styles of 
European society, fashions, styles and artistic tastes that resonated and were emulated by east 
coast elites during the 19
th
 century.  
 
Those same elites however, wrestled with the ideas and practices of their own natural and  
built environment, and in poetry, literature and painting, attempted to produce a self-
conscious, authentic ‘American’ art whose parameters of aesthetic judgement nevertheless 
remain anchored in the transnationally arbitrated circulation of norms and values. This typical 
tension shown in American elites paid increasing attention to the vernacular forms of thought 
and art developing after the Civil War, and by the early 20
th
 century American thinkers such 
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as Lewis Mumford were beginning to draw out these forms and make the case for them to be 
acknowledged as products of domestic cultural refinement on par with the academy-
sanctioned. As the ‘subject’ of American art and culture diversified- from Whitman’s 
prioritization of the democratic spirit of the American working class, to Alfred Stieglitz’s 
photographs of the New York poor, new media forms and artistic practices began to move 
away from the aesthetics of the ‘Classics’ towards capturing the aesthetics of an urbanizing, 
chaotic and mechanizing society. These changes- in the imagination and focus of artistic and 
cultural producers-, as demonstrated in the last chapter, are situated within a broader inter-
class and cross-class aesthetic contestation over the norms and values of a rapidly 
modernizing society.  
 
The uniqueness of the American experience, I argue here, is the particular manner in which 
these discordant ‘cultures’ were synthesized in the mass persuasion complex of the Sloanist 
political-economic formation. And in line with Benjamin’s argument in the Work of Art, it is 
proposed that mass reproducibility of these art forms- a branch of which carried out the 
imagization of the contradictions of modernity- facilitated the co-ordination of ‘fashionable’ 
styles, artistic trends, and ‘modernist’ manners and lifestyles that celebrated both 
individuality and the idea of upward social mobility. The triumph of these ideas in terms of 
culturally legitimating mass market society were not a result of a ‘top-down’ dissemination 
of norms and values from elite classes, but rather represent the ongoing aesthetic challenges 
to those norms and values. 
 
Given the period of study, and the necessity of isolating key actors and practices, I will first 
elucidate on the ‘vernacular’ culture of art and engineering that developed in the 19th century. 
When one thinks of the mass production factory as embodied by the River Rouge and 
Highland plants of the Ford Corporation, it is not only that the designs of the site themselves 
were the completion of a long process of perfecting simple, efficient assembly line 
engineering, but the imagization of these, by Charles Sheeler, was able to tap into an aesthetic 
appreciation of efficiency and sleek, simple design that can be traced to the settlement and 
conquest of the West.  
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4.2 American Culture and Art: Tensions between the Vernacular and the Worldly 
 
In Made In America, John Atlee Kouwenhoven argues that the traditional idea that American 
art is an extension of that produced by Western European civilization refuses to acknowledge 
the vernacular forms of cultural production. Rather than the art and culture itself being 
inherited from Europe, it was the ‘exacting cultural standards and criterion through which art 
is regarded and judged by.’260 
 
The pursuit of ideals of simplicity in the United States always co-existed uneasily with the 
material demonstration of wealth by individuals or social groups, whose fashions and styles 
were, like in Europe, aesthetic markers of upward social mobility. David E. Shi traces this 
tension throughout the history of European settlement in the United States, from the pre-
revolutionary era. From the Puritans and Quakers through to the ‘Patrician’ and ‘Progressive’ 
era, continual admonitions against materialism by ministers, magistrates and politicians who 
preached the ‘universality of plain living,’261 were counteracted in the everyday life by 
practices of outlandish lifestyles. The font on which they preached, which ‘provided a mythic 
idiom for nurturing moral concern and social revival that has proved both durable and 
influential, if not entirely reliable,’262 at the time offered a convincing case for settlers fleeing 
religious persecution in the Old World, but even by 1651 in the Massachusetts Bay Colony, 
‘the emerging Boston merchant classes especially chafed under the restrictions placed on 
their business and personal habits. Successful merchants, artisans and traders struggles with 
the conflict inherent in a communal ethic that stressed both hard work and simple living.’263 
 
As such, from the outset, a ‘double-standard’ existed in the United States that simultaneously 
celebrated plain and simple living on the one hand, and sought to emulate the ‘worldly’ 
fashions of Western European parlour culture on the other. This can be traced even within the 
pre-revolutionary circulation of lifestyle pamphlets or ‘conduct literature,’ designed to 
provide emerging middle classes (that is to say in the United States, not property-owning 
classes, but occupationally non-manual) with a guide for acting in the correct manner; 
Hemphill argues that this interest in manners is an expression of a culture that saw itself as 
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middle class, establish a powerful discursive and aesthetic ideational framework of social 
mobility.
264
 We must also take care to situate this is in a recognition of what ‘middle class’ 
means in the US. Though occupational roles have played a part in attempts to concretize the 
category, Hemphill also highlights that even in the late 18
th
 century, ‘fixation on occupation 
denies the a truth recognized by an earlier generation of historians who insisted on the middle 
class character of this society, and who noted that the groups of farmers, artisans, merchants 
and professionals all included persons who were poor, persons who were rich, and many of 
middling means.’265 As such, we might think of the aesthetic challenges amongst the 
‘middling sort’ as reflecting the tension between attempts to be recognized as middle class- 
through the uptake of manners and consumption of particular artefacts of fashion and culture- 
and the moral attempts (traced back through the Puritan and Quaker heritage) to be seen to 
abide by codes of conduct and lifestyle that were simple, austere and materially 
undemonstrative. As will be argued in Chapter 5, it is precisely this tension that works its 
way into the mass persuasion complex of the early 20
th
 century, with Calvin Coolidge’s 
stage-managed election campaign by Edward Bernays illustrating this dialectic of simplicity 
(ascribed to the character of Coolidge as a simple, hard-working American ‘everyman’) and 
material celebration (ascribed to the manner in which Bernays mobilised the latest celebrities, 
fashions and styles to support the campaign). 
 
Given this tension, I would propose that the idea of an ‘authentic,’ autonomously developed 
American art can only be made appreciable by constantly situating it within a transnational 
body of ideas, styles and cultural practices. The aesthetic parameters of this style, 
Kouwenhoven argues, were created and maintained by European bourgeois elites during the 
course of the 19
th
 century during the struggle for supremacy and wresting political hegemony 
away from the ancien regime. Nevertheless, cultural ideals that ‘resided’ in the previous 
social formations continued to influence the developments of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
century through this transnational circulation.As such, European art and culture as we 
understand is properly the product of the social and material conditions of Western Europe 
from the late Middle Ages to the onset of industrialization, one accordingly rooted in the 
agriculture and the handicrafts, with attitudes towards beauty and sublimity also shaped by 
                                                 
264
 ‘Middle Class Rising in Revolutionary America: The Evidence from Manners,’ C. Dallett Hemphill in Journal of 
Social History, 30:2 (1996), pg. 317 
265
 Ibid., pg 318. 
130 
 
the tenuous preservation of a Greco-Roman substratum in the urbes of Northern and Central 
Italy, its inheritance through Catholicism and finally the Protestant rupture.
266
 
 
American culture, on the other hand, received these sensibilities but did not confront the same 
social and material conditions that produced them in Europe; yet they were left with the 
residual criterion of European artistic judgement despite having to undertake new socio-
economic practices that stimulated a techno-scientific 
267
mindset. This likewise happened in 
Europe, but having already ‘developed’ their art and culture to a sufficient degree, the 19th 
century was therefore characterised by the dissemination of these standards across an 
increasingly volatile and self-recognising mass society. In the States, the techno-scientific 
mindset meant that an authentic American art would develop under these conditions; industry 
and science and the racial, ethnic and industrial class division (Kitsch, Vernacular) would 
contribute to the forging of an authentic American by the 1920s, one where the domain of art 
itself shifts, and requires a new lexicon and criterion of judgement to find out what 
Americans actually appreciate artistically. 
 
“For a hundred and fifty years the historians and critics of American culture have, in effect, 
been applying the established western European criteria of value to the products of a 
civilization which has had less and less in common with that which produced the forms and 
techniques from which those criteria were deduced. To the cultural achievements, and 
specifically the arts of a civilization whose dynamics originate in the technology and science, 
they have sought to apply the standards which were appropriate to those of civilizations 
founded upon agriculture or handicraft commerce.”268 
 
The next stage of the argument is to develop the ‘vernacular,’ those artistic and creative 
techniques/form that belong to the people. They are the ‘products of a unique kind of folk art, 
created under conditions which had never before existed.’269 Vernacular refers to ‘unself-
conscious efforts of common people to create satisfying patterns out of the elements of their 
environment.’270 However, it is not to be regarded as the products of communities that have 
been ‘cut off’ (e.g., Pennsylvania Dutch), but the art of a ‘sovereign, uncultivated people.’ 
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“In their purest form these patterns comprise the folk arts of the first people in history who, 
disinherited of a great cultural tradition, found themselves living under democratic 
institutions in an expanding machine economy.”271 
 
This assertion of artistic and cultural endeavour ‘from below,’ correlates with the relatively 
unhindered civil space that developed in the United States under Lockean conditions of 
private property and the sense of individual freedom. The settlement of the West produced 
unique social conditions, that, unlike the older cities of the eastern coast where ‘urbanization, 
commercialism, and cosmopolitanism were also combining to introduce diversity into the 
heretofore homogenous social order,’272 facilitated the development of a vernacular aesthetic 
that was detached from the ornamented styles in architecture and fashion that adorned the 
elites and rising ‘middling’ sort of the developing cities of the East. As such I would argue 
that ‘Cultural Hegemony’ in the United States, whilst anchored in the Patrician or Custodian 
elites of the East Coast, was never quite all encompassing (in the sense of defining the values 
and norms of culture) to overcome the voices of subordinate groups. Even in the early 20
th
 
century, in the depths of racial tension and clear, nationally articulated policies of 
discrimination, the New Negro movement managed to make itself heard and respected 
through the Harlem Renaissance.
273
 
 
Yet it is also in these Lockean conditions that ideas of commercialism and materialism began 
to flourish as a culture. The townhall character of early 19
th
 century American socio-political 
life began to be displaced in the antebellum years as ‘ships brought not only new goods but 
new people and new ideas,’274 presumably for the same reasons- religious freedom, 
perceptions of mobility and opportunities to create wealth- that the original settlers had 
arrived for.  And ‘in the process, the original medieval impulse toward a consensual 
communalism was gradually displaced by a more modern Lockean individualism.’275 As 
such, the ‘communal’ outlook of the early era, which apparently prioritized equality amongst 
social groups and transcendence of the social hierarchies that plagued the Old World had its 
roots in the ideals of the medieval Guild system of European mercantile cities. This 
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‘medievalism’ returns as a transnational movement in the Arts and Crafts Movements of 
England, Germany and the United States. 
 
However, problems of historical reflection means that these authentic moments are ignored in 
the wider intellectual and cultural pursuit of attaining comparable artistic status to European 
counterparts; ‘no one bothers to note the patterns of colors, shapes, sounds and ideas which 
plain people produce.’276Kouwenhoven’s ‘vernacular’ art of America therefore develops in 
the material conditions of the frontier; adaptation and innovative use of resources that ‘was 
likely to be marked by simplicity. There was no room in such a tradition for the ornate, and it 
was merely sound sense to design a thing as economically as one could.’277  
 
In tracing the development of American vernacular art, Kouwenhoven emphasizes ‘pastoral 
simplicity and efficient design,’ in the ‘axes, hatchets, picks and shovels,’ that were used in 
the encounter with the American natural environment. Whilst they were ‘not pleasing to the 
eye,’ the core values emerging from the making of these tools finds its apogee in the Corliss 
Steam Engine, first shown at the Centennial Exhibition’s Machinery Hall, where it was 
‘gracious’ enough to stand side by side with European counterparts. The tradition that ‘had to 
have machines and tools that would work well in a rough land, would economize labor and 
would save the owner from running to far-off shops for repairs,’ meant a predilection for light 
and simple tools, which were reflected in the form. An engine of that size had ‘long been 
customary for the designers to strive for architectural or other ornamental effects.’ The 
Corliss had a spartan, almost severe design, that exhibited clumsiness, and ‘looked much 
better in motion that it did when standing still.’ Nevertheless, the Corliss received exalted 
reviews from visitors, attracted to the very things that made it appear grotesque according to 
the generally accepted criterions of industrial design at the time. 
278
 
 
Kouvenhowen asserts that the next stage of the vernacular tradition finds its expression in 
‘empirical engineering,’ one with ‘no tradition, no codified grammar, of technological design, 
but only an intuitive sense of appropriate form.’ The focus remains on intuition, adopting 
original methods of design and patterning, and an aesthetic development of ‘economy of line, 
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lightness, strength and freedom from meaningless ornament.’279As such ‘The characteristics 
of economy, simplicity, flexibility with the products of the vernacular displayed so clearly in 
the United States are closely related to the design of the American system of industrial 
production itself.’280 In this way, the role of industrialization and westward expansion in the 
United States, which ascribe a perpetual quality of a society constantly on the move and 
traversing the boundaries of space and time, give rise to an appreciation of the aesthetic value 
of efficiency: 
 
“A living organism of industry, all compact of social values, may be truly an aesthetic whole. 
It may have beauty transcending a multitude of partial uglinesses, not because it is good, but 
because its excellence shows the form of perfect unity. That harmony of potent action, that 
blending of mutual influences, which, in symphony or drama, makes it difficult to disentangle 
cause and effect, is an unfailing mark, in the conduct of life no less, of the presence of the 
aesthetic quality.”281 
 
To stress again, this appreciation of efficiency- and an aesthetic that apprehends engineering 
and mechanized industry as cultural products, rather than external forces created by science 
and economy- must be located within a broader transnational arc of artistic and cultural 
judgement into which that aesthetic of efficiency could be ascribed virtue and beauty. The 
flipside to this is where the tools and products of an ‘engineering culture’ are judged by 
artistic and cultural criteria that distinguishes specific spheres of production. In this schema, 
the kind of vernacular developments taking place in the United States are not understood for 
their cultural or artistic worth; rather, once they have made themselves (and thought about as) 
the forces of mechanized economic transformation, they are culturally vilified as a part of a 
deus ex machina of modernity and modernization, an unstoppable force seemingly out of 
control of human action, ideas and practice.
282
  
 
Kouwenhoven argues that the lineage of the vernacular American art in industrial design 
produced what we now understand as ‘mass production.’ Eli Whitney, in 1798, manufactured 
10,000 rifles in two years, an unprecedented amount for the time, where there was a lack of 
skilled gunsmiths. The system of machine-made, standardized and interchangeable parts was 
of ‘primary importance in the history of modern civilization,’ by the early 1870s, the system 
had been so extensively applied in different industries that 600,000 sewing machines were 
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made and sold in a single year. The ‘American System of Manufactures,’ the precursor to 
Fordism, for Kouwenhoven,  strengthened and accentuated the characteristic qualities of 
American vernacular tradition; and furthermore if rifles, reapers, sewing machines and 
watches had not already been characterized by simplicity and plainness, it would have been 
difficult to imagine the system developing in the first place, or at least more problematic to 
apply.
283
 
 
The developments in American manufacturing systems, and the rapidity in which it spread 
was also to do with how power was transmitted from a prime mover (steam engine, water 
wheel, turbine) to the different machines within the factory. In 1841, Robert Willis observed 
that in Britain, it was dispersed by long shafts and toothed gear wheels, whereas in America it 
was in large-belts, moving rapidly and quietly.
284
 This system of pulleys and belts was less 
rigid than the toothed-wheel transmission, and its flexibility meant the arrangement 
machinery could be changed with considerable freedom- which became more important after 
the introduction of the new system of interchangeable parts. Kouwenhoven argues that the 
modern system of mass production is the unification of the system of interchangeable parts 
(developed by Whitney) and the mechanical handling system developed by Oliver Evans as 
far back as 1785. Their twin contributions- to the very design of the industrial structure itself- 
eventually lead to its unification by Henry Ford, the ‘modern system of power-driven 
assembly line manufacture.’285 
 
The rise of the system of mass production as a cultural artefact in itself, I argue has 
consequences for the shaping of any hegemonic political-economic system created around it, 
and particularly the aesthetic consequences of a system whose ‘abstract qualities having 
influenced every aspect of life in the twentieth century, drastically altering the material and 
social texture of Western life.’286  
 
Having noted the tension between a developing vernacular culture and the criterion of 
aesthetic judgement held by the Custodian elites of the Eastern cities, we will now turn to 
how reactive aesthetic contestations took place once observers became more aware of the 
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economic and social effects of industrializing society. As I have tried to suggest, these 
reactions varied in their critical purchase. Some associated these developments with the rise 
of large corporations and directed their criticisms towards the agents of organized capitalism; 
others, more sanguine, looked towards the political system to correct the perceived ills. I will 
go on to argue, then, that the reactive (or ‘antimodern’ as Jackson Lears deems) ideas of the 
Arts and Crafts movements posit (despite often being fused with Socialistic and counter-
hegemonic rhetoric) themselves antagonistically against the rise of machine production, not 
because of the alienation of individual workers from the production process (as generally 
understood in the Marxian sense), but because of a refusal to grasp the emancipatory 
underpinning of a system that developed precisely because of a celebration of worker 
ingenuity in the aesthetic of efficiency. As such, the machine-driven path towards mass 
production as manifested in Ford’s River Rouge and the Highland Plant in the 1910s and 
1920s was the culmination of a vernacular culture that appreciated beauty and sublimity in 
the materiality, design and tools of building that society, reflecting a cultural development in 
which the distance from central political and cultural authority allowed a space in which a 
developing art and culture could develop its own aesthetic parameters of judgement, divorced 
to a certain extent from the Atlantic circulation of bourgeois norms and values. 
 
 
4.3 Transnationalizing Modernity I: Foundations in Thought and Practice 
 
Writers like Edward Bellamy captured this disquieting era of rapid social transformation by 
thinking ‘out a logical conclusion for the processes of mechanical organization and 
monopoly, for the national expansion of great industries like steel and the stockyards, that 
were taking place under men’s noses.’287 Fused with a conception of a fair, communal society 
that had abolished private property, Bellamy’s Utopian vision in Looking Backward 
nonetheless assumes both the development of mechanized industrial forces and techno-
scientific planning and administration that would infuse the Stalinist mass industrialization of 
the Soviet Union a few decades later. Bellamy, like English critics John Ruskin and William 
Morris, rarely acknowledged the social relations that had engineered those possibilities in the 
first place, nor the active contribution of workers to shaping the onset of mass industrial 
society. Rather, they witnessed first hand perceived ills that they blamed on the rise of the 
machine age. Startled at its possibilities, yet fearful of the long term consequences that 
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machine-led production would have on the deskilled workers, Ruskin and Morris initiated a 
discourse of ideas and practices within the realm of factory production that spread rapidly 
around the advanced industrial nations of the period.  
 
As an idea, rather than a specific and historical system of factory production, mass production 
embodies a range of preoccupations central to the Modern perspective, particular with regard 
to the potential perfectibility of machine production and form-giving. The British Arts and 
Crafts movement for example expressed hostility toward the idea of moving toward a 
machine-based system of production, though their concerns appear to have undergone some 
kind of reconciliation in both Germany and the US. Producers gradually begun working with 
machines to produce luxury goods, believing that the machine would help the individual 
craftsmen produce harmonious form; critics and designers alike sensed that the artist had a 
‘duty to supervise and encourage the production of sober, machine-made forms which would, 
in turn, foster a stable , orderly society sharing common values.
288
 
 
These common values, I argue, are grounded in the way the art of a particular period is used 
to ‘judge’ the society in which it is produced. The task to undertake during the decades 
leading to the Sloanist political-economy, is to understand the way in which the perception of 
art, i.e., what constituted an art form, changed accordingly with the socio-economic and 
cultural conditioning of the United States. In the previous section, it is established that the 
specificity of 19
th
 century development in the US produced an aesthetic of efficiency in which 
the products of mechanical engineering were ascribed artistic qualities. We must also situate 
this within the cross- and inter-class aesthetic contestation over norms and values evaluated 
in Chapter 3, which gives rise to a tension between aesthetic judgement based on 19
th
 century 
bourgeois values against the emergent aesthetic of modernity and modernization. The 
perspective argued by Raymond Williams is that Ruskin and Morris see art and culture as 
emerging organically within social relations (similar to Kouwenhoven’s narrative of 
American vernacular art), as opposed to be directed from ‘above,’ i.e., from ruling elites.289 I 
would add that the role of the aesthetic here is to mediate that tension between that art and 
culture produced independently from specific, hierarchical social relations on the one hand, 
and the idea of art and culture as envisioned by ruling, or Custodian elites on the other. 
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As a reaction to the encroaching mechanization of production in mid 19
th
 century England, 
Ruskin’s ‘political economy of art,’ separates two kinds of beauty: typical and vital. Firstly, a 
‘typical’ beauty, that refers to the external qualities of bodies and objects, that can be judged 
beautiful or not according to ‘universal’ principles, where an artwork is imbued with ‘the 
grace of divine attributes.’290 This conception of the aesthetic, I suggest, is bound to the ideals 
of aestheticism that emerged from bourgeois attempts to ground a universally applicable set 
of criterion through which the judgement of art could take place. As an increasingly 
formalised branch of art criticism, this kind of conception of beauty negates the possibility of 
vernacular forms of art being considered canonical and therefore unrepresentative of the 
Divine. The second that Ruskin describes is ‘vital’ beauty, ‘the feliticious fulifillment of 
function in living things more especially of the joyful and right exertion of perfect life in 
man.’291 As opposed to the universalist Divine judgement reserved for typical beauty, 
Ruskin’s conception of ‘vital’ beauty speaks to the role of the design and function of things 
and how they contribute to the fulfillment of human existence. It is this idea of beauty that 
would later form the basis of the Bauhaus project under Walter Gropius in the Weimar era in 
Germany; in the United States, no equivalent project of apparent ideological cohesion 
emerged with enduring influence precisely because that conception of ‘vital’ beauty was 
already inscribed into the vernacular development of art and culture in the United States, 
though it still had to contend with the ‘universal’ or ‘typical’ judgements of beauty held by 
Custodian elites who mediated the transnational circulation of bourgeois aesthetics within 
American discourses of democracy, manifest destiny, social mobility and the promise of 
abundance. 
 
“The art of any country is the exponent of its social and political virtues. The art or general 
productive and formative energy of any country is an exact exponent of its ethical life.”292 
 
Williams argues that Ruskin’s ideas of vital beauty were anchored in the ideal of the 
perfectibility of mankind, and how design and form could exert on that process. Ruskin’s 
conservative critique of 19
th
 century laissez-faire capitalism- the ‘organic society’- was 
premised upon a Utopian vision of collective legislation, and as such his critique struck 
chords with both socialists as well as Custodian mentalities; that is to say, the ideas of design 
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and function that underpinned the critique were still based on a quasi-authoritarian ideal of 
class hierarchization.
293
 The ‘organic’ society appealed to both conservative and Marxist 
thinkers of the time, as it dispensed with ideals of equal distribution of wealth in favour of an 
‘interdependence and interrelation between industrial classes.’294 In the realm of conservative 
thought, it led to a critique of ‘men in industrial production,’ for which the ‘cash-nexus’ was 
the only active relation; this critique was typically employed by Custodian, old-moneyed 
classes. For the critique eventually expounded by Marxists, the ‘organic’ society became the 
basis for its attack on industrial capitalism as a whole and the limitations of 19
th
 century 
‘triumphant middle-class liberalism.’295 However, the difference in the United States (as 
more fully explored in Chapter 3) was that this ‘triumphant middle-class liberalism,’ was not 
shaking off the bondages of residual gentry power, but rather the dominant mindset that 
united a variety of social groups that in Europe at the same time would not have been deemed 
as ‘middle-class.’ 
 
The very ‘idea of culture,’ according to Raymond Williams and Terry Eagleton, is something 
that was a product of Western European socio-economic transformations in the 19
th
 century. 
This is not to suggest that there was a causal link between the changes initiated by the 
Industrial revolution and the transformation of culture; but rather the terms and parameters of 
judgement of cultural products and practices were intimately linked to the way in which 
writers like John Ruskin and William Morris characterised and ascribed civilizational 
standards to artworks and cultural objects. Furthermore, a keen focus on architectural 
standards and more broadly those creative outlets that contributed to the building of society 
show for Raymond Williams that that intimate, dialectical connection between culture and 
political-economy is mediated according to the manner in which writers, practioners and 
idealogues (all three in the case of Ruskin and Morris) apprehended their built environment 
and the discourses of social change that accompanied and influenced it. In this sense, for 
Ruskin and Morris: 
 
“Political Economy was neither an art nor a science, but a system of conduct and legislature, 
founded on the sciences but directed by the arts.”296 
 
                                                 
293
 Ibid., pg. 146 
294
 Ibid., 
295
 Ibid 
296
 Ibid., pg. 148 
139 
 
It is a vision of political-economy that acknowledges its basis in science and rationality, and 
one grounded in particular forms of emergent state power- but also one that co-exists with the 
arts and culture. The problem posed by this  is how political-economy is directed by the arts, 
and if it is, in what way does art and culture- that according to Eagleton, the ‘aesthetic; acts as 
a reservoir for non-alienated modes of cognition
297
- reveal or conceal the contradictions of 
political economy? 
 
In this respect, it is important to highlight the reactive nature of Ruskin’s thought- for it is in 
the inherent conservatism of these ideas relating to culture and political economy that made it 
vulnerable to legitimizing the forms of production and consumption that he directed his 
critique against; this is something shared by the Bauhaus and avant-garde modernists in the 
United States at during the 1920s and 30s. Ruskin had a particular vision for the social 
hierarchization at the apex of which would be a benevolent, aristocratic ruling class 
composed of Landowners, followed by a second estate of merchants and manufacturers and a 
third estate of scholars and artists. The function of each of these was also well defined- the 
goal of the landowning aristocracy was to ‘ensure order among inferiors,’; the merchants and 
manufacturers were there to ‘initiate honest production and just distribution,’; and the 
scholars and artists in their ideational and aesthetic capacities were to ‘develop wise 
consumption through the training of taste.’298  
 
The role of the scholar-artist social class is of special importance to us; for it resonates with 
the Custodian attitude of spreading refinement of manners and tastes through vertical 
dissemination in a society where everyone knew their place. Yet the idea of ‘training of 
taste,’ was also part of the fabric of rise of self-help books and lifestyle magazines that were 
mass circulated in the United States. Lippmann argues that the very health of democratic 
society was at stake because of the lifestyles were being sold, with the implication of 
individuals being able to ‘consume status.’299 Both the Custodian vision of disseminating 
culture from above and the modern, media driven ideals of consuming status through 
adoption of certain manners, behaviours and the consumption of fashions and good are 
underpinned the assumption that the possession of certain goods or emulation of lifestyles 
represented an upward shift through the hierarchy of society and culture. The crucial 
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difference is that under conditions of Custodian cultural authority, the strength of the idea of 
upward social mobility is counteracted by the rigid structure of society; under conditions of 
mass reproducibility and dissemination of media and cultural literature, the concept of an 
individual moving upward through social classes encounters less resistance, situated as it was 
during the era of the breakdown of Custodian cultural hegemony and the rise of diversified 
cultures. This uneasy tension, I believe is precisely what Walter Benjamin elucidates in the 
Work of Art: that despite the removal of ‘aura’ and the authenticity of art, mass 
reproducibility itself transforms the parameters of social hierarchy, providing the scope for 
subordinate classes to pursue their social and cultural goals through the mass consumption of 
culture. The ideas of Ruskin, despite his preference for a vertically and rigidly organized 
society, opens up the idea that ‘vital’ beauty- that which fulfills happiness in the individual- 
can be interpreted by anyone for their own interests, aspirations and conceptions of beauty. I 
would assert that this ideational strand continues through to early 20
th
 century avant-garde 
modernism, with its focus on interpersonal subjectivities and the challenges they presented to 
both academy-sanctioned ‘high art,’ as well their reactive disparaging of the ‘lowbrow,’ 
kitsch products of mass cultural production.
300
 
 
If Ruskin opened up a key discourse relating to culture and political economy, Williams 
asserts that the work of William Morris, and his sensitivity to the working classes in England, 
initiated a transnational circulation of ideas and practices of how to respond to the 
encroaching domination of the machine in production. Beginning with the Arts and Crafts 
movement in England (which also influenced American workers), and moving through the 
German Werkbund to the final relocation of the Bauhaus in the United States, it will be 
argued that despite being driven by Utopian, Socialistic ideals of how best to design and 
produce the built and imagized environment for the betterment of humankind, the forms, 
styles and techniques of these movements unwittingly legitimated the rise of mass 
consumption society in the United States, precisely because those forms tapped into the ideal 
of upward social mobility that I argued in the previous chapter predominated during the 
aesthetic contestations over values and norms between and within changing structures of 
class and class consciousness. 
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Morris’ departure point from Ruskin is that he believed that art ‘is the cause of the people,’301 
and that it represented an ontologically unique way of conceptualizing the ‘progress of 
society.’ Art, for Morris did not stand particularly for the improvement of working conditions 
nor could it be used to reveal a future system of a more equally distributive system of wealth. 
Rather, his project was about ‘winning back Art, that is to say, the pleasure of life; win back 
Art again to our daily labor.’302 Morris also advocated a retreat away from machine 
production, and believed in a somewhat romantic restoration of the medieval guild system. 
Williams argues that as a result of his idealization of a society without machines, his vision of 
the Arts and Crafts movement was compensatory and sentimental; or a refusal to confront 
realistically the transformations in production at the time. Walter Benjamin, on the other 
hand, was much more sensitive to the reality of mechanical reproduction and the potentials it 
might open up for subordinate classes to realize their cultural, political and socio-economic 
interests. For Benjamin, I argue, the mechanically reproducible art was the only way possible 
that working people could have ‘won back Art’, but as opposed to Morris, this can only occur 
under conditions of commodified consumption and mass reproducibility, rather than within 
the labour process itself. The problem opened up by this discourse on art and political 
economy  is whether ‘art’ and ‘culture’ produce an ideal society, or whether ‘art’ and 
‘culture’ are consumable as lifestyles that also express the political aspirations of the 
idealized society- one in the United States I have asserted was anchored in the idealization of 
upward social mobility. 
 
4.4 Transnationalizing Modernity II: Entering the 20
th
 century  
 
The Arts and Crafts movement inspired by Ruskin’s writings and instigated by Morris began 
in earnest in Britain after 1860. Concentrating initially on household objects, textiles and 
decorative forms such as wallpaper, the ideals of simplicity and craftsmanship (with minimal 
ornamentation drawn from folk arts or romantic styles such as those advocated by the Pre-
Raphaelite Brotherhood) soon extended into larger architectural projects, culminating in the 
‘Garden Cities’ movement of Ebenezer Howard. The common bond of the British Arts and 
Crafts movement was a perceived anti-industrialism, concern for the degradation of worker’s 
lives in industrial conditions, and concern for their alienation from culture and the products of 
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culture.
303
 However, even Morris’ own company set up in 1861 to provide employment for 
traditional craftsmen came undone by the reality of the competitive capitalist market; 
Whitford argues that the original ideological impulse was compromised because these 
attempts to stem the tide of machine-led industrialization were i) impractical in the sense that 
craftsmen’s products were more expensive than mass-produced ones, and could only be 
afforded precisely by the social class of ‘swinish’ rich that had the least need for them; 
cottage industries’ survival was thus dependent upon the patronage by the bourgeois, even 
though the idea and value placed on craftsmen’s products were thought to accrue and be 
appreciated by the ‘ordinary people.’ And ii) they were naive in the sense that they drew their 
ideational power from ‘imagined’ rather than authentic Middle Age guild systems, in which 
mechanization was not even a possibility.
304
 I would argue that therefore, the reaction to 
modernization under machine-led conditions forms the primary ideational ‘condition’ that 
underpins later aesthetic transformation. The critique is not directed per se at capitalist social 
relations, but rather than an exogenous rendition of industrialization as ‘deus ex machina,’ in 
which art and design can serve a corrective function against the social and cultural issues 
wrought by rapid modernization. Through greater focus on thought and practice, art and 
design may also develop into a transformatory or emancipatory contemporary force, as long 
as the potential of the machine is grasped and mobilised for the purposes of human good. As 
artists, it is vital to take note and theoretically incorporate the utopian aspect of their initial 
phase- driven not by revolutionary fervour nor compliant accommodation, but recognising 
broad potentialities for the improvement of the human condition through the role of art and 
design; as such these utopian visions work themselves into the aesthetic of the modernity, 
and thereby hold in its production (not consumption) the ideals and values assigned to 
‘human improvement’ by the artists.  
 
Whilst the Arts and Crafts movement did not have ultimate success in stemming the tide of 
machine-led industrialization, the ideas and products (particularly in housing) had an 
enduring influence in Continental Europe, where the not always thoroughly elaborated 
ideational dimension of Ruskin and Morris found a more explicit revolutionary voice through 
the Bauhaus School. Whitford argues that the admiration for British Arts and Crafts in 
industrial products, craft schools, garden cities and modern domestic architecture was an 
expression of the industrial and mercantile power it demonstrated in its global power. With 
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Germany and France looking to emulate Britain in the international system, the aesthetic 
produced by the Arts and Crafts found favour amongst both craft manufacturers and political 
leaders alike in the Continent.
305
 It is therefore of some curiosity that at the very moment that 
British  global political-economy hegemony (one that was possible precisely because of rapid 
industrialization and mechanization) began to be meaningfully challenged (from the early 
1880s onwards), the aesthetic expression of that power- that is to say, the styles that 
contenders considered to be worth aesthetically emulating- was derived partly from a 
movement that was premised on hostility for the system of production underpinning it. 
 
The Wiener Werkstatte, established in 1903 followed the ideological example of the British 
Arts and Crafts movement, concerned with ‘revitalizing the architecture, crafts, painting and 
sculptures from the shackles of historicism,’ but moved away from the medievalist, folk 
ornamentation of Morris. Craft workshops that produced furniture and textiles for sale in their 
own store, and provided training and support for its artists and craftsmen stressed simple and 
geometric forms.
306
 Galvanised by the arrival of Adolf Loos, who ideologically and 
aesthetically justified the Werkstatte focus on stylistic anonymity and nonexistent 
ornamentation in the 1908 essay ‘Ornament and Culture,’ the continental approach by 1910 
stressed the values of Arts and Crafts but with a reconciliation with mechanization, and 
admittance of the unstoppable force characterized by modernization. For Loos, the ‘greater 
the decoration, the greater the exploitation of the employed craftsmen,’307 and associated the 
ornamentation of products with both the conspicuous consumption of bourgeois classes as 
well as the kitsch tastes of the ever increasing white collar classes. 
 
A more coherent focus began to develop around the design and form of ‘objects that express 
the qualities of the materials in which they were made.’308 Loos also acknowledged that there 
was no point in creating an ideology of craftsmanship if the products of that craft were not 
affordable by the bulk of the working masses, and in the context of emergent forms of mass 
reproducibility, Hermann Muthesius switched the focus of Arts and Crafts towards a 
complete embracing of the machine- declaring that ornamentation and mechanization were 
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irreconcilable and that machine products were ideal for the working masses as they were 
‘smooth form reduced to its essential function.’309 
 
The realization, then, of the necessity of mass reproducibility for providing cheaply available, 
but well designed and formed products, led to a further alliance, or set of compromises with 
the key agents for which the machine-led industrialization reaped material rewards- the 
capitalist themselves. The German Werkbund was founded in 1907 by twelve artists and 
twelve industrialists, aimed at reconciliation of art, craft, industry and trade, and a specific 
focus on improving the quality of German products as a state-sponsored attempt to compete 
with British household products. Though the Werkbund shared with the Arts and Crafts 
movement a concern for people’s relationship to the product (its ability to aesthetically fulfil 
the pleasure outlined by Ruskin’s vital beauty), the foundation itself had accepted 
industrialism and capitalism as realities that design and form must adjust toward, and at best 
hope to placate the potential extremities of alienation from product that they believed would 
entail. This relationship, of a movement that had in its origins in a counter-hegemonic 
impulse that was simultaneously reactive and progressive in nature, to the broader capitalist 
reformations of the ‘managerial revolution,’ found Werkbund founder Peter Behrens being 
appointed chief designer of AEG in 1907.
310
 Behrens’ vision completes the move from the 
antimodern framing of Ruskin and Morris’ ideas to a modernist concern that was 
‘consciously seeking and finding the first ways to the reunification of the work of work with 
the creative artists,’ and asking ‘whether and when it will be possible to transform the great 
technical achievements of our age into the expression of a mature, elevated art.’311 
 
The Bauhaus School was founded by Werkbund member Walter Gropius in 1919, supported 
by the Weimar governments whose initial liberal and social democrat composition afforded 
the original ideas of the Werkbund a state-funded privilege and national recognition. Despite 
inheriting the Werkbund’s concern of synthesizing artistic craft and capitalist industry, the 
socio-political climate of early Weimar Germany saw an increasing willingness of artists to 
showcase explicit concern with their relationships to the social and political environment. 
Receiving inspiration from the Expressionist and Dada movements, Bauhaus artists shaped 
their art in terms of social and political-economic revolution using the school in its early 
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period as springboard to mobilize revolutionary consciousness- similar in vein, to the Marxist 
aesthetics elaborated by Georg Lukacs. The ‘artist-intellectuals’ of early Weimar Germany 
believed that their art should be ‘motivated by a desire for reform, transformation and 
breaking through the limits of cultural norms and embedded social value systems that 
prioritized authority, duty, and the virtual elimination of possibilities for change within the 
existing system.’312 Nevertheless, their focus on individual ambition and continual innovation 
of styles and forms left them bereft of the social activism that would necessitate those 
changes. Retreating into a world of individual ambivalence, the Bauhaus further suffered 
from internal dissent and faced severe economic crises from 1923 onward; by 1925 and its 
forced relocation to Dessau (after the Thuringian State government refused to sanction 
funding due to the polarizing political climate), the Bauhaus under Hannes Mayer began to 
tailor its teaching to the demands of industry.
313
 Yet despite the perpetual requirement to 
compromise beliefs and ideas due to the necessity of survival (a common theme, alas, 
amongst modernists from all nations during this period), the significance of Bauhaus is that 
they ‘created patterns and set the standard of present day industrial design; it helped to invent 
modern architecture; it altered the look of everything from the chair you are sitting on to the 
page you are reading now.’314 In short, the aesthetics of design and form produced by the 
Bauhaus entered the grammar of hegemony under Sloanist conditions of mass production and 
mass consumption. The details of their design were motivated by utopian concerns to create 
better living conditions for the working masses.
315
 They were also motivated by a desire to 
fulfill the ‘pleasure’ of life that art and culture promise. 
 
Despite the revolutionary impulse of the Bauhaus, the rapid integration of their forms (in 
architecture), styles (in typefaces) and fashions (household object), their idea of ‘unity of 
spirit,’ captured stylistically by Lyonel Feininger’s Cathedral (1919) resonates closely with 
the potentialities of mass reproducibility and consumption that Benjamin intimates. In other 
words, because the products of the Bauhaus style took shape during a period where mass 
production, mass consumption, mass reproducibility and mass persuasion- in short the 
coming of ‘mass’ society- provided the overall political-economic conditions in which their 
ideas could take shape and form, they were ideally suited for integration in capitalist society 
                                                 
312
Greenberg, Allan Dada and the Bauhaus, 1917-1925, University Microfilms International, 1979, pg. xiii 
313
Whitford, Frank Bauhaus, Thames and Hudson, 1984, pg. 8 
314
 Ibid., pg 10 
315 Caton, Joseph Harris The Utopian Vision of Moholy-Nagy, Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1984, pg. 51 
146 
 
in America precisely because their products and ideas fitted in with the promises of mass 
industrial society- abundance and a sense of cultural equality. 
 
“This spirit of unity was not intended to be a national spirit, but a human spirit; the 
determining characteristics were universal, intended to transcend the artificial boundaries 
rooted in nationalism and the cultural straitjackets into which men are educated.”316 
 
This integration of the ‘world of work’ with ‘creative artists,’ finds parallels in the United 
States, where modernist artists such as Edward Hopper and Alfred Stieglitz worked for 
advertising and public relations firms
317
; writers like Malcolm Cowley, who as a part of a 
generation of ‘exiles’ who participated in the First World War in France were exposed to the 
literary modernists and avant-garde of Europe, found work in tabloid magazines and 
newspapers, providing copy and sensationalized stories that often criticized and mocked the 
very bohemian circles they co-habited with.
318
 Though the Arts and Crafts movement’s 
resonance in the United States was largely limited to the architecture of Lewis Sullivan and 
Frank Lloyd Wright, modernist and avant-garde art, along with revolutionary politics of 
anarchism and Socialism infused the rise of a modernist class of writers and artists who 
challenged the cultural authority of the Custodian elite. The importance of this in terms of 
capturing the ‘moment’ of hegemony, is the way in which counter-hegemonic thought and 
practices in the domain of art and culture contributed to the aesthetic of hegemony. For if the 
products of culture and the forms through which they are disseminated through mass 
persuasion industries align with the aspirations of subordinate groups (again I stress that the 
‘aspiration’ is upward social mobility, possible and realizable with the breakdown of socio-
cultural hierarchy, rather than political-economic hierarchy), then the interaction of ‘residual’ 
and ‘emergent’ cultures with that of the dominant showcases that the political-economic 
formation is not driven from above. Furthermore, the transnational circulation of sleek, 
simple styles pioneered by the Bauhaus, I argue, complimented the vernacular appreciation of 
machine and industrial forms and structures that developed in the United States, where the 
products of mechanized industry were apprehended and aesthetically appreciated as cultural 
artefacts that complimented pre-existent ideals of upward social mobility, as opposed to the 
originating ideas of Walter Gropius. Nevertheless, the interest in the design and styles of 
Bauhaus products proliferated in the United States following the establishment of the ‘New 
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Bauhaus’ in Chicago in 1937, integrating into a recovering mass consumption economy 
whose products ‘contains the repression and virtual disappearance of its utopian humanistic-
social dimensions.’319 
 
The American experience of Bauhaus was not the first nor a unilateral instance of ‘German’ 
art and architecture’s influence in the US. Dankmer Adler who emigrated to the US as a child 
in 1854 was instrumental in establishing the Chicago school in 1881 with Louis Sullivan.
320
 
The work of this school was a crucial influence on the embryonic Bauhaus in Europe, 
particular the skyscraper visions of van der Rohe in the 20s as well as the design theory of 
Gropius and Meyer. Frank Lloyd Wright, who worked as an assistant to Sullivan, was 
likewise a tremendous influence on the early years of the Bauhaus, as attested by his visit and 
exhibition to Berlin in 1910. Thus we can see that the aesthetic encounter between two 
ostensible nation states was rather a multifaceted and reinforcing exchange between expert 
and artisanal classes, whose work and thought often transcended the limitations accorded to a 
supposedly ‘authentic’ national artistic culture- in the case of the US, at the turn of the 20th 
century, this had hardly been determined in any case.
321
  
 
Therefore I would argue that the ‘international’ dimension of aesthetic political economy is 
actually the very transnational preconditions that allow the ‘international’ to take hold in the 
first place. In other words, what we believe and understand as ‘American’ or ‘German’ in this 
case relating to the modernist movement, was only possible and determined by an initial 
transnational aesthetic encounter, mutually reinforcing each other, transforming and adapting 
content, meaning and style until becoming solidified in their respective national 
consciousness via the emergent media such as film and print media that allowed a rapid 
dissemination to take place to the wider populations. Furthermore, the two-way transmission 
of ideas and practices in the domain of art challenged embedded notions of aesthetic 
judgement. In both the United States and Germany, the Bauhaus contributed to the waning of 
influence of styles such as Beaux-Arts, whose architecture and design was associated in 
America with cultural elites who still looked to 19
th
 century European traditions for 
inspiration; the next section will show how a relatively small social group of American 
Modernists, in a short period of time, helped to a) overcome the Custodian cultural authority 
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in the domain of art and culture, and b) unwittingly contribute their styles and techniques to 
the developing iconologies of Sloanism 
 
4.5 American Modernism and its Contribution to Mass Persuasion 
 
“The arts defined a quality of living which it was the whole purpose of political change to 
make possible.”322 
 
The recognition of the political qualities of art and culture, and their potential to unravel and 
depict the social struggles of early 20
th
 century America shared with contemporaneous 
European modernism an ideological anchor in counter-hegemonic thought and practice. Alan 
Antliff argues that anarchism was the primary ideological force that lent coherence and 
direction to the American modernism movement between 1908 and 1920.
323
 Similar to the 
Bauhaus project in its early idealist phase before relocation to Dessau, the American 
modernist sought to bridge the gap between the two epistemologically separated spheres of 
politics and art. And similarly to the Bauhaus, their overall political impact-in terms of a 
systemic transformation- remained negligible compared with the impact their styles and 
techniques had on the emergent iconologies of mass persuasion. Furthermore, by directing 
their art towards revealing a ‘society where individual tastes, desires and inclinations’324 
could flourish, they unwittingly helped to culturally legitimate the values and norms, or 
‘ethos’ associated with a mass consumption society.325 They believed fervently in an artistic 
and cultural project of individual liberation in an American society where academy-
sanctioned ‘high art’ remained consumable by a privileged elite; and as such, the central 
irony is that it was only under conditions of mass reproducibility and mass consumption in 
which their project could be met. 
 
The anarchist (in distinction to ideologies based on communal politics) underpinning of 
American modernism is important in this respect, in the sense that early twentieth century 
anarchism was a ‘contested discursive field,’ with multiple forms of anarchism competing 
against each other and ‘affecting the self-conscious identity of the artist and recipient.’326 
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What they did share, was an opposition to ‘any ensemble of cultural beliefs and practices that 
oppressed the individual.’327 In this respect, whilst the modernists were influenced by the 
ideas of anarchism, their critique was directed against the cultural beliefs of perceived elites 
rather than the system of private property and expropriation itself. An ‘ethos’ of market 
society that prioritized individual choice and stylistic freedom would in that case not appear 
so distant from the goals of the American Modernists. In other words, by separating the 
cultural values of the Custodian elites from the processes involved in the transformation of 
capitalism to a bureaucratized managerial form that paid closer attention to the habits and 
aspirations of the mass, the modernists left their own ideas and stylistic innovations 
vulnerable (like the Bauhaus) to a form of everyday culture captured by mass consumption. 
So if capitalism in the United States at the end of the 19
th
 century was struggling to culturally 
legitimize itself through Victorian era Custodian values, the embracing of the rhythms and 
tempos of modernity by anarchist-modernists provided an ‘emergent’ culture through  which 
the grammar of hegemony could relocate in the focus of the individual and the upward social 
mobility that a secure Custodian WASP elite seemed to stand against (at a socio-cultural 
level, if not a political-economic one). I highlight this aspect in terms of the dialectical 
interplay between emergent and dominant cultures that Williams’ suggests holds the key to 
interrogating the nature of hegemony during a specific period. In the case of the American 
Modernists, their success in dismantling aspects of the dominance of Custodian elites on the 
one hand was counteracted to a certain extent by the integration of that cultural victory into 
the agencies and institutions of a newer, transformed and visualized culture of capitalism that 
would itself become dominant in its cultural form, that is to say, its aestheticization. 
 
Artists like Robert Henri, whilst trained in the formal techniques and classical styles of the 
American art academy system, created an avant-garde through their fusion of revolutionary 
social and political tendencies with artistic goals. These artistic goals were premised, upon a 
‘new consciousness that would constantly transform every aspect of the self in an unending 
quest for life’s affirmation.’328 Influenced by Nietzschean prototypes that posited artists, 
religious visionaries and philosophers at the high end of this quest
329, the ‘anarchist-
modernists’ of the United States had an uneasy and tenuous relationship to the emergent 
‘masses,’ on the one hand portraying the lamentable situations of poverty and alienation with 
                                                 
327
 Ibid., pg. 5 
328
 Ibid., pg. 8 
329
 Ibid. 
150 
 
startling reality, yet placing the subjects of their concern as a part of a ‘herd mentality’ that 
was insufferable to the anarchist focus of the individual.
330
 Yet in their conflict with the 
Custodian norms, the modernists were strategic in the way they brokedown the hold of the 
institutes, like the National Academy of Design that were perceived to discourage artistic 
independence with training placing a premium on mastery of Greek, Roman and Renaissance 
art through imitation. The rational process of composition discouraged spontaneity and 
experimentation, and academy judges tightly controlled the ‘space’ of the American creative 
world, holding annual exhibitions presided over selection panels that were composed of 
artists and teachers that reinforced Custodian approved value and dictated the terms of the 
public consumption of art.
331
 Furthermore, the Custodian establishment rewarded their 
favoured artists by networking support through newspapers and art journals, making it 
difficult for artists pursuing alternative visions of culture to transcend this system of cultural 
patronage.
332
 
 
Robert Henri, having had his work formally rejected by the National Academy of Design in 
1907, set up his own exhibition at the MacBeth gallery in New York in 1908 to showcase 
work of his nonacademic associates; this group would famously become known as ‘The 
Eight,’ and counted amongst them Charles Sheeler, who would go on to create the photo-
imagization of Henry Ford’s River Rouge and Highland Plants.333 Henri also re-organized the 
curriculum at the New York School of Art, prioritizing’ personality, originality of vision, idea 
and inventive genius in the search for specific expression stimulated.’334 And similar to the 
‘exiles’ of the Lost Generation of American literary modernists, Henri encouraged his 
students to develop their artistic personas in the slums of New York’s working class district, 
finding cultural inspiration amongst the bohemians of Greenwich Village. Typically, this 
form of cultural practice saw Henri’s students walking the line between pursuing artistic 
goals of individual innovation and expression and producing standardized illustrations in 
order to make a living. Bessie Marsh, one of Henri’s students, received attention from the 
New York World for her painting of two women in the slums recovering from a night out 
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drinking, yet made her living by selling commercial pastels of ‘pretty girls with hats,’ to 
educators and art dealers.
335
  
 
Despite the consistency of compromised activity made by Henri’s modernists, the artistic 
instruction they received that valued ‘personality,’ ‘individualism,’ ‘virility,’ and ‘life,’ 
contributed to the breaking down of cultural, gender and class barriers that had previously 
consigned artists to producing art that was amenable to the National Academy and consumed 
by upper classes.
336
 Furthermore, the vision of artistic freedom gradually found popularity in 
the press, showcasing the importance of the mediation of emergent aesthetic values in an era 
of mass reproducibility. I would concur at this point with John Xiros Cooper, who argues that 
the prime concern of artists in avant-garde enclaves developing in places like Greenwich 
Village was the preservation of art’s worth, and that any counter-hegemonic thought 
underlying their sometimes explicit anti-capitalist position was motivated by a reaction 
against what they saw as the encroaching commercialization of the art world. Their focus on 
‘defending the truth and art’ from commercialism, their habitation in bohemian enclaves were 
also motivated by a desire to re-create the ‘expiring traditions and values of community,’ in a 
comradely circle organized around the creation of art and enjoyment of intimacy.
337
 In terms 
of the aesthetic conservatism of the avant-garde, the preservation art’s worth, its absolute 
value in the process of completing the finished product through personal strain and sacrifice. 
The absolutes that structured these judgements were authenticity, necessity and primordiality; 
ones that supposedly lifted the greatest works beyond the reach of the commodity. But 
without the benefit of retrospect, nor a holistic theoretical framework to organise practical 
action, early modernists were bereft to understand the actual nature of capitalism, its 
transformatory potential for society: 
 
“…It could transform every affirmation of aesthetic worth, every gesture of aesthetic revolt, 
indeed take the idea of revolt itself and turn it into a sustaining structure of the new 
system.”338 
 
As such, I would argue that the two main achievements of the avant-garde in America- 
firstly, its contribution in challenging and overcoming the cultural hegemony of Custodian, 
academy-sanctioned art, and secondly in prioritizing and popularizing the ideals of individual 
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self-expression- represent an emergent culture becoming durable and powerful enough at a 
particular juncture of political-economic transformation to surmount the supposed values 
and norms of the dominant capitalist culture, lending it the dynamism and cultural legitimacy 
for its agencies of mass persuasion to then re-create visualizations and imagizations of an 
American capitalism anchored in mass consumption practices that appealed to both the 
‘residual,’ conservative values of the late 19th century as well as the modernist values of 
individual expression. The leitmotifs provided by the latter finally also realize the promise of 
upward social mobility in an iconology of capitalism. The particular juncture that makes this 
possible, as will be argued in Chapter 5, is precisely the conditions of mass reproducibility 
that allow an emergent culture such as the avant-garde, despite (or because of) its internal 
antagonisms and contradictions to become durable and aesthetically powerful in a period of 
political-economic transformation. 
 
 
4.6 Spaces of Contestation: Studio 291 and the Ferrer Center 
 
Studio 291 was opened in 1908 by American photographer Alfred Stieglitz, and is regarded 
as having contributed to establishing photography as an artform worthy of a status 
comparable to painting and sculpture in America.
339
 The gallery not only exhibited 
photography, but was also a site of introduction for European avant-garde artists like Pablo 
Picasso and Marcel Duchamp, whom Robert Henri had met in Paris and sent their artwork to 
Stieglitz. Like Henri and Emma Goldman, Stielglitz shared a ‘hatred of academic 
conservatism and the exploitation of artists at the hands of the commercial gallery system.’340 
The Studio 291, which also promoted the photogravure works of the internationally 
distributed Camera Work (in which Emma Goldman published her anarchist writings), as 
such acted as a site of culturally counter-hegemonic ideas and practices, and along with the 
Ferrer Center links together a number of important American Modernists including Edward 
Hopper and Stieglitz’s wife Georgia O’Keefe. Their work for Edward Bernays will be 
elaborated upon in Chapter 5 to demonstrate the intimate personal connections that 
contributed to the mass persuasion industries. Like Henri’s Macbeth Exhibition, the Studio 
291 promoted radicalism and individualism, showcasing ‘bold experiments of avant-garde 
artists,’ and affirmed the goals of self-fulfillment and artistic freedom in a place where ‘one is 
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free to delight in the freedom of expression in others, thus making it one’s own freedom and 
one’s own expression.’341 It further enmeshed the modernist artists’ ideal of a non-national 
bound artistic community that was also expressed by the Bauhaus. 
 
Likewise, The Ferrer Center, opened in New York in 1911, acted as a training school for 
modern artists like Edward Hopper and Man Ray, both of whom would become iconic 
figures of American Modernism, with Hopper’s paintings of the lonely figures of New 
York’s nightscape, haunting Art Deco cafés and dramatic use of dark and light acknowledged 
as a key influence by Hollywood film directors from the 1950s onward. This enduring legacy, 
taught, created and nurtured in marginal sites of artistic activity that fused anarchist politics, 
counter-hegemonic artistic practices and reactive ideas against both the perceived 
commercialization, helped to create an aesthetic  of American capitalist power, its hegemony 
anchored in the exchange and dissemination of new styles, techniques and ideas of an 
emergent, transnational modernist culture, and contested against the norms and values of 
dominant and residual cultures of corporate capitalism and Custodian genteelness. We can 
note that the aesthetic styles of modernism, ranging from the Bauhaus to the pioneering 
photography of Stieglitz attempted to capture and unravel the specific forms of life and 
culture that were developing under conditions of modernization, affirming their products with 
qualities that were supposed to bring back joy and fulfillment to art from the sterility of 
academy arts that were suited to 19
th
 century bourgeois culture. Yet in attempting to politicize 
their art and culture, and seek the ‘spirit of unity’ in form and design emphasized by the 
Bauhaus, modernism contributed to the ‘mass’ forms of capitalist society, ranging from 
architecture to industrial and commercial products that bore the hallmark of culturally 
counter-hegemonic styles- particular in their rejection of ornamentation and preference for 
sleek, straight and ‘efficient’ forms.342  
 
In this, I argue that that ‘emergent’ culture personified by the artists and photographers of 
sites like Studio 291 and the Ferrer Center also justified the ‘aesthetic of efficiency’ which 
had been drawn out of American vernacular forms of art and engineering in the 19
th
 century, 
which similarly had emerged in contradistinction to the European bourgeois styles and 
fashions of East Coast elites. As such, the ‘residual’ and ‘emergent’ cultures provide 
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hegemony in the early 20
th
 century with a grammar that was drawn from the past (whose 
culture of efficiency and hard work had worked to fulfill the promises of Manifest Destiny 
and abundance (as imagined in the form of the factory as cultural artefact) and the dynamism 
of the present and the emergent cultures that were no longer submerged by Custodian 
dominance- a fact made possible by the rise of mass production and mass reproducibility. 
 
Artists such as Charles Sheeler, Man Ray and Edward Hopper were all trained at the Ferrer 
Center and exhibited their work at Studio 291. Sheeler would also paint and photograph the 
Ford factories at Highland and River Rouge, contributing to the iconology of capitalism. His 
techniques were influenced by Aleksander Rodchenko, a prominent figure of Soviet 
Constructivism. This transmission of ideas between modernists from different nations 
showcases that despite the different ideologies and systems of property of nations, the 
modernists existed as a transnational class of artists and cultural producers who sought to 
visualise and provide critical commentary on the processes of modernization. Despite their 
often critical posture against the lowbrow, kitsch products being produced for the mass 
market, they also contributed to the ‘celebration’ of modernity, imbuing their art with beauty 
and virtue. As such these aesthetic developments conferred an appreciation of modernity and 
modernization in general, rather than capitalism per se. The aesthetics of hegemony in 
America, then, showcase a celebration of the artefacts- cultural and industrial- that hoped to 
deliver the promises of abundance and mobility. In a similar vein, Rodchenko’s work for 
USSR in Construction helped to legitimate the Stalinist efforts of mass industrialization on a 
similar terrain: it was not so much a celebration of Communism, but one that highlighted the 
huge possibilities of industry and the society that might develop out of that in terms of 
fulfilling people’s needs and desires.343 The difference in the United States, however, was 
that the malleability of structures of class consciousness meant that the art and culture 
produced under conditions of mass reproducibility were open to interpretation in a way that 
was not possible in an authoritarian context in the Soviet Union.
344
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
343
 Margolin, Victor, The Struggle for Utopia: Rodchenko, Lissitzky, Moholy-Nagy, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1997, pg. 44 
344
 Ibid., pg. 58 
155 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has aimed at elaborating the key aesthetic contestations in early 20
th
 century 
American art and culture. The purpose of this is to provide an understanding of the styles and 
movements that contribute to the aesthetics of hegemony under Sloanist conditions. The 
importance of these movements, particular in the case of modernism, was that they presented 
a political challenge to received notions of cultural and political-economic order. Using 
Raymond Williams and Walter Benjamin as a theoretical template for this analysis, it has 
been shown that the development of an under-appreciated American vernacular art co-existed 
with 19
th
 century bourgeois categorizations and appreciation of art. Furthermore, the rise of a 
transnational modernism artistic movement, fused with counter-hegemonic ideas and 
practices, likewise challenged and prevailed over the ‘high’ art preferences of American 
elites. 
 
The tensions between vernacular art and culture and bourgeois preferences highlight both the 
importance and difficulty of drawing out the ‘aesthetic of hegemony.’ Vernacular art 
remained unappreciated and overlooked because of expectations that American art would 
imitate and conform to parameters of artistic judgement that had been created in Western 
Europe and circulated amongst East Coast elites in America. For an individual to have a 
refined taste, or sense of style, it was Europe that they would turn to for inspiration. Those 
tastes and styles represented aesthetic markers of a person’s position in society, and in the 
context of a society evermore conditioned by ideals of upward social mobility, became 
models of emulation.  
 
However, residing through the completion of Manifest Destiny at the turn of the 20
th
 century, 
an American vernacular art and culture that prized the ‘aesthetic of efficiency’ and sleek 
design using simple materials began to make an impact on the styles and designs upon 
architecture and public works that would become iconic to American power, including the 
great skyscrapers of New York and the Brooklyn Bridge. At the same time, Europeans 
reacting against the increasing mechanization of production initiated discourses and practices 
that were designed to restore the sense of worth to worker production as well as create 
products that fulfilled aesthetic virtue for those who consumed them. Beginning with John 
Ruskin in Great Britain and culminating in the Bauhaus School in Germany, these ideas had 
‘anti-modern’ impulses and counter-hegemonic thoughts behind them. They also gradually 
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ceded more and more towards mechanization and eventually big business. The key point 
however, is how those initial impulses of aesthetic fulfillment offered a new template for 
mass production and mass consumption in terms of design and style. 
 
The reception of modernism in the United States has been often cast aside as a moment where 
capitalism ‘absorbed’ counter-hegemonic art and culture. By looking at the spaces of 
contention such as Studio 291 and the Ferrer Center, this chapter has argued that those artists 
and cultural producers had a more enduring effect on the ‘aesthetics of hegemony.’ They 
provided a new grammar in which ideals of upward social mobility could be captured and 
furthermore demonstrated the waning of Custodian cultural norms. Focusing on the ‘new’ 
and the ‘individual,’ modernism provided an aesthetic template for the development of 
Sloanist society, whose power lay precisely in its ability to showcase promises of abundance 
and mobility in a visual iconology of capitalist power. In this way, it showed surprising 
concomitance with a similar visualization of collective industrial power in the Soviet Union. 
 
The next chapter will demonstrate how the transformation in artistic practices, alongside the 
changes in structures of class and class consciousness, coalesced in the mass persuasion 
industries, the key site that articulated and disseminated the values of the ‘aesthetics of 
hegemony.’ 
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Chapter 5 
The Art of Mass Persuasion 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter established the role of artistic modernism and American vernacular in 
shaping the ‘aesthetic’ of hegemony under Sloanist conditions in early 20th century. This 
chapter will critically evaluate in what way that ‘aesthetic’ was visualized and articulated in 
key site of dissemination; the mass persuasion of industries of advertising and public 
relations. These industries demonstrate a particular social interaction between business, 
government, social theorists and artists, designers, and copywriters. The individuals of these 
different social groups all lent their interests and values in the co-ordination of strategies of 
mass persuasion. 
 
Ideas of mass persuasion, as exemplified in the work of Edward Bernays and Walter 
Lippmann, provide a strong focus on the ‘psychological’ and ‘scientific’ bases of new 
marketing, advertising and public relations strategies. Despite the enduring relevance of these 
perspectives, it is not the purpose of this chapter to document or discredit the role of the 
‘depth’ approach, behavioural psychology and other tools of social science in the rise and 
success of the advertising and public relations industries, nor to underestimate how they 
contributed to the ascent of mass persuasion in the political-economic and socio-cultural 
arenas. Rather, it focuses on how the art of mass persuasion co-existed with these social 
scientific theories, and provided an aesthetic template for them to be realizable in the 
articulation and visualization of hegemony under Sloanist conditions. 
 
It will be argues that the advertising and public relations industries are not distinct entities, 
but from the outset were intertwined and produced a range of new techniques- from the use of 
celebrity endorsements for both politicians and household goods and the pioneering of 
‘emotional’ merchandising to the use of avant-garde and modernist artistic techniques and 
creation of a mass communicative complex between advertisers, newspapers, magazines and 
radio. As such, an analysis of the growth of the advertising and PR industries themselves can 
only go so far, in that whilst it might illuminate their success in creating and sustaining a 
mass consumption orientated political economy, it does not explain the power of the ideas 
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that underpinned that success, or in what ways it contributed to the re-articulation of 
hegemony by the time of the crucial juncture of the Great Depression. 
  
It will therefore be argued that the art of persuasion- aimed at consumers and voters- had 
become entrenched as a technique of political-economic elites- precisely because, as a 
technique that drew from the reservoir of cultural discordance in the United States over the 
nature and reflection of encroaching trends of modernity and modernization, it acted as a 
‘Janus’, able to simultaneously privilege the ideas, norms and values of the previous, 
‘Custodian’ era as well as proclaim selected ‘virtues’ of the modern age that were favourable 
to the requirements of an expanding consumer market. With respect to this process of 
‘selection,’ the role of the editor becomes paramount, for both the selection, phrasing and 
arrangement of copy as well as the placement and stylisation of increasingly prevalent visual 
aids. Making of use of new medias and continually refining techniques of photogravure 
newspapers, lifestyle magazines and poster art began to showcase a number of visual 
accompaniments to copy, from satirical political cartoons and photographs of warfare, to 
advertisements. 
 
The key social agents that contributed to the art of mass persuasion held a number of often 
discordant and antagonistic ideals about what was happening in the US at the time- from the 
more obvious figures of Edwards Bernays and Calvin Coolidge, to the ‘backstage’ characters 
of the copywriting and illustrations departments of advertising agencies, the ‘space-jobbers’ 
of newspapers and lifestyle magazines. Holding haphazard assumptions about people’s 
desires and behaviour on the one hand, and yet a yearning for professionalization, industry 
acceptance and organizational standardization on the other, the encroachment of the science 
of mass persuasion only becomes definitive after the period of creative innovation that 
characterises advertising and PR between 1919 and 1929. As such, the ‘moment’ of 
hegemony, the genesis of a culturally legitimated ‘consensus’ that successfully articulates the 
political-economic interests of a specific elite as general interest occurs during the integration 
of artistic and creative techniques that bypass the rational subject and appeal to emotional and 
sentimental faculties of people. In liaison with emergent structures of communication and 
medias of visualization, I will argue that this represents an aesthetic transformation of 
political economy, whereby the depiction of ‘ideals’ of material aspiration and personal 
‘utopias’ of individuals (i.e., how people would like to be perceived and how people would 
like to be in the future) give rise to a political-economic configuration that became 
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increasingly hinged upon appearance (i.e., perception and reflection upon form) of ideas, as 
content was gradually stripped away- what Jackson Lears has called the ‘collapse of 
meaning.’ 
 
The importance of this approach, and focusing on the social agency that facilitated these 
transformation, showcases that far from having planned strategies of ‘deception,’ or ‘veiling’ 
in the Bernaysian sense, advertising and PR men often acted impulsively and 
opportunistically. Rather than social content of advertising art and copy either reflecting 
transforming attitudes of the American public or engineering those attitudes, the practices 
and ideas of advertising people remain ambiguous and selective- sometimes distorting social 
reality to create ‘modern’ aspirational models infused with progressive, modernist 
sensibilities that were at odds with the reluctant modernism of other advertisers. The section 
regarding the differences in approach, attitude and ideas of three advertising agencies during 
this period should showcase how both Custodian and Modernist ideals were integrated into 
an aesthetic of the American Dream. 
 
Finally, we must consider the dialectical interplay of ideas, practices and images that allows 
us to move beyond the idea that hegemony operates as a ‘top-down’ process where the norms 
and values of ruling classes are ‘filtered down’ through society. David Gartman argues that 
the emergence of mass produced automobiles- whether it be Ford’s ‘everyman’ Model T, or 
the vertically stylised brand ranges of the General Motors Corporation- was as much to do 
with the pressures of working class and emergent white collar class agencies, that their 
consciousness of upward social mobility and choices made in the market for automobiles, 
their responses to questionnaires over chassis design, all represent political aspirations and 
demands made within the seemingly separate domain of culture. Precisely because of an 
ever-growing recognition of the ‘masses’ and the ‘public,’ business leaders looked towards 
the advertising and PR industries to ascertain more clearly (though often with nonsensical 
results, as the example of JWT’s European market for GM foray will show) what the desires, 
political, economic or socio-cultural, of the people actually were. Whilst Packard provides a 
convincing argument that this ‘probing of the public mind’ through psychoanalytical and 
social scientific techniques is justified, it is argued here that those techniques, whilst certainly 
in early fruition during this period, did not become prevalent until the New Deal era, and that 
for the period between 1919 and 1930, the circulation of ideas and attempts to influence 
public desire were more influences by artistic and creative techniques.  
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As such, this final chapter aims to reconcile the claims made in the previous three chapters. 
Firstly, that a framework of Sloanism provides a fuller picture of hegemony than Fordism. 
This chapter shows how advertisers and public relations consultants shaped and fostered the 
ideals of upward social mobility within the agencies of mass persuasion. It will also show 
how the breakdown of cultural order and rise of counter-hegemonic ideas helped to bring a 
vocabulary and grammar to the mass persuasion industries that allowed it to portray 
particular ideal-types of American history, present and future in which Raymond Marchand 
argues coalesces around the idea of the ‘American Dream.’ Finally this chapter will 
demonstrate how the techniques and styles of both modernism and vernacular American art 
contributed to the images produced by the advertising industries, and how they figure in the 
public relations industry. These final claims will be substantiated by a case study of Edward 
Bernays’ public relations work, drawn from the Library of Congress Archives. 
 
5.2 Situating Mass Persuasion 
 
“The conscious and intelligent manipulation of the organised habits and opinions of the 
masses is an important element in democratic society. Those who manipulate this unseen 
mechanism of society constitute an invisible government which is the true ruling power our 
country.”345 
 
“The use of mass psychoanalysis to guide campaigns of persuasion has become the basis of a 
multimillion dollar industry. Professional persuaders have seized upon it in their groping for 
more effective ways to see us their wares- whether products, ideas, attitudes, candidates, 
goals or states of mind.”346 
 
Edward Bernays, writing in 1928 on the cusp of the Great Depression in Propaganda, 
presents in the most straightforward manner the case for the manipulation of the ‘masses’ as a 
means through which those occupying the dominant social order can retain and expand their 
power into all areas of social, political and economic life. In no uncertain terms, Bernays calls 
upon these people- the true, ‘invisible’ government of the United States of America- to 
organise specific strategies of manipulation, to draw a ‘veil’ over society under the guise of 
liberal democracy and stand assured behind this veil to particularise the tastes, habits and 
opinions of the ‘masses.’ 
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For Bernays, this project of deception, of mass persuasion, was a necessity if Americans were 
to live together in a peaceful and functioning society. Armed with the new social scientific 
tools provided by psychoanalysis, Bernays was adamant that there were now novel ways of 
‘reaching into the mass,’ believing that ‘the understanding of the mental processes and social 
patterns of the masses facilitates the ability to harness the old social forces and contrive new 
ways to bind and guide the world.’347 
 
Thirty years later, in the Hidden Persuaders, Vance Packard confirmed the 
professionalization of the public relations industry as a multi-million dollar phenomenon in 
the United States by the 1950s. Focusing on the ‘depth’ approach to public relations and 
advertising, Packard privileges the role of social scientific, psychological and psychiatric 
techniques that underpinned Motivational Research and Behaviouralism to explain the rise of 
Persuasion in the United States. His analysis brings to the fore dedicated advertising 
agencies, flanked by phalanxes of psychologists, with rooms dedicated to testing volunteers 
from the public where ‘depth’ probing into people’s subconsciousnesses could be carried out, 
analysed and translated into marketing and advertising strategies. These ‘depth’ men were 
attempting to understand ‘why people do what they do’- in order to more efficiently and 
effectively influence people’s behaviour, and direct that behaviour in non-coercive ways 
towards the mass market of commodities and services.
348
 
 
Despite the enduring relevance of these perspectives, it is not the purpose of this chapter to 
document or discredit the role of the ‘depth’ approach, behavioural psychology and other 
tools of social science in the rise and success of the advertising and public relations 
industries, nor to underestimate how they contributed to the ascent of mass persuasion in the 
political-economic and socio-cultural arenas. Rather, focusing on the Gramscian moment of 
hegemony, studies of Edward Bernays’ PR work drawn from the Library of Congress 
Archives, along with analyses of three major advertising agencies in the pre-Great 
Depression era (N.W. Ayer & Son, J.W. Thompson, and Barton, Durstine & Osborn (BDO)) 
will be interrogated to argue that these techniques, together with the transformation of the 
socio-cultural content of advertising art can allow us to re-imagine the processes of 
hegemony during the early Fordist period.  
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Specifically, it will be argued that, advertising and PR industry are not distinct entities, but 
from the outset were intertwined and produced a range of new techniques- from the use of 
celebrity endorsements for both politicians and household goods and the pioneering of 
‘emotional’ merchandising to the use of avant-garde and modernist artistic techniques and 
creation of a mass communicative complex between advertisers, newspapers, magazines and 
radio. As such, an analysis of the growth of the advertising and PR industries themselves can 
only go so far, in that whilst it might illuminate their success in creating and sustaining a 
mass consumption orientated political economy, it does not explain the power of the ideas 
that underpinned that success, or in what ways it contributed to the re-articulation of 
hegemony by the time of the crucial juncture of the Great Depression.  
It will therefore be argued that the art of persuasion- aimed at consumers and voters- had 
become entrenched as a technique of political-economic elites- precisely because, as a 
technique that drew from the reservoir of cultural discordance in the United States
349
 over the 
nature and reflection of encroaching trends of modernity and modernization, it acted as a 
‘Janus’, able to simultaneously privilege the ideas, norms and values of the previous, 
‘Custodian’ era as well as proclaim selected ‘virtues’ of the modern age that were favourable 
to the requirements of an expanding consumer market. With respect to this process of 
‘selection,’ the role of the editor becomes paramount, for both the selection, phrasing and 
arrangement of copy as well as the placement and stylisation of increasingly prevalent visual 
aids. Making of use of new medias and continually refining techniques of photo-lithography, 
newspapers, lifestyle magazines and poster art began to showcase a number of visual 
accompaniments to copy, from satirical political cartoons and photographs of warfare, to 
advertisements.
350
 
The key social agents that contributed to the art of mass persuasion held a number of often 
discordant and antagonistic ideals about what was happening in the US at the time- from the 
more obvious figures of Edwards Bernays and Calvin Coolidge, to the ‘backstage’ 
characters
351
 of the copywriting and illustrations departments of advertising agencies, the 
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‘space-jobbers’ of newspapers and lifestyle magazines. Holding haphazard assumptions about 
people’s desires and behaviour on the one hand, and yet a yearning for professionalization, 
industry acceptance and organizational standardization on the other, the encroachment of the 
science of mass persuasion
352
 only becomes definitive after the period of creative innovation 
that characterises advertising and PR between 1919 and 1929. As such, the ‘moment’ of 
hegemony, the genesis of a culturally legitimated ‘consensus’ that successfully articulates the 
political-economic interests of a specific elite as general interest occurs during the integration 
of artistic and creative techniques that bypass the rational subject and appeal to emotional and 
sentimental faculties of people. In liaison with emergent structures of communication and 
medias of visualization, I will argue that this represents an aesthetic transformation of 
political economy, whereby the depiction of ‘ideals’ of material aspiration and personal 
‘utopias’ of individuals (i.e., how people would like to be perceived and how people would 
like to be in the future)
353
 give rise to a political-economic configuration that became 
increasingly hinged upon appearance (i.e., perception and reflection upon form)
354
 of ideas, 
as content was gradually stripped away- what Jackson Lears has called the ‘collapse of 
meaning.’355 
 
5.3 Advertising and Public Relations: Social Agency and Mass Persuasion 
 
“To make advertising interesting, we need a sensation; and advertising forms so large a part 
of our daily intellectual diet, that it seems not too grasping to ask for a change of mental 
food.”356 
 
The modern advertising industry in the US has its roots in the period between 1890 and 1930, 
during which period a number of previously separate tasks, carried out by separate 
practioners, gradually began to be absorbed by successful advertising agencies such as N.W. 
Ayer & Son, founded in 1869 in Philadelphia. These tasks included the traditional, 19
th
 
century role of the advertising agencies such as buying and selling space in newspapers and 
printed journals. Other ‘primary’ functions of what we now understand as advertising, such 
as the production of written copy, illustrative accompaniments and the processes of 
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physically reproducing the advertisement were carried out by separate, normally independent 
tradesmen.  
 
Thus the agency remained a ‘middle-man,’ whose entry into economic life was necessitated 
by geographically expanding market areas, with clients requiring sales promotions into ‘new’ 
markets across the United States. The advertiser in the 19
th
 century would then be sub-
contracted by the agency to provide copy, and was assumed to have enough knowledge about 
local or regional peculiarities, especially regarding localizing sales campaigns in accordance 
with vernacular language and customs.
357
 In tandem with local newspaper editors and 
publishers, the agency acted as a co-ordinating node between the producer/seller, the 
advertiser, and the mediums through which advertising would take place.  
The transformation of the advertising industry in terms of the gradual centralization of these 
separate, specialist roles under the guise of a modern corporation cannot be pinpointed to a 
specific moment, but histories of both N.W. Ayer and J Walter Thompson (JWT) agencies 
highlight the role of expanding circulation of newspapers, when editors and owners of 
newspapers sought to increase their income through advertising, as subscriptions alone could 
no longer pay their enterprise any longer.
358
 The history of newspaper and print journalism 
expansion, indeed, can be considered to be corollary to the transformation of advertising- in 
fact the very first ‘advertising’ agency known in the United States, Volney B. Palmer, was 
founded in 1842 in Philadelphia at the behest of the city’s printers who had recently launched 
newspapers.
359
 As newspaper circulation rose throughout the late 19
th
 century, so 
advertising’s role transformed to deal with the technical details of printing and layout, 
lithographic reproduction and illustration. Nevertheless, advertisers still saw their function 
primarily in terms of their contribution to one goal- shifting the commodity from producer to 
consumer: 
 
“Some of them buy and sell tangible goods; others buy and sell services; but this difference 
does not affect the value of their work. They win a place in our economic structure through 
their ability to perform a service more cheaply or more effectively than the non-specialised 
business man can do it.”360 
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J Walter Thompson published the Blue Book of Advertising in 1904, which likewise specifies 
the role of advertising in terms of ‘space-buying,’ and articulates the company’s policy of 
buying space in bulk to produce the most efficient outcome for the client: 
 
“A large agency has a special claim upon the consideration of advertising mediums, because 
of the magnitude of its output. Buying space in large quantities (and as we have shown, we 
are the largest buyers in certain lines in this country), we naturally expect and properly 
obtain the best possible treatment for our clients.”361 
 
As such, until the period after the First World War, advertising’s function was considered by 
their practioners as functional and instrumental. Self-awareness of the social role of 
advertising, its potentialities for transforming people’s consciousness in an enduring manner 
and cultivating styles, fashions and trends of consumption, is something that only appears 
after 1919; the period of 1900-1919 can therefore be considered to be one of technical 
innovation, organizational reform and standardization, as well as absorbing influences from 
developments in social sciences (survey techniques being the most predominant at that stage, 
under the banner of ‘scientific’ approaches to advertising and marketing) and the world of 
art.
362
 Accompanying this change is the transformation of the advertisement itself, moving 
from ‘mere explanation and description to argument, persuasion and lure.’363 
 
Advertising firms such as N.W. Ayer were also involved in forms of PR from the early 20
th
 
century. Having secured large corporate clients such as Standard Oil and the National Biscuit 
Company, Ayer were initially compelled to take account (in their advertising campaigns) the 
public attitude towards ‘big business,’ which during the ‘muck-raking’ era of journalism, had 
been unfavourable, with the experience of the depression of the 1890s still fresh in the public 
mind, and further enhanced by journalistic work that ambitiously uncovered widespread 
corruption by the ‘robber barons’ as well as municipal politicians. Ayer’s leadership (at the 
time under the founder’s son, F. Wayland Ayer) recognised the need to repair relations 
between their client and the public, with the most common form of this being carefully placed 
news material, that whilst not denying the malpractices of corporate activity, at least 
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portrayed big business as apologetic and attuned to the reformist drives of the Progressive 
movement: 
 
“The agency strove to obtain public goodwill principally by the use of advertising, but 
inevitably it was compelled to prepare publicity material as a part of its regular work and 
also prepare news releases. By 1920 the firm had a well-organized publicity bureau which 
became increasingly important during the next decade. Its function was not merely to get 
news material into the papers; sometimes it had to restrain the client’s desires in that 
direction.”364 
 
Bernays’ writings in 1928, however, also incorporate theories of mass psychology, such as 
those of Trotter and Le Bon, whose studies argued that the ‘group mind does not think, but 
has habits, impulses and emotions.’365 As such, Bernays’ own theory and practice of PR was 
justified in accordance with these theories, whose ‘newness’ and ‘scientific’ nature. Ayer’s 
Public Relations work, on the other hand, gives no indication of the influence of theories of 
mass psychology until the Cold War period, with PR functions limited to sending news 
material to journalists and editors. It was not until 1930, as the ramifications of the stock 
market crash began to be felt as the Great Depression, that Ayer’s attitude towards PR 
‘transformed from impressing the client among the press, to assisting clients on all possible 
fronts.’366 
 
For Bernays as an individual practioner, the role of PR was the dominant form of mass 
persuasion, with advertising acting as one of many potential auxiliaries in the process of 
persuasion (this will be made clearer in the section on the case studies of Bernays’ work). For 
N.W. Ayer however, PR appears to function as a subordinate of advertising, whereby 
strategically placed news material acts as a stepping stone in the wider advertising campaign- 
a necessary part of the campaign nonetheless, in order to generate the ‘goodwill’ from the 
public towards the client or the brand in relation to perceptions of malpractice or corruption. 
Furthermore, their respective attitudes towards the role of PR differ once again as Bernays’ 
articulates the role of PR specifically in terms of deception (‘the necessary evil’) and 
broadens the scope of PR to the domain of politics and society, recognising the utility of 
propaganda and PR as a force for consensualizing and legitimating elite values and 
positively shaping public attitudes towards their leadership during an era of rapid socio-
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economic transformation,  whereas N.W.Ayer regarded it no more than one of many 
functions carried out by the agency, and their perspective on PR remains limited to improving 
the client’s ‘saleability.’ Nevertheless, Ayer’s recognition of the importance of PR is 
confirmed by the very fact that they had a dedicated publicity bureau in place by 1920. 
 
With this in mind, I would argue that whilst the functions of PR and advertising differ- PR 
being the ‘general management of the client’s relationship with the public,’ and advertising 
involving the specific role of art, copy and design techniques- the closeness of the two in 
terms of their relationship with both clients and the public make them a hybrid conjunction of 
social agents that facilitated the art of mass persuasion. Whilst Bernays’ Propaganda 
impressively portrays mass persuasion as a science and tool of manipulation, it is 
questionable whether the social impact he predicted and desired would have been quite so 
assured without the transformation of creative styles and social content of advertising art that 
took place on drawing tables of Madison Avenue during the 1910s and 1920s. Likewise, 
would advertising have become the ubiquitous phenomenon it is today without the public 
relations agents and their tireless efforts to forge multiple channels of meaningful 
dissemination through newspapers, radio and film? As an indication of their relevance, 
marketers spent $100 million on adverts in newspapers and magazines in 1900, with 3,500 
different advertisements reaching approximately 65 million people.
367
 By 1914, this figure 
had jumped to $682 million; and on the cusp of the Great Depression in 1929, advertising 
volumes had reached a staggering $2,987 million.
368
 
  
The final ‘node’ in piecing together the art of mass persuasion, is the role of newspapers and 
magazines. Until the widespread availability and affordability of household television sets in 
the United States, advertising budgets remained largely pinned to newspapers and magazines, 
even despite the growth of radio.
369
 Not only was printed journalism important for the 
placement of advertisements, but editors pioneered some techniques that would later go on to 
become ‘industry standard’ within advertising. William Randolph Hearst, ‘largely 
responsible for everything we see in newspapers today,’370 introduced ‘staged’ photography 
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in The New York Journal during the Spanish-American War, and in his renowned circulation 
battle with Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World, pioneered the use of ‘Yellow Journalism.’371 
This editorial ‘technique,’ summarised by Frank Luther Mott, involved the use of ‘scare’ 
headlines, greater space given to pictures and drawings, faked interviews and the use of 
supposed ‘experts,’ to provide pseudo-scientific evidence for engineered claims.372 Both were 
also instrumental in pioneering the use of colour, particularly for full-colour Sunday 
supplements. The use of sensationalised headlines in newspapers has its parallel in Albert 
Lasker’s pioneer work in ‘sloganeering,’ whilst the staged photography used to elicit 
sympathy for the plight of the Cubans during the war is a predecessor for the rise of 
‘emotional merchandising,’ during the 1920s, in the way the sale of the ‘idea’ (in this case, to 
garner support for the US government in going to war with Spain) was hinged upon creating 
emotional and sentimental ‘hooks’ to engage the consumer with the personal feelings of 
shame. 
 
Another figure of importance in this respect was Henry Luce. Whilst not associated directly 
with the advertising or PR industries, as founder of the Time-Life media empire, Luce was 
instrumental in the spread of targeted magazines such as Time (1923) and Fortune (1930). 
Luce pioneered the ‘terse, personality-based, attitudinal ‘new journalism,’ as well as 
‘investigative, analytical and highly literate articles that examined business society.’373 
Luce’s magazines pioneered photojournalism in the United States that drew from the avant-
garde and constructivist photography of Soviet artist Alexander Rodchenko. Both Luce’s 
Fortune and Rodchenko’s USSR in Construction were launched in 1930. For now what is 
important is to concretize the agency that underpinned the art of mass persuasion- the 
advertising industry, Public Relations practioners, newspaper and magazine editors are all 
considered here to be a part of the same complex of mass communications whose techniques, 
ideas and styles were instrumental in the ascent of mass persuasion and the emergent 
iconology of the American Dream.  
 
5.4 The Transformation of Advertising: Values, Form and Content. 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, the transformation of the social content of advertising art 
will be considered as an aesthetic development that mediated a complicated set of class and 
                                                 
371
 Campbell, W. Joseph Yellow Journalism: Puncturing the Myths, Defining the Legacies, Praeger, 2001, pg. 7 
372
 Ibid., pg. 15 
373
 Brinkley, Alan The Publisher: Henry Luce and his American Century, Knopf Doubleday, 2010, pg. 11 
169 
 
class consciousness problems in the United States between 1900 and 1930. The ‘complicated’ 
set of problems here refers to the way in which class as traditionally understood is related to 
transforming ideals and values of class consciousness. Roland Marchand’s study Advertising 
the American Dream argues that by 1940, advertising had successfully developed to the point 
where it became the primary source of the social reproduction, expansion entrenchment of 
mass consumption society in the United States.
374
 Furthermore, the social power of 
advertising lay in its unique ability to conceal or circumvent the lived, material socio-
economic contradictions in US society at the time, particularly the widening gap between 
wealthy elite groups and a number of marginalised social groups. The ‘American Dream’ 
here is to be understood as an aesthetic of upwardly mobile materialist aspiration, where 
values of individual socio-economic mobility, hard work and wealth are prized over other 
existent values such as socio-economic equality and social justice. The power of frequently 
repeated images and ideas helped to ‘establish broad frames of reference, define the 
boundaries of public discussion and determine relevant factors in a situation.’375 Furthermore, 
it engendered an idea of what it meant to be an American citizen, during a dramatic period of 
social and economic transformation.
376
 Advertisements contributed to the shaping of a 
‘community of discourse,’377 where the highly visible and penetrative features (most notably 
in radio, broadcast into the family home) and continuous repetition through all forms of 
emergent popular media meant that the creative slogans and images of advertising found their 
way into the ‘common’ or ‘public’ discourse of the US. We may even broaden out this 
suggestion that whilst it played a significant role in establishing frames of reference, 
perception and discourse, contributes significantly to the re-ification of capitalist political-
economic and social relations, which become all the more important in a society of perpetual 
change. It is argued here therefore that the social power derived from advertising was 
powerful enough to remain in place as a hegemonic ideal during the Great Depression and 
New Deal reconstruction eras, and as such its development and sophistication before the 
onset of the era of economic crisis is of paramount importance. 
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In the thirty year process of facilitating and engendering a mass consumption society, 
advertising art’s most notable achievement was its ability to portray workers and their 
families as consumers. Terry Smith argues that the Fordist paradigm that rested on labour-
wage accommodation and surveillance of workers in attempts to achieve workplace docility 
could not alone produce the socio-economic upheaval that is characterised by neo-Gramscian 
IPE. Rather, the problem of social control (in a Gramscian sense) could only be resolved if 
the workers started to think like the middle classes, to adopt their consciousness, their desires, 
tastes and consumption habits and internally normalise the socio-cultural and political-
economic norms of the bourgeois.
378
 For Smith and Gartman, the ‘docility’ or acquiescence 
of all non-hegemonic social groups (i.e., not just blue collar factory workers) to the values of 
a re-invigorated capitalist ethic based on mass production should be theoretically grounded in 
aesthetics, which, as I explained above, can more fully realise how the contradictory and 
antagonistic values of different social groups were synthesized into an apparent ‘totality’: 
 
“The true move to modernity, then was the move to consumerism. The true site was not the 
factory but the creation and circulation of market imagery.”379 
 
Social control and the moment of ‘hegemony’ in Fordism is a Political-Economic power that 
flows not just from the brutality of the workplace, its ‘projections of inevitability’, total 
control, ideals of reason and rationality and the ‘model leader,’ but more fundamentally 
“from its own contradictions, its constantly self-revolutionalizing  reinvention of 
constraints.”380 This ability to continually ‘self-revolutionize’ constraints is at the same time 
the ability to open up new social potentialities. Walter Benjamin alludes to this in ‘The Work 
of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,’ whereby despite the collapse of authenticity 
of art (the loss of ‘aura,’), its mass reproducibility and availability for the ‘masses,’ 
transforms the aesthetic of art, in the sense that whereas authentic art and culture was 
understood by its bourgeois or elite consumers via cultural parameters regarding questions of 
beauty and sublimity, reproducible art and its new ‘consumers’ shadows the future of a world 
where people understand that culture and art are no longer the preserve of the elite, that 
culture and art are no longer the hegemonic artefacts of ruling classes, but can now be 
subjected to complete re-interpretation amongst those who are dominated.
381
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‘Culturally Conservative’ Marxists such as Adorno and Daniel Bell have generally 
disregarded this aspect, bemoaning the mass culture industry as an arena for the circulation of 
kitsch cultural products that reflect the atomisation and distraction of a populace who become 
increasingly unable to transform their society (or even think about the idea of transforming 
their society) because of the deepening of the cultural and leisure/entertainments industries. 
From a Benjaminian perspective, one that is taken up by Smith and Gartman, the 
transformation of advertising art may be understood as elite attempts to manipulate and 
engineer consensus amongst the dominated (articulating special interests as general interests), 
but from a Benjaminian perspective, we can understand this same process as one where the 
working classes are increasingly aware of their capabilities in society, their access to art and 
culture and their ability to realise their own aspirations and values through those domains, 
rather than in the traditional political domain.
382
 In other words, people are not drawn to the 
world of mass culture and mass consumption because they are passive dupes, or atomised 
robots who require an analgesic because of the twin affects of alienated labour (under 
machine dominated Fordist practices) and the totality of administered, instrumentalized 
capital, but rather participate in these new, everyday, activities, as political interventions, 
realizing their aspirations and values through consumptive practices and lifestyle choices that 
were in any case unavailable to them previously. 
 
The most telling and enduring transformation of the social content of advertising was the 
passage from descriptive and ‘reason-why’ advertising towards the subtle, suggestive 
qualities of emotion-based advertising. There are no clear distinguishing points during this 
passage, as some advertisers continued to use explanatory copy for some products. However, 
advertising historians like Marchand agree that the space in the advert dedicated to copy 
gradually became less and less, with a higher degree of value being put upon the illustrative 
content, that by 1930 had begun to be dominated by combinations of photography and refined 
artwork influenced by avant-garde movements such as Surrealism. Nevertheless, advertisers 
had to pay attention to the values and demands of the manufacturers/sellers. The case of 
N.W.Ayer’s relationship with Steinway Piano’s illustrates this. 
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5.5 N.W.Ayer & Son 
 
After the First World War, the piano manufacturing industry began to suffer as ‘family pride 
in the parlour piano began to give way to pride in the car.’383Further inroads were made by 
increasingly affordable home Radios, which offered a broader entertainment spectacle, 
instead of only music. Steinway enlisted Ayer in part because of Ayer’s highly ‘traditional’ 
image (as opposed to rival such as Lord & Thomas, owned by Albert Lasker). Steinway 
refused to compromise the prestige of their product by the commonly perceived notion that 
only high-pressure advertising or ‘cheapening’ the product for mass accessibility (pioneered 
by Lasker’s Sloganeering revolution between 1910 and 1920). Ayer’s solution to this was to 
convince famous classical musicians to support Steinway’s by posing for photographs that 
would be placed centrally in the advertisement: 
 
“NW Ayer & Son soon showed these measures were not necessary to success. It provided 
a series of rotogravure advertisements in metropolitan newspapers, emphasizing the 
importance of musical training in the education of children...and in carefully chosen 
magazines, the agency also placed a now-famous series of advertisements in color, 
featuring portraits of famous musicians, scenes from well-known operas, and graphic 
interpretations of distinguished compositions.” The results of this campaign was a 
success for Steinway; “by 1929, although the piano industry as a whole had dropped 
below its 1921 capacity, Steinway sales were 69 percent above those of 1921”384 
 
Here we can see that the techniques of persuasion require more than the artistic content of the 
advertisement itself. Not only do Ayer carefully interpret the values of the Steadway Piano 
firm- values orientated towards the cultivation of music sensibilities as a part of a broader 
‘good’ education- but they also mobilise three emergent techniques; i) the use of the latest, 
avant-garde techniques of rotogravure photography in order to position the product in the 
‘modern’ and ii) the stylish placement of music celebrity and popularity (akin to the Bernays 
method) and iii) the dissemination of these in newspapers and magazines, using PR methods 
of influencing key media to place the company and its product in good stead with the public. 
All of this is carried out with one eye looking to the past, re-creating the Custodian appeal of 
personal self-improvement through classical education and training in a modern, competitive 
mass market. 
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This example also showcase that as an agency, their particular rooting in ‘Custodian’ 
attitudes- as well as clients that gravitated towards Custodian ideals- did their utmost to avoid 
the kind of sensationalised appeals that were the hallmark of other agencies, particularly 
JWT, Lord & Thomas and BDO. Instead, their approach in the 1920s was conditioned by 
concerns for ‘cultivating’ attitudes of good taste and education whenever the opportunity 
presented itself. Hower’s study reveals that Ayer saw their own position on advertising 
techniques as morally unassailable; as another example of their work, this time with Hills 
Brothers, a coffee manufacturer who pioneered the vacuum packed sealed tins, Hower notes 
that: 
 
“...the Ayer advertisements made no attempt to attribute any human ills or discomforts to the 
use of stale coffee. Nor did they try to insinuate that coffee possessed mysterious aphrodisiac 
properties.”385 
 
It should be also noted that the advertising agency still undertook work that was more akin to 
the original function of the agency; buying ‘space’ and organising the distribution of adverts. 
Their work with Ford Motor Company was much like this, given Ford’s personal preference 
to retain the function of illustration/graphic design and copywriting within the Ford 
advertising department. The Ayer agency office in Philadelphia contained a Media 
department and a Printing Department that dealt with the actual setting of type, the printing 
off of the finished form in varying sizes from ‘tabloid sheets to standard eight-page columns.’ 
‘Meanwhile other members of staff had prepared a list of over nineteen hundred newspapers 
in the United States and Canada in which the advertisement was to appear.
386
  
Overall, we can use the history of N.W. Ayer to summarise the following transformations in 
advertising and its social content: 
 
 The agency began to provide specialist copywriting, ‘a growing recognition of the 
profits to be derived from effectively prepared advertisements.’  
 The beginning of recognising the ‘profession’ of advertising through prize-giving and 
incentives for outside copywriters.  
 Move from ‘announcement’ style advertising to innovative copy and stylish 
presentation. 
 Increasing depiction of human beings in advertisements, especially children 
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 Development of photo-electric processes of engraving 
 Copy text reduced, made larger and well-spaced without crowding. 
 Beginning to emphasise the trademark of the client as recognisable brand. 
 Use of layout and display that drew attention to the ad; early entry of modernist art 
techniques. 
 Idea of arousing and stimulating a general interest in product as well specificity of the 
brand. 
 Colour makes its entry in 1893 in American periodical Youth’s Companion. Despite 
the increasing use of chromolithography, not until 1910 that the mechanical and 
financial costs came down; colour helped to create an ‘atmosphere of richness and 
splendour which was particularly useful in advertising luxury products. 
 
After 1906, even larger spaces were being used for advertising; full-page ads started to 
become common, marking a decisive ‘entry’ point for advertising styles and themes 
becoming a part of the ‘fabric’ of everyday life: 
 
 Copywriters were beginning to achieve a ‘unity of text and decoration’; this came of 
closer agential co-ordination of activity between illustrators and copywriters. 
‘ARTWORK’ not any longer the production of a picture, but ‘having a specific job in 
communicating an idea.’ We can hope to prove or argue that the idea was one of 
capitalist consumption norms. Copywriters were trying to persuade, but not 
consciously to reproduce the domination of capitalist thought- driven as much by 
attempts to standardise and professionalise, to achieve stylistic satisfaction in their 
own work. The consideration of technological and artistic techniques must therefore 
made central to the operationalization of hegemony as capitalism undergoes a social, 
cultural and aesthetic transformation. 
 Big business begins to use advertising agencies; in response to the muck-raking era, 
the companies looked for means of developing a more favourable attitude towards 
their enterprises. In addition to writing copy that appeal to human buying motives 
(both rational and emotional) in order to induce desire, illustrative developments 
showcased techniques that ‘could be designed to relate a product to familiar or easily 
grasped concepts so as to give it, by association, an intangible but appreciated 
value, such as luxury, beauty, or success.’ Demonstration that the values of 
175 
 
aspirational materialism were hinged upon these ideas as timeless- capitalism driven 
by emulation and aspiration towards these things. 
 Ayer appoint art director in 1910 responsible for all design and illustrations; but 
whilst ‘genuine art’ had made its way into European advertising posters before 1900 
(Jules Cheret and Toulouse-Latrec), American advertising art remained amateurish 
due to the difficulty of finding competent artists willing to accept advertising 
commissions as well as the problems of reproducing satisfactory quality illustrations 
in colour. 
 
“by 1915, however, the business world was beginning to appreciate the commercial value of 
beauty. A number of influences contributed to this change. The artistic taste of the entire 
nation had been improving. Sincere and able artists were finding a real challenge in 
commercial work and were learning how to adapt their skill to the purposes of 
advertising.”387 
 
Again, Hower reflects that ideas of beauty and artistic taste were comprehendible as 
externalised qualities- appreciation and cultivation of tastes of ‘high art’, now reproducible 
through advertising copy and illustration. The key difference with N.W.Ayer was its 
willingness to mobilise new, modern techniques in art whilst imbuing this with Custodian 
sensibilities. This was not lost on Ayer’s rivals, whose initial foray into sloganeering and 
‘cheapening’ began to lose its appeal to more sophisticated techniques that had to appeal to 
the perceived sense of longing for a recently transformed past, one in which Custodian 
domination of culture (from art to ideals of education) appeared secure. Whilst ‘Custodian 
mindsets’ continued into the 1920s, they were forced to contend with the new ‘Apostles’ of 
modernity in Madison Avenue whose lifestyles were closer to the trends of modernism. The 
transformation of advertising art as such reflects this antagonism, which found its expression 
in the enduring iconology of advertising artwork, an aesthetic that was able to accentuate the 
perceived positive cultural qualities of both worlds whilst simultaneously embedding 
materialist aesthetic of consumption, that showcased people’s desires and a life that they 
ought to aspire toward. 
 
“The best advertising art is slightly ahead of the average person’s taste, just as the best style 
in clothing is a little in advance of what the masses are wearing.”388 
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Therefore by 1930, advertising can be said to have portrayed products from toothpastes to 
political candidates as being able to satisfy private longings.  
 
5.6 J.W. Thompson and General Motors: Sloanism  
 
One of the key rivals of Ayer was the advertising firm JWT. Led by the charismatic Stanley 
Resor, regarded as the pioneer of ‘luxury’ advertising, fashioning campaigns and brand 
names after the ‘lifestyles’ of the well to do, he was a founder member of the American 
Association of Advertising Agencies, and in 1927 moved into the modern Art Deco 
skyscraper known as the Graybar building. More in tune with the ‘Apostle of Modernity’ of 
Marchand’s analysis than the Custodian, traditional outlook of Ayer, Resor’s wife Helen 
Landsdowne was regarded as the greatest copywriter of her generation and is credited with 
the introduction of ‘sex appeal,’ following the successful Woodbury facial soap campaign 
THE SKIN YOU LOVE TO TOUCH.
389
 
 
The case of JWT’s work for GM is instructive as in the way that Ayer’s relationship with 
Henry Ford reflected the Custodians coming to terms with modernity, JWT and Alfred Sloan 
appear to be ‘modernists’ who came to terms with the residual Custodian traits. Furthermore, 
as Sloan introduced the idea of product brand differentiation and planned obsolescence, his 
strategies (from the perspective of Smith and Gartman) can be seen to more definitively 
encompass the art of mass persuasion more so than Fordism. JWT’s work for GM also 
encompasses their attempts to enter the international markets, holding branch offices in 34 
countries around the world.
390
 
 
“It is a part of our policy to fit our activities into the life of the countries wherein we operate. 
It is a human courtesy. It is diplomacy. It is also mighty sound business.” (James D. Mooney, 
President of GM Export Company)
391
 
 
Mooney and Resor shared similar attitudes to international expansion, and Mooney in 
particular espoused an almost missionary, imperialist attitude towards the spread of GM 
abroad, believing that ‘American business in export trade,’ to the ‘the most powerful 
constructive force in a world which is steadily rebuilding.’392 Tellingly, he ‘dreamed of a 
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great American commercial Empire,’ something that appealed to the mindset of Resor- not 
particularly because he was an American imperialist, but because it excited his enthusiasm 
for new projects and new challenges regarding advertising. Whilst the availability of 
‘American autos in foreign countries gave backward peoples the opportunity to transcend 
‘their old-time lethargies and traditional inertias,’ Resor was advised by his Sam Meek (hired 
to run JWT’s London office) that local customs and practices were respected. Along with 
GM, between 1925 and 1930 these attitudes had helped JWT to capture the overseas accounts 
of major brands such as Unilever, Pond’s, Kraft, Kodak and Rowntrees. 
 
JWT’s hiring of John B. Watson, the founder of the psychological school of behaviouralism, 
has been credited by Vance Packard with helping JWT becoming the pioneers of ‘scientific 
advertising.’ Watson, who was handpicked from John Hopkins University by Stanley Resor, 
promoted the idea of ‘demographics,’ for marketing research, advising Resor that different 
classes behave differently and so that an overall advertising campaign should be 
compartmentalised to appeal to potential consumers from all backgrounds.  
 
“Watson promoted the use of demographics in advertising, and the General Motors multi-
tiered product line seemed perfectly suited to the strategy. A hallmark of JWT's approach to 
GM advertising followed the automaker's practice of breaking down the markets by income 
group-lower incomes formed the market for Chevrolet, middle incomes for Buick and 
Oldsmobile, higher incomes for Cadillac. Watson also advocated Sloanism," named after 
Alfred Sloan, a GM executive who promoted GM's new policy (in the late 1920s) of yearly 
model changes. This meshed well with GM's general strategy, as pithily articulated by their 
research director in the mid-1930s: "The whole object of research is to keep everyone 
reasonably dissatisfied with what he has in order to keep the factory busy in making new 
things."
393
 
 
He we have the core of the Sloanist political-economy; a system of perpetual consumer needs 
created through advertising and marketing to feed new styles and brands for corporations to 
research and produce. Nevertheless, whilst Watson’s influence extends beyond the GM case, 
the role of his ‘scientific advertising’ strategies has come into question during this particular 
period. He was certainly paraded to give speeches at conventions and conferences to clients 
and during a period when:  
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“the Thompson agency and the advertising community more generally, sought stature in the 
business community increasingly caught up in the zeitgeist of ‘efficiency,’ ‘science,’ and 
‘control,’ Watson became a symbol of competence, a popularized reification of ‘Science,’”394 
 
Kreshel acknowledges that whilst Watson’s ‘scientific’ approach to demographics and 
advertising were applied in certain cases, there are some doubts to how much science was 
actually practiced- indicating that the scientific technique was espoused at a superficial level 
perhaps to gain leverage in the context of an intra-advertising agency debate taking place at 
the time over the professionalization of their industry. Kreshel also shows that whilst Watson 
espoused science, in his talks he ‘also promoted the move from the rational to the emotional 
appeal and the use of testimonials to induce strong emotions.’395 The ‘emotional’ 
merchandising strategies had already been in place for a number of years before Watson 
joined, and it is likely that his enduring legacy (in liaison with other developments such as 
those survey techniques developed by George Gallup) only became industry standard at a 
later date. Not only do the highlight the general incompatibility of attempts to use scientific 
techniques in advertising, which depends on probing the emotional and sentimental reasons 
behind people’s ideals and values, but the very word ‘Science’ was used to justify and 
legitimate practices that were actually uncoordinated, opportunistic and dominated by pre-
given ideas about people’s behaviour- in this way Watson is not so different from the father 
of ‘engineering of consent,’ Edward Bernays. Moreover the role of science represents an 
intervention in the protracted ‘moment’ of hegemony, where ideals and values of the 
scientific community- and the perception that these values are dominant over those in the 
creative and artistic world- are mobilised in a superficial level to legitimate strategies of mass 
persuasion.  
 
Notwithstanding this criticism, Watson’s promotion of demographics at a surface level at 
least slotted in with GM’s product differentiation strategy. As a vertically integrated company 
that produced its own parts and accessories, (that other car manufacturers would usually 
purchase from smaller companies, similar to the Microsoft versus Apple approach of the 
contemporary period), there was already more scope for internal product differentiation, that 
would eventually characterise GM’s overpowering of Ford’s market share between 1923 and 
1927. The key brands were: 
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1. Chevrolet: “for the Hoi Polloi” (41% of GM sales, 1926) 
2. Pontiac: “for the poor but proud” 
3. Oldsmobile: “for the comfortable but discreet” (Pontiac and Oldsmobile, 29%) 
4. Buick: “for the striving” (25%) 
5. Cadillac: “for the Rich” (5%)396 
 
The Sloanist strategy of having different priced lines was ‘used to exploit consumers’ social 
and material aspirations to their fullest.’397 The differentiation, through product stylisation 
and planned obsolescence, encouraged consumers to trade up, over time, from Chevrolet 
through to Cadillac; it therefore also stimulated sales during times of slack, as GM 
encouraged brand loyalty, allowing consumers to trade their car for a newer and higher-
priced one before car’s useful life was over; durability, therefore, a prized social value of the 
Custodian mentality, started to be replaced in the domain of production with the values 
associated with upward mobility, with the symbols of that ascent being ‘easier’ to derive 
through the process of consumption (as opposed to its realization through education or 
cultivated appreciation for the high arts). 
 
Again, it is difficult to ascertain the full impact of the scientific approach to marketing and 
advertising. Whilst the research director proclaimed “The whole object of research is to keep 
everyone reasonably dissatisfied with what he has in order to keep the factory busy in making 
new things.”398 In PR and advertising, behaviouralism stressed an expansion in market 
research and social observation to facilitate advertising campaigns and market feasibility; the 
use of ‘emotional’ appeals was also pioneered with the widespread introduction of 
testimonials. However, Meron argues that Watson did very little in reality to actually practice 
the science of behaviouralism; instead it was the ‘aura’ of science that he brought in terms of 
the sense of professional method it brought to the industry, as such making the real practices 
of advertising and marketing irrefutable under the general umbrella of social science (and 
later psychoanalysis).
399
 Though there is an element of deception in this process (having 
similarities with the patent medicine scandals), it was not a conscious one; rather, the issue of 
science and attempts to explain human behaviour according to universal principles stems 
                                                 
396 Merron, Jeff ‘Putting Foreign Consumers on the Map: J. Walter Thompson’s Struggle With General Motors’ 
International Advertising Account in the 1920s’ The Business History Review (1999, 73:3), pg. 472 
397
 Ibid, pg. 476 
398
 Ibid, pg.  478 
399
 Ibid., pg. 480 
180 
 
from discourse of science attaining some kind of hegemonic value amongst elite classes 
during the latter part of the 19
th
 century.
400
  
 
The JWT experience in during the European roll-out of GM illustrates this issue. The picture 
is one of complete chaos; researchers and office managers struggling to get a grip on local 
cultures; and meeting bemused responses from survey participants for whom the very idea of 
survey was alien. Coming up against local resistance and mistrust, the researchers themselves 
used ‘casual’ methods for their findings- including running out of the building and ‘shouting 
questions’ at pedestrians, in a last-minute attempt to finish up research. The impression is one 
of a heavy focus on the qualities of scientific research backed up by haphazard and intuitive 
‘methodology’ to fit in with the goal of presenting substantiated and approved data. Meron 
also makes the point that the idea of conducting quick research to impress the client was more 
important than actually carrying through more identifiably social scientific research. 
401
 
JWT’s GM research used a uniform questionnaire that was translated into different languages 
in Europe, and then later rolled out to Argentina and Uruguay in 1929. Reports derived from 
this research was primarily descriptive statistics, covering topics such as the reason why 
people bought GM cars, their doubts about GM cars, the factors they considered before 
buying, who drove the car and when, colour preferences and interest in auto mechanics. 
There was no usage of the techniques that would later become central to the PR/Advertising 
industry; psychometrics, focus groups, or attempts to get at the unconscious desires of 
consumers. The reports categorized their selected audiences by occupation and class, but little 
else to give copywriters a feeling for a mass audience.
402
 Crucially by 1929, JWT researchers 
presumed that unconscious motivations played a role in people’s consumer preferences 
despite the inability to actually ascertain such knowledge.  
 
Despite the voluminous research on different country export markets, ostensibly conducted to 
ensure culturally attentive and sensitive approaches to the ensuing advertising campaign 
along national lines, the research produced supported the idea that automobile consumption 
practices concurred with the US model that offered different product lines based on class and 
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class perception. The research, however, did open up new consciousness about international 
media, foreign business practices and non-US consumers, which became a hallmark of export 
advertising thereafter. All this was achieved in little over two years, between 1927 and 1929.   
 
Newspaper advertising remained the primary media through which JWT operated, in all their 
foreign offices. However, this period apparently witnesses a surge of differentiated 
publications, and  
 
“with so many media options and so many different car lines, one of JWT’s main challenges 
would be to make things simpler. JWT would strive to give each car a distinctive appeal both 
in copy, type, layout and art. So distinctive will these campaigns become that it may be 
possible to remove the name of the car and still recognize it as that car’s advertising.”403 
 
It seems that whilst JWT advertising did use distinctions between international cultures and 
mobilised demographics derived from surveys in designing its international GM campaigns, 
the more sophisticated theories such as Watson’s behaviourism had little impact on ad 
content, and no evidence that JWT men applied these theories during the actual composition 
of the ad. In general, it seems that automobile advertising remained behind the generic 
psychological manipulation prevalent in ‘fear appeal’ advertising for toothpastes and 
deodorants. 
 
General features of the advertisements include illustrations that appear more prominent than 
copy and automobiles set by passengers or passers-by. According to the ‘social tableaux’ of 
advertising theory by Marchand, the content of a social tableau ad depended on the 
merchandising strategy for that product, shaped by pictorial conventions and the desire to 
provide the consumer with a scene into which they could comfortably and pleasurably place 
themselves. However the assumptions of advertisers were reinforced by popular culture (and 
not derived from research)- people preferred to identify with portrayals of themselves as they 
aspired to be, rather than as they ‘really were’; and therefore, the aesthetic of the social 
tableau must necessarily aim at depictions of circumstance and setting that are a ‘step-up’ 
from the lived circumstance of the reader/recipient.
404
 The social tableaux from GM’s 
American ads tended to emphasise the family unit, whereas in Mid. Eastern countries like 
Egypt, the tableaux were adapted to the cultural parameters of the place (e.g., women were 
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not expected to drive, neither was it acceptable to aspire to drive, in contrast to ads placed in 
women’s magazines in the US which targeted the educated, independent woman). 
 
Despite the resources and time dedicated to conducting market research in international 
markets on the premise of locating cultural difference and awareness of national media 
subtleties, Meron argues that by 1929, the New York-based international department had 
settled on the use of ‘pattern’ copy and illustrations that could be adapted by local creatives in 
any country. The more immediate and functional reasons for the ascendance of pattern copy 
included cost-saving measures, where a standardized portfolio would cut down the expense 
spent on creative work individual offices would have to carry out; international offices would 
therefore have more time and money available to spend on ‘financially rewarding labors’ like 
gaining new clientele. On a ‘philosophical’ level, this standardization would facilitate a 
powerful international image for GM.
405
 
 
This international image was one premised on the transnationalization of the Chevy as GM’s 
symbol. Despite being the ‘low-income’ bracket model in the US, advertisements for the 
Chevy from India to Buenos Aires stressed that the car as ‘accepted’ by prominent, wealthy 
and classy individuals; a sense of global belonging through style and exclusivity that 
transcended the national cultural differences that JWT initially tried to uncover. Despite an 
acknowledgement that there were indeed cultural differences, the research staff of JWT also 
premeditated the idea that the differences between the elites- those that were targeted by the 
advertisements- were not so great that they could not integrate an assumed image of wealth 
and style that spoke across these national cultural differences. In a society where ‘class’ 
appears to have played no definitive or prominent role in the party political organisation and 
mainstream governmental system, the assumptions of class status, preferences and 
consciousness rears its power at an aesthetic level. 
 
Whereas GM’s American ads often looked for portrayals of the nuclear family (before the 
idea existed), the depiction of the upper class corresponded closely with the generic 
depictions of foreign ads; women depictions based around the ‘Fisher Body girl’ of young, 
slim and urbane; men dressed in suit-tie combination or fashionable sporting outfit. As such, 
we may argue that either those responsible for copy and illustration in foreign ads already 
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assumed that there was a general concomitance in style and values of a ‘transnational’ upper-
class, set apart by subtle national differences but ultimately converging around socio-cultural 
norms regarding leisure time and fashion. Did they discern this from observations of upper-
class activity in foreign countries, or was it simply repetitive ‘patterning’ of copy that 
implicated particular fashions and styles in their depictions. Furthermore, if these styles were 
not similar to those depicted in the ads, did these depictions encounter resistance or in fact are 
we looking at the genesis of ‘Americanization’- aspirational ‘good-life’ adventures of the 
upper class creeping other cultures through advertising’s social tableaux? The following 
illustrations, taken from the Duke University Libraries Digital Collections Archive 
“Emergence of Advertising in America, 1850-1920,” should showcase the 
transnationalization of an aesthetic of aspiration. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184 
 
5.7 “The Motor Car is the Magic Carpet of Modern Times” 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
The intention of the social tableau in this advert is blatant and clear; ‘Lexington motor cars 
are sold in every civilised country on the globe’. Where better to start than the Thorobred 
Anglo-American relationship? Despite the claim that their cars are sold in every civilized 
country, Lexington ensures that the recipient remembers that ‘primitivism’ in the form of the 
horse-drag used by ‘American Indians’ co-exists within the heartland. The peaceful setting of 
the tableau, generating an aesthetic of civility and calm in what is supposedly England, would 
be immediately recognisable to the emergent middle-classes who had begun to move away 
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from the centre of big cities like New York, towards the suburban areas that were 
characteristic of the lifestyle of ‘conspicuous consumption.’ 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
In this tableau, the appeal of the social content is anchored in the privileged lifestyles 
afforded by a tight but artistically influential minority of Americans for whom an excursion 
of discovery to Alpine and Mediterranean Europe became a ‘passage-of-rights.’ American 
literature of the 1920s, most notably the work of the ‘Lost Generation,’ of willing exiles such 
as Ernest Hemmingway, John Dos Passos, F. Scott Fitzgerald and Malcolm Cowley 
galvanised an interest in the European centred trends of artistic modernism, whilst also using 
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the ‘Old World’ as a distant site for escaping the themes of individual alienation, rationalised 
management and urban confusion that dominated their reflections of American society during 
this period. Though their literature often focused on the travails of an absent and emotionally 
troubled elite class, their accompanying psychological desolation, and the fraught intra-elite, 
intra-generational struggle with their Custodian elders, the portrayals of a wealthy class 
whose interests in art, culture, travel and self-discovery were appropriated as the ‘good life,’ 
a facet of the aesthetic of the American Dream of aspiration, mobility and leisure. The 
achievements of this class are placed in stark contradistinction to America’s immediate 
neighbours in Mexico, where the slow-paced destitution of their society is embodied in the 
‘Rude Cart.’ 
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Figure 3 
 
This tableau picks up on similar themes from the previous one, though this time the more 
‘practical’ Lex-Sedan (as opposed to the Touring Car) is depicted congenially alongside 
Flemish countryside women drawing water from a well. The encounter of wealth and 
mobility with ‘backwardness’ once again highlight the sense of innate superiority, producing 
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an aesthetic  of distinct American progress; here even Europeans are depicted as being mired 
in traditional rural toil, the countryside (for Americans) being turned into a ‘playground’ for 
driving around and admiring. By placing a distinctly American advertisement in an 
international tableau, the image-makers served more than glorifying the automobile, but 
intrinsically achieved this through contrasting the idea of upward social mobility with a 
lifestyle that has been surpassed; the water-well of the Flemish, as well as the ‘Ancient 
monocycle’ of the Chinese. 
 
 
Figure 4 
 
‘A well-known watering place’ on the Atlantic Coast moves the tableau back to the US, and 
here the advertisement focuses once again focuses on leisure and gentility. The Coupe at the 
foreground intimates an Art Deco future resting at a serene, impressionistic depiction of 
quaint conversation and an undisturbed strolling. Japan- no stranger to industrialization or 
‘progress’ during this period- has as its ‘favourite vehicle’ the two-wheeled jinrishka, pulled 
forward by human labour-power. The aesthetic convenience here is to showcase an elite, 
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leisure based class for the United States and a general depiction of Japan as being backward. 
The specificities of elite class lifestyle in the US are as such showcased as ‘things as they are’ 
in contrast to the idea that Japanese society in general has cultural preferences for more 
archaic lifestyle. 
 
5.8 Mass Persuasion and Politics 
 
Another figure of importance in the ascent of mass persuasion in the United States is Calvin 
Coolidge. Gaining the Presidency in 1923 following the death of Warren Harding, elected in 
his own right a year later and deciding not to stand for re-election when his term of office was 
completed in 1929, Coolidge straddles the entirety of the ‘swinging’ 20s in the United States, 
and was the first leader to articulate the role of advertising in modern America. Whereas 
Woodrow Wilson had organised the Committee for Public Information in 1917 as a 
nationwide bureau for the exercise and dissemination of wartime propaganda, Coolidge’s 
backers and the people who were instrumental in cultivating his image- most notably Bruce 
Barton and Edward Bernays, meant that Coolidge was the first President to both harness and 
reflect upon the mass persuasion. In an address to the American Association of Advertising 
Agencies in October 1926, Coolidge spells out in clear terms the role that advertising will 
play in the United States: 
 
“..as we turn through the pages of the press and the periodicals, as we catch the flash of 
billboards along the railroads and the highways, all of which have become enormous 
vehicles of the advertising art, I doubt if we realize at all the impressive part that these 
displays are coming more and more to play in modern life. Even the most casual observation, 
however, reveals to us that advertising has become a great business. It requires for its 
maintenance investments of great amounts of capital, the occupation of large areas of floor 
space, the employment of an enormous number of people, heavy shipments through the 
United States mails, wide service by telephone and telegraph, broad use of the printing and 
paper trades, and the utmost skill in direction and management. In its turnover it runs into 
hundreds of millions of dollars each year. 
When we stop to consider the part which advertising plays in the modern life of production 
and trade we see that basically it is that of education. It informs its readers of the existence 
and nature of commodities by explaining the advantages to be derived from their use and 
creates for them a wider demand. 
It makes new thoughts, new desires, and new actions. By changing the attitude of mind it 
changes the material condition of the people. Somewhere I have seen ascribed to Abraham 
Lincoln the statement that "In this and like communities public sentiment is everything. With 
public sentiment nothing can fail; without it nothing can succeed; consequently he who holds 
public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions. He makes 
statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed." Advertising creates and 
changes this foundation of all popular action, public sentiment, or public opinion. It is the 
most potent influence in adopting and changing the habits and modes of life, affecting what 
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we eat, what we wear, and the work and play of the whole Nation. Formerly it was an axiom 
that competition was the life of trade. Under the methods of the present day it would seem to 
be more appropriate to say that advertising is the life of trade.”406 
 
Coolidge’s address poignantly surmises the attitude and belief in modern advertising that 
many ‘apostles of modernity’ and ‘architect of desire’ sitting in that room would have held. 
In the midst of unprecedented prosperity and no indication of the troubles that lay ahead, by 
1927, advertisers received the acknowledgement that they had so craved. Yet closer 
inspection of Coolidge’s relationship with the social agents of mass persuasion may account 
for his enthusiasm- for his tenure in office, his rise to the apex of political power in the 
United States had been the first genuine campaign orchestrated by the machinery of mass 
persuasion.  
 
Seven years earlier in 1920, Bruce Barton- founder of Barton, Durston and Osbourn in 1917, 
and author of The Young Man’s Jesus (1914) and The Making of George Groton (1918)407, 
wrote a political pamphlet Calvin Coolidge: A Man With a Vision, But Not a Visionary. At 
the time, Coolidge was Governor of Massachusetts, and had gained a regional reputation as a 
tough strike-breaker and upholder of the law after he sent in the National Guard to combat 
rioting policemen from the Boston Police Force in 1919. Previously, despite his focus and 
internal ambition, he had generally been regarded as ineffectual and lacking initiative. The 
popularity and support that had facilitated his rise to the Governorship stemmed from his 
image as ‘standing for a more comprehensible, simpler America.’408 
 
Following the strike break, Coolidge’s stock within the Republican Party hierarchy began to 
rise, and his trademark ‘reliability’ began to attract powerful and influential mentors. His own 
belief in small government lent him particularly well to backers who saw him as someone 
who would work in the interest of the economy- i.e., business. Frank Stearns, a Boston 
department store magnate and Dwight Morrow, a financier from JP Morgan, would prove to 
be the most important, with Morrow enlisting the help of Barton in November 1919 to 
‘humanize’ Coolidge- who whilst respected within the Republican Party for his ‘reliability,’ 
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found it hard to shake of his public reputation as being ‘cold, taciturn and reclusive.’ For 
Morrow, there were deeper reasons for backing Coolidge- Morrow was a leading light in 
Wall Street who wanted to stabilize long-term investment in Europe through government 
sanctioned lending and unrestricted access to international markets- the long term goal being 
the transfer of international financial power and leadership from London to New York.  For 
the investment bankers headed by Morrow, this meant that economic considerations rather 
than political ones should be the basis of foreign policy- and they regarded this as ‘normal.’ 
Coolidge was regarded as someone who would not provide any obstacles for this goal.
409
 As 
such, Coolidge’s name began to be circulated around as a potential nominee for the 
Republican Presidential Candidate at their convention in 1920. 
 
Barton’s importance in this is that he ‘was amongst the first to grasp what a burgeoning 
American consumerism meant for the conduct of politics. He had been the editor for a 
Sunday magazine, Every Week, where he honed in a style focusing on inspiration and uplift, 
and also provided screenplays for films for the Committee for Public Information. Jackson 
Lears argues that Bruce Barton was a crucial figure in legitimating corporate business values 
and to ‘bridge the gap between an economy based on a Victorian ethic of production and self-
denial and a consumer economy based on self-fulfillment,’410 and ‘like many Americans who 
came of age around the turn of the century, Barton struggled with conflicting impulses. He 
was drawn to the rugged self-reliance and simplicity of an earlier America, yet he was 
fascinated, too, by the glittering prospects of an emerging consumer culture.’411 
 
After being enlisted by Morrow, Barton’s task was to introduce Coolidge as a political 
commodity, not by discussing the issues of the day but by presenting a personality with 
whom Americans could identify.’412 In his pamphlet on Coolidge (originally printed in 
‘Woman’s Home Companion,’ March 1920), Barton set about the ‘construction’ of Coolidge 
as personality: 
 
“The great majority of Americans are neither radicals nor reactionaries. They are middle-of-
road-folks who own their homes and work hard, and would like to have the government get 
back to its old habits of meddling with their lives as little as possible.”  “It sometimes seems 
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as if this great silent majority had no spokesman, but Coolidge belongs with that crowd: he 
lives like them, he works like them and he understands.”413 
 
Barton’s construction of Coolidge’s image is aimed directly at the ‘great majority of 
Americans,’ and contains a number of presumption about their preferences and ideals about 
personality and character, which Barton assumes would like to be reflected in their 
politicians. With the rapidly rising ‘White Collar’ classes in mind, Barton’s depiction of a 
potential future presidential candidate as a ‘man-of-the-people,’ using a widely read 
Woman’s lifestyle magazine as the main media of dissemination was a far cry from the 
traditional ways of portraying leading politicians, whose rise through party ranks were 
dependent on the systems of patronage rather than achieving public consent. 
Overall, Barton’s text is presented in a straightforward manner, as if in a private conversation 
with an individual. Anecdotal about his family history and engaged in creating Coolidge as 
an independent man who could have used patronage if he had wanted, but instead worked 
hard and dedicated his time to serve the people and uphold the principles of the constitution 
and the ‘traditions of the forefathers.’ Barton’s central claim for Coolidge is the one that 
appears to resolve that contradiction between Custodian and Filiarch, between the Victorian 
era and the rapid-Tempo of the modern era: 
 
“I said at the beginning of this article that there are certain old-fashioned characteristics of 
Coolidge that are exceedingly refreshing in these ultra-modern days. Most obvious amongst 
them is the simplicity of his living. He is always well dressed. But beyond this his living is 
conducted on the plane of the most ordinary citizen.”414 
 
This appeal to ordinariness is at the same time an appeal to the idea of equality, or at least 
achievable equality. Similar to the developments in advertising, Barton’s PR work for 
Coolidge showcased ‘ordinariness’ and the ‘everyday life’ when in fact these things were out 
of reach for most people. But by articulating in a way that appealed to the sentimentality and 
emotion behind it, Barton was able to circumvent this potential contradiction.  
 
Barton called Coolidge a ‘contemporary forefather.’ He was portrayed as a man whose ideals 
and ambitions for the country are rooted in those of the country’s forefathers, yet in tune 
enough to recognise the opportunities afforded by the new modern America. Barton, 
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alongside Albert Lasker and Claude Hopkins (and to an extent Stanley Resnor) can be 
considered to fit, ideationally, between the more productivist, Custodian attitudes of Henry 
Ford, and the more direct ‘Filiarch’ prototypes who served their early apprenticeships in the 
advertising industry during this period (i.e., those that came into leadership and maturity in 
the Cold War era).  
 
A few years later in 1923, following the death of Warren Harding, Coolidge took office as 
President, but was required to win the election the following year. His image, whilst 
improved, remained one of detachment. It would be Edward Bernays that orchestrated the 
next main Coolidge campaign, and the following section details Bernays' work with Coolidge 
as well other examples of Bernays’ PR work, which will show clearly the ‘holistic’ practices 
and ties between social agents from PR, advertising, and journalism, and how they mediated 
political, economic and artistic issues during the ascent of the art of mass persuasion. 
 
5.9 Edward Bernays: the ‘Aesthetics of Hegemony’ 
 
By 1923, Bernays had set up his own PR agency on Madison Avenue. Having garnered a 
degree of notoriety with his ‘Torches of Freedom’ publicity stunt415, Bernays would then go 
onto orchestrate two major PR campaigns which further demonstrate the efficacy of PR and 
mark its entry as a potent influence and shaper of both political and economic affairs during 
‘peacetime’; first the ‘Breakfast with Coolidge’ stunt, and secondly, the ‘Art in the Fashion 
Industry’ movement for the Cheney Brothers between 1923 and 1927. Whilst the first 
campaign showcases Bernays innovative personal contribution to the stylisation of politics, 
the second resonates more broadly with themes of culture and art and how they impacted on 
the growing mass consumption society, as Bernays was instrumental in convincing the textile 
and fashion industries to incorporate artistic considerations into their products. These primary 
case studies are taken from Bernays personal typescripts to be found at: 
 
The Library of Congress Archive: ‘Edward L. Bernays Papers. Typescript on Public 
Relations Work and Politics, 1924: Breakfast with Coolidge’ 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
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5.9.1 Breakfast 
 
“People thought Coolidge was cold and taciturn. His introverted personality didnt appeal to 
free-wheeling Americans.”416 Theodore Roosevelt’s daughter, Alice Longworth, had referred 
to Coolidge as ‘weaned on a pickle,’ a sobriquet that Bernays believed was damaging- 
moreover he makes it clear this negative reputation ‘spread through the country.’ His task as 
such was ‘How could Coolidge’s warmth and human sympathy be emphasized?’ 
Bernays’ strategy to ‘humanize’ Coolidge was to create and publicize an ‘open’ breakfast 
where the President would be surrounded by actors and actresses, because “there was no 
disputing that they carried a strong combination of humanness, warmth, extroversion and 
camraderie.”417 
 
Bernays had concluded that the association of popular film stars would offer the ‘greatest 
amount of publicity with the greatest potentiality for humanizing the President.’ Here, it is 
not so much Bernays’ acknowledgement that the right kind of ‘publicity’ for key political 
figures was of ever more increasing important in a society which was being increasingly 
exposed to and influenced by mass communications, but rather the focus on the 
‘humanization’ aspect of Coolidge’s character. Of course, we know that Coolidge was a 
human, and that his stature as a politician must have already been relatively secure due to the 
fact that he had already been elected president. What is of importance here is Bernays’ 
intervention in terms of the maintenance of popularity of the office of the President and his 
idea of ‘hooking’ the figure that occupies that office to the broader real or perceived cultural 
trends (and thus opening up the possibility of ‘opening up’ a cultural trend through enacting 
this in the mass communications structure)- in this case the idea that film stars exude a 
warmth and popularity and enjoy an influential status amongst the voting public. Bernays 
notes that the President ‘recognized the implications of his venture into imagemaking.’ 
 
Bernays organised an ‘important and newsworthy’ group, led by entertainer Al Jolson, to 
meet the President for breakfast.
418
 With no official from the White House to organise the 
hand-shaking ceremony and introduction with the President, Bernays took up this function 
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himself, and when at the end Coolidge stepped up to him and requested his name, Bernays 
replied, “oh, Mr. President, that’s not important, i’m only the publicity man for the party.”419 
This demonstrates to an extent what Bernays would later articulate in both Propaganda and 
the Engineering of Consent- that the function of PR was to remain in relative anonymity, 
working behind the scenes as the faceless force driving interaction between disparate groups 
of people and their interests. David Miller and William Dinan argue that even nearly a 
century later, ‘this is how PR people like it- covert, subterranean, in the dark. PR operatives 
are technicians in the back room ensuring that corporations and governments are able to 
pursue their interests, just so long as no light is cast into the shadows.’420 
 
Further evidence of Bernays’ keen eye for socio-cultural trends was the penning of a short 
jingle to be sung on the White House lawn after breakfast by Al Jolson, called ‘Keep 
Coolidge.’ 
 
The race has begun 
And Coolidge is the one, 
 The one to fill the presidential chair, 
Without a lot of fuss 
He did a lot for us, 
 So lets reciprocate and keep him there!
421
 
 
By mobilizing the increasing popularity of the radio advertisement jingle, Bernays had staged 
a twin coup; simultaneously garnering the ‘humanizing’ aspect of Coolidge with his 
association with popular entertainers as well as sending a message to the voting public 
through a medium (the short jingle) that perfectly showcased the ‘straight-talking’ and ‘free-
wheeling’ language that he (correctly) assumed would mark a memorable imprint upon the 
collective consciousness of the masses. Therefore Bernays in his lone role as a PR agent had 
not only acted as node in the communication between a elite political force and its detached 
and distanced public, but had stylised the event to the extent that the next morning, the 
‘Breakfast Party,’ had made front page news across the country, with the influential New 
York Times, New York Herald and New York Tribune all carrying detailed depiction of the 
characters and events of the morning. Interestingly, Bernays had organised the event under a 
‘third-party’ called the Coolidge Non-Partisan League, yet he was annoyed that the 
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newspapers chose to ignore this and deemed the actors and actresses to have been a part of 
the ‘Theatrical Republican League.’: 
 
“This was one of the fortunes of war. One can plan an event, cover every foreseeable 
contingency. But you cant control them- as is the case when the two main purposes of the 
breakfast party were omitted in the New York Herald, New York Tribune, bumped by more 
glamorous aspects of the event.” 
 
It is furthermore instructive to note Bernays own reflections of his role in the event: 
 
“If someone had at the time accused me of helping to change the image of Calvin Coolidge, I 
would have said ‘go fly a kite.’ I was applying an old press technique of adding newsworthy 
names to the austere person of the President of the United States in an event that jutted out of 
the routine of circumstance and made news.” 
 
“I was thoroughly aware of the implications of humanity and warmth the breakfast at the 
White House carried to the people of the United States.”422 
 
 
5.9.2 Fashion 
 
Bernays situates his advice to the Cheney Brothers, an old New England Silk firm from 
Connecticut in the context of a broader cultural transformation that he believes began after 
the end of the First World War: 
 
“America became more nationalistic, more self-conscious. This new awareness of ourselves 
we expressed in new art, literature, music and drama. We declared ourselves independent of 
Europe. America wanted self-sufficiency not only in chemicals but also in cultural values and 
ideas.”423 
 
It is debatable whether the yearning of American self-expression occurred only after the First 
World War, but Bernays’ ‘advice’ can be seen as reflective of a cultural transformation that 
has already made itself visible and fashionable in the major urban areas, and by advocating 
this shift seems to be keenly aware of what this implies for firms and companies who risk 
ignoring it at the cost of their survival. 
 
In terms of the fashion industry, Bernays remarks that ‘we wanted to declare ourselves 
independent of Paris but were afraid to cut ourselves loose. American women wanted 
American fabrics, but they must be made with more style. Drab designs were not good 
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enough...and these new demands were extending in to other consumer fields. Art in Industry 
must not be restricted to textiles. It must extend into kitchen gadgets and furniture, into 
everything that went into common use in the home and outside. We began to realize that a 
machine-made product need not be ugly.’424 
 
Bernays is referring to a movement that began in the early 20
th
 century, a follow-on to the 
Arts and Crafts movement that was necessitated by the entry of many artisans into a 
competitive labour market for machine made household goods and sought to privilege the 
machine as the centre point for a new approach to art and the machine.  
 
His PR counsel for the Cheney Brothers, ‘old, stodgy and respected New England 
manufacturers,’ from South Manchester (Connecticut) who ‘dominated the town 
economically, socially, politically and ideologically,’ would last five years, and resulted in 
the acceptance by the conservative, traditional family of the new techniques of art-in-
industry. Bernays is clear in pointing out the obstacles presented by the family’s attitude and 
values and lists those elements that accentuate the gravity of his task: 
 
“The Cheneys had a Puritan conscience, an inbred nature, inhibiting restraints and the ego-
motivated self-centeredness and superiority of the New England upper class.” Bernays 
disparagingly refers to pamphlet given to him by the Charles Cheney that explained their 
family history from the time of the original Cheney who had emigrated to England during the 
Norman conquest, through to their arrival in Massachusetts in the 17
th
 century. ‘The piece 
was written with the serious self-sufficiency of the Plantagenet or the Tudors.’425 
 
We might conclude from these remarks that Bernays was taking on no less than a definitive 
east coast Custodian clan, increasingly out of step with the culture of modernising America. 
Two of the brothers, ‘one a painter and another a theatrical producer suffered ostracism from 
the family’ on account of their deviance from the norms expected by this ‘royal family of 
Americans.’ Bernays therefore identifies the first obstacle in transforming the mindset of the 
Cheneys (and secure them on the path to increased profitability) as the archaic social and 
cultural values. He notes that when ‘scientists in the 20th century began experimenting with 
strange synthetic yarns, Cheneys snooted them,’ and squarely concludes that ‘the Puritan 
spirit undoubtedly played a part in curbing their interest in style and fashion,’ despite their 
trade being connected so closely to the garments industry. Another factor he identified was 
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‘their disdain for women...in 1923 no women held a responsible prostitution in the firm, 
although most of their manufactured products were bought by women.’ 
 
With regard to the actual products, Bernays describes them as ‘conventional,’ and ‘old-
fashioned’ and noted competitors like Mallinson were looking for ‘new art inspiration for 
their silks.’426 
In order to overcome this problem, Bernays enlisted the assistance of Henry Creange, French 
industrial art designer who had recently arrived in America from Alsace-Lorraine  looking for 
new connections in the US. Bernays describes the marriage of convenience between Creange 
and the Cheney brothers, for whom he was to become Art Director: 
 
“They recognized they needed each other. Creange...lived in a world of his own creation, 
concerned primarily with his own advancement. He regarded me and others as tools to 
satisfy his drive to achieve his ambition, not money or power, but the satisfaction of having 
himself pointed out as the man who made Cheney Brothers the style leader in the United 
States, the symbol for art in industry in the US., ‘I am the man!’”427 
 
We can see here a demonstration of how social agents (Creange) influenced by ideas and 
style of artistic modernism interacted with the austere, Custodian elite classes in the US to 
produce a vibrant resolution to problems of profitability and decline. Creange’s motives were 
completely different to those of the Cheneys- wishing to gain cultural status and infamy, he is 
an exemplar of those in the creative industries with antagonistic or ambivalent attitudes to 
capitalism and industrialism who nonetheless provided the styles and techniques for the new 
industrial mode of capitalism emerging under conditions of mass production during that 
period. Relating this to Gramsci’s ideas of how consensus is formed, or how social norms and 
values are embedded to the extent that they become a part of the ideational fabric of the 
everyday life, this antagonistic relationship between two disparate actors should be 
considered as an aesthetic contestation that unravels during the processes of transformation of 
political-economic formations. In other words, rather than hegemonic ideas emanating from 
the apex of political-economic power and being consensualized downwards through society 
(through processes of co-option), this example should show how unintended and seemingly 
un-natural alliances between archaic capital and artistic modernism shifted the very terrain of 
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hegemonic ideas from the Custodian attitudes of piety and simplicity in design towards 
modern ornamentation and superficial stylisation.
428
 
The impression given by Bernays about working with Creange is one of pure excitement. 
Rather than planning strategies of deception and manipulation, Bernays was ‘willing to be his 
tool,’ because ‘he stimulated me,’ and he found that ‘we were both relating silk to social, 
political and ideological situations, making it a part of the stream of life itself.’429 Similar to 
the copywriters and illustrators of Roland Marchand’s Advertising the American Dream, 
Bernays as a PR agent for Cheney Brothers has his mind focused on the task- that is, to 
increase the profitability of his client- but also enjoyed the ‘buzz’ and excitement of learning 
about new techniques and designs. The collaboration between Bernays and Creange resulted 
in a manifesto that was published by The New England Council called “The Three Phase 
System for the Mass Production of Style Goods: A Plan for Lifting New England 
Manufacturers Out of Price Competition.” 
 
The plan consisted of seemingly obvious phases of 1) novelties, 2) improvement of the 
preceding year’s innovations, and 3) ’staples’. More important than the plan itself was what 
Bernays conducted afterwards to initiate the plan.  
 
“I thought of phase 1, 2, 3 whenever I saw a beautiful painting, a lovely building, a 
provocative sculpture. I tried to evaluate the inspiration it might have for silk. Sometimes the 
color of a dress worn by my dinner partner started a chain reaction later reflected in a 
Cheney innovation. I kept closely in touch with aesthetic trends, trying to anticipate what 
impact new ideas in one field might have in another.”430 
 
Bernays had also admitted before that he ‘had no interest in style as such,’ yet he co-
ordinated a vigorous public relations campaign, ensuring that he cultivated cultured onions on 
aesthetics and style in order to present a face of legitimacy to those in the industry. The 
strategy included
431
: 
 
1) Building up relations of Cheney Brothers with the trade and the opinion moulders and 
group leaders. 
2) We organized a network of fashion news and interpretation to establish the 
authenticity of what was to follow 
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3) A free style service gave the fashion editors of the country authentic news about silk 
usage and style in Paris and New York.  
4) We sent out croquis, drawings of dresses, to newspapers. 
5) We photographed pretty girl models in Cheney silks and sent their photographs to 150 
rotogravure sections of newspapers. 
6) We added a free mat service for 300 small newspapers.  
7) We correspond with hundreds of newspaper editors 
 
Bernays also details how they tried to combine the ‘best features of French inspiration with 
those of South Manchester, Connecticut,’ and used French terminology such as ‘croquis’ for 
‘fashion sketch,’ ‘a form of snobbery, I suppose.’ They also made fashion information 
bulletins for salesmen in department stores, so ‘after their perusal would talk more 
intelligently about yard length silks for dresses.’ Perhaps the most enduring legacy of 
Bernays’ PR strategy was this: 
 
‘We wrote to a list of manufacturers from which Cheney had bought pencils, electrical 
supplies, ball bearings in the machinery that wove the silk, tags, shelving, billiard tables and 
vacuum cleaners, telling them we were willing to have them mention our name as users of 
their product in publicity and advertising.’432 
  
This represents an extra-ordinary effort on the part of Bernays and showcases his obsessive 
attention to detail to produce the desired goal- ‘wide-spread publicity for Cheney resulted.’ 
Following the arrangement of a presentation of silk to the wife of the then President, Warren 
Harding, as a ‘tribute from the silk artisans of the country,’ Bernays decided that in order to 
accentuate the haute couture status of Cheney silk, he travelled to Lyon, France, ‘the great 
city of silk.’ 
 
“I knew that a prophet, to be honored in his own country, must be honored in another. I 
arranged with the Textile Musuem in Lyon to accept three length of silk made by Cheney 
Brothers for inclusion in their exhibits.”  
 
Yet even this could not quench Bernays’ insatiable thirst for public engineering; having noted 
that Cheney’s rivals, Mallinson’s had recently published a series of prints that showed 
American ‘shrines,’ such as Washington’s home at Mt. Vernon and the Grand Canyon, 
Bernays concluded that ‘Style leaders engineered Mallinson’s Americanism. Cheney had to 
meet this challenge.’ 
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5.9.3 The Internationalization of Public Relations Strategy 
 
Bernays’ response was to capitalize on the ‘nationwide interest aroused by the Tutankhamen 
discoveries in Egypt,’ and convinced Creange and Cheney to set up the Cheney Brothers Tut-
ankh-Amen Award, a scholarship to send a young American female designer to Egypt to 
study the excavations and come back to the US to create some silk designs inspired by what 
she saw. Bernays would go on to organise the infamous National Soap Sculpture in White 
Soap Competition at the behest of Procter and Gamble a few years later. 
 
The recipient of the scholarship was Hazel Slaughter, who was presented with the 
Tutankhamen award at a silk exposition ceremony covered by the New York Times.  Bernays 
writes triumphantly that ‘overnight a little girl from Brooklyn became the heroine of a 
glamorous adventure that focused much publicity on her and on the Cheney Brothers 
pioneering spirit in silk design.’433 
 
Within a year, the PR campaigning had started to pay dividends for Cheney Brothers, as their 
silks started to gain widespread recognition as an example of American manufacturing 
innovation; the ‘art-in-industry’ movement of Bernays and Creange started to influence other 
divisions of textiles, including a range of men’s ties that Bernays labelled the ‘radio-series,’: 
 
“...the preoccupation of the American people with the new gadget, radio, elicited a "radio 
series" of fast, vividly moving colors with the suggestion of "the mystery of the ether" the 
snap of static, the world of sound." The names of these ties illustrate public interest in radio: 
radiophoto, wave length, jazz music, radiogram, announcer, radio station, code static, dots 
and dashes, sounding off, criss-cross "He's in Paris."
434
 
 
Recognising the increasing popularity of the radio medium, Bernays and Creange therefore 
created a fashion range that appealed to the modernist sensibilities of a new class of white 
collar workers, finding a way to capture the new experiential transformation induced by radio 
listening into the fabric of style and taste.  
 
Further newspaper campaigns for the ‘art-in-industry’ movement created by Bernays and 
Creange resulted in the institution of an annual Gold Medal for the individual who had done 
most to advance art in industry, sponsored and judged by the Architectural League of New 
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York, and organised by the President of B. Altman and Company Department Store, Michael 
Friedsam- a figure who had been approached by Bernays in order to convince him about the 
art-in-industry movement. The first recipient was of course Creange.
435
 The awards dinner at 
the Ritz Carlton was attended by luminaries of the Rockefeller institute, confirming upon the 
Creange the desired cultural reputation that he had been seeking since coming to America and 
joining with Bernays and the Cheneys. 
 
Bernays’ campaign continued with the project of gaining international cultural recognition 
for the Cheney Brothers. Creange had created a ‘ferroniere’ silk  through an ironmonger, 
Edgar Brandt, and following some valuable publicity gained from draping the silk around 
Brandt’s own ironworks in New York, Bernays suggested that the silks be taken for 
exhibiting at the Louvre in Paris. 
 
“Here we had a wonderful example of cultural cross fertilization, hands across the sea. 
American silks showed recognition to French art and France showed recognition to 
American manufacture.”436 
 
The important point here is that Bernays engineered a situation where a traditional textile 
manufacturer’s product had undergone a transition in a year from being a drab, outdated 
fashion to something considered to be ‘art’; recognised by the perceived cultural superiority 
of the French (which despite American attempts of freeing itself from the burden of European 
cultural and artistic emulation still remained associated with ‘high’ taste).  
“The students of perception have found that people see in art what their culture permits them 
to see. This is true of music and paintings, as it is of silk design. And what had been done of 
course was to get these department stores to make possible new perceptions to the Cheney 
silk, by tying it up with the new art movement. 
Great crowds came to the opening in Paris which was given official sanction by the presence 
of our Ambassador, Myron Herrick, Paul Leon, Minister of the Beaux Arts, and hundreds of 
French and American notables. We sent Arthur Waldron to drape the silks. Newspapers 
reported the event here on February 28, 1925 and this in turn stimulated a whole flow of 
editorial comment.”437 
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Bernays here establishes a chain of linkages regarding the relationship of the PR industry to 
art and to the commercial market- ‘create’ new perceptions of a product through its 
association with a new, fashionable artistic movement (in this case, one that Bernays had put 
together with Creange), encouraging sales outlets to portray the new product and art 
movement in a certain way through association with an internationalised cultivated artistic 
culture by way of endorsement from foreign dignitaries and then to re-circulate the narrative 
in stylised form through editorial comment. 
The overall result was an acceptance by the Cheney brothers for the need for Public Relations 
management, and more broadly accentuating the breakdown of their Custodian attitudes 
towards mass production and mass consumption: 
 
“Cheney Brothers, despite its traditions, now accepted the principle of organized public 
relations. They set up a public relations committee which held weekly meetings at the 
company offices on 34th Street. Colonel Heckman, the sales manager; Ward Cheney, just out 
of Yale; Miss Goldsmith of our office; the advertising manager and I, discussed problems as 
if we were settling the affairs of the world at a summit conference. Our meetings had all the 
hallmarks of high diplomacy -- ego projection, retreat, politics, deals, and fulfillment of 
purpose to some degree.”438 
 
Further initiatives undertaken by Bernays include; the publication of a book of the history of 
textile design, published by Doubleday and containing advertisements for Cheney Silks; 
providing Cheney silk gowns for a Hollywood motion picture; and further galvanising the 
art-in-industry movement by arranging a ‘close entente’ with Charles Richards, head of the 
American Association of Museums. 
 
Through Richards, Bernays pulled of a masterstroke which showcases the intimate 
connection between commerce, art and politics: Richards was a personal associate of the then 
Secretary of Commerce, Herbert Hoover, and arranged for the appointment of himself, 
Creange, and Frank S. Holmes of Lennox Pottery to act as Official U.S. Commissioners to 
the ‘International Exposition of Decorative and Industrial Art in Paris, held in the summer of 
1925. Bernays himself was appointed as an associate commissioner to take charge of arrival 
publicity and the arrangement of galas, dinners and champagne receptions. Using his contacts 
amongst Parisian journalists to make front page news in the Paris Herald, Bernays believed 
the event to cement both Franco-American friendship and exchange in the domain of modern 
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art as well as showcasing to a variety of industrial leaders in the US the importance of the art-
in-industry philosophy: 
 
“The exhibition had crystallized in the minds of the delegation support for the modern art 
trend. Since its members were influential in many different areas of industry and the 
professions, they soon translated their new beliefs into action. Storewide exhibitions which 
demonstrated the influence of the exposition were held at Lord & Taylor's and Mercy's.”439 
 
Between 1925 and 1927, Bernays facilitated the trend of transnationalizing modern art; 
following Creange’s decree that ‘colors instead of design were to rule as the keynote for 
fashion,’ Bernays ‘discovered the young painter Georgia O’Keefe, a disciple and later wife of 
‘legend in his own lifetime,’ Alfred Stieglitz, a photographer largely responsible for initiating 
the modern movement in photography in the US, advancing the art of photogravure printing 
and making photography an acceptable art form. Bernays describes O’Keefe and Stieglitz as 
being on the verge of destitution, angry at the treatment that American artists received, not 
even being able to afford a studio. Bernays offered them his own father’s studio, and brought 
in their modernist techniques and ideas in colouring to the Cheney stable. At the same time, 
Creange excitedly brought in the Dutch Fauvist painter Kees Van Dongen. Van Dongen had 
already received acclamation amongst Parisian galleries, and Bernays and Creange believed 
the combination of O’Keefe’s ‘Americanness’ and Van Dongen’s revered reputation would 
combine to give Cheney silks an association with the ‘Parisian high life.’  
 
“We sent a book about him to the art critics of the most important newspapers to encourage 
recognition of Van Dongen before the silk exhibit. Now I tried to other manufacturers willing 
to use Van Dongen for inspiration of their product. I induced the Almco Galleries, lamp 
manufacturers, to make ‘lamps inspired by Kees Van Dongen, the French impressionistic 
genius whose influence has been so dominant in the world of modern art...’”440 
 
The lamps were to have shades made from Cheney silk- tying together an American painter, a 
Dutch artist, a New England textile manufacturer and an art deco lamp company, however 
was not enough for Bernays, who went on to ‘persuade Broadway publicity men to co-
operate with us by having their stars wear gowns made with Van Dongen silk.’  
 
“We sent the Van Dongen exhibit touring in art galleries through the country as far west as 
San Francisco. Leading department stores showed the silks with the panolly of promotion, 
newspaper advertisements and news space to mail to their customer.” 
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“The consistent pattern of art-in-industry and style leadership Cheney had followed over the 
preceding years was making its impact. People were looking to Cheney for leadership in 
beauty and style. The firm was receiving accolades it wanted and now deserved. Cheney 
Brothers, the stodgy old New England firm became Cheney Brothers, the great fashion house 
that combined the best features of Paris and New York. We had proved the validity of our 
three phase approach and the effectiveness of dramatizing the launching of new styles.” 
 
The following points can be drawn from this case study of Edward Bernays’ Public Relations 
Work: 
Bernays, as a lone PR agent, was instrumental in creating ‘third-party’ advocacy, a technique 
of celebrities or fashionable endorsements through a chain of linkages for his clients or 
products. Remaining in the shadows, he mobilised disparate social and cultural agents from 
the US and Europe in order to achieve his goal of enhancing publicity for his clients and their 
aims (popularity for Coolidge, increased profitability for the Cheney Brothers). The ensuing 
co-ordination of agency resulted in ‘hitching’ together of political and economic goals with 
the ideals of cultural emulation, and in particular seems to have been instrumental in 
introducing ideas relating to the role of modern art in machine industry in the United States.  
Keeping in line with a Sloanist model of political economy, the desire for continually updated 
modes of style in products, mobilising artistic styles and techniques circulating in a 
transnational class of creatives, Bernays brought in artists to overcome the crisis of 
profitability experienced by some American industry; fusing together people whose 
motivation was not profit, but survival (in the case of Stieglitz and O’keefe) with those whose 
was profit 
This speaks to an aesthetic rendering of a Gramscian theory of hegemony, as the domain of 
the superstructure (including ideas and artistic reflection) becomes vital in the social 
legitimation of transformations in the economic base; therefore rather than conceiving of a 
relationship that figures cultural transformations following on from economic transformation 
(e.g., the culture of mass consumption necessarily follows on from the transformations of 
mass production facilitate by Ford), there is rather a dialectical interplay whereby the power 
of agency to influence culture, style and fashion confirms a change in attitude of capitalist 
business toward mass production and acceptance of the new conditions of the US economy 
(as exemplified by the transformation of attitudes of the Cheney brothers). 
The role of PR differs fundamentally from advertising in the style of co-ordination involved. 
Whilst the advertising industry employed in its service a number of different professions, PR 
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appears to have a broader social function in terms of the co-ordination of politics, economy 
and culture.  
 
5.10 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has argued that in order to grasp the power of public relations and advertising in 
the United States, they should be considered as industries of a broader mass persuasion 
complex. With common roots in the newsprint industry of the 19
th
 century, public relations 
consultants and advertisers were reliant on each other to achieve their goals. 
 
The industries of mass persuasion represent a collision of increasing attempts at making their 
work appear ‘scientific’ on the one hand, and using the latest trends in art, fashion, tastes and 
celebrity culture to achieve outcomes for their clients. It has been suggested that in this early 
phase (1900-1930), before the formalization of scientific theories of advertising and public 
relations, work was carried out in a haphazard, uncoordinated manner that actually provided 
the innovation and technique necessary to become powerful forces in American political-
economic life. 
 
Copywriters, illustrators and media experts all had to be aware of the latest trends in art and 
culture in order to make their product or client ‘sellable.’ Yet they also had to be aware of 
‘residual’ cultures and be sensitive to the expectations and aspirations of emergent white 
collar classes. The apparent ‘inclusivity’ of mass persuasion- its ability to make it seem like 
corporations or politicians are delivering what people want- comes from this very 
malleability in techniques of imagization and dissemination. Those techniques and styles 
were influenced by developments in photography and artistic modernism, as well as 
appealing to vernacular sensibilities of efficiency and ‘plainspeak.’ The content and form 
likewise prioritized ideals of emulation and material aspiration, conforming with the promises 
of abundance and mobility that resided in the 19
th
 century. 
 
In their actual practice, advertisers differed in both their willingness to embrace new 
techniques and styles as well how they articulated their work. The NW Ayer agency, for 
example, showcase deep Custodian traits. They sought to imbue their work with ‘educational; 
qualities and showed a distaste for the kind of ‘fear’ based advertising of other corporations. J 
Walter Thompson agency, on the other hand, show an enthusiasm for embracing the rhythms 
207 
 
of modernity, and a willingness to confront foreign markets with the ‘latest’ techniques, no 
matter how haphazard their research and findings were. It is of no surprise that Ford was a 
client of NW Ayer, whereas General Motors under Sloan pursued their expansion with J 
Walter Thompson agency at the helm. 
 
The advertising campaign for Lexington automobiles from the Duke Library Digital Archives 
shows how the ideals of mobility were co-ordinated in a visualization of American mass 
persuasion. These advertisements contain the hallmarks of a Sloanist political economy, with 
different brands being marketed and situated in ‘tableaux’ that were designed to celebrate the 
American system in contradistinction to other part of the less developed world. It is here that 
the ‘appeal’ of consumption derives from, something that resonated in contemporary 
American ‘soft power.’ 
 
This chapter has also demonstrated the intimate connection between media, politics and 
consumption. This was an era where politicians like Calvin Coolidge began to be ‘marketed’ 
in a similar way to commodities. Both Bruce Barton and Edward Bernays were sensitive to 
the need to make Coolidge appear like a more charismatic figure for the voting public. They 
both also understood the best way to do this was to combine the ‘residual’ attitudes of 
conservatism and plainspeak with the dynamism of a leader who understood and appreciated 
the cultural changes of the modern period.  
 
Overall, it has been argued that the ‘aesthetics’ of hegemony require agencies of mass 
persuasion to delve into the sometimes antagonistic circulation of different cultures and ‘re-
assemble’ them in an image that can appeal to a ‘mass society.’ A universalizing tendency 
was created through this in the sense that it confirmed the strength of the ideal of upward 
mobility over class-based political action. The ‘promise of abundance,’ then become a terrain 
to be fought over in the domain of consuming culture, rather than in politics itself. 
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Conclusions 
 
6.1 Capturing Hegemony 
 
Like the neo-Gramscians, this thesis has aimed to demonstrate that the contemporary ‘soft’ 
power of the ‘American way of life,’ begins with transformations that took place in the early 
20
th
 century in the United States. However, it has prioritized the ‘aesthetic’ dimension of 
American hegemony, evaluating the role of art, culture and mass persuasion techniques in 
creating an enduring appeal for American products and American culture. Given the ubiquity 
of American cultural power, this has been a necessary project to re-animate the neo-
Gramscian theories of International Political Economy, which have thus far evaded questions 
of culture and aesthetics. 
 
In doing so, I have sought to demonstrate that the terrain of analysis for hegemony in the 
United States first requires a shift of epistemological focus towards Sloanism instead of 
Fordism. Whilst both ‘systems’ represent the culmination of technological innovations in 
mass production techniques, Sloanism provides a more dynamic framework of analysis 
because it accounts for processes in mass consumption as well. As has been argued, the 
Sloanist paradigm bestows centrality to the emulative strategies of brand differentiation and 
stylistic obsolescence. These techniques are an omnipresent feature of American and 
transnational corporate power in the contemporary period. As such, this thesis has re-situated 
the concept of hegemony in the same period as the neo-Gramscian analysis of Fordism, but 
takes into account the importance of Sloanist techniques as a means of consensualizing power 
in society. In this way, I would suggest that a theoretical framework which accounts for 
‘aesthetics’ of hegemony helps us to better understand the appeal and power of contemporary 
American power. This power is anchored not just in the historical processes of compromise 
between capital and labour, but also in the way in which the ‘American way of life’ has been 
sold. Its highly visual aspect, through mass persuasion agencies in advertising and public 
relations, as well as through global media channels, must be accounted for in political-
economic theory if a better realization of global power is to be sought. 
 
As elaborated throughout this thesis, there is a missing ‘moment’ in neo-Gramscian theory 
which fails to account for these ‘aesthetic’ aspects. This is all the more surprising given that 
both Gramsci and the neo-Gramscian articulate hegemony as a system of power that achieves 
a moment of consent through ideological apparatuses. It seems, however, that the conception 
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of these ideological apparatuses reproduces the materialist understanding of cultural 
transformations as following on as corollaries from the fundamentals of the productive system 
from which people and societies reproduce themselves. In other words, processes of culture 
are ‘superstructural’ renditions of transformations in the ‘economic base.’ Culture is then 
reduced to mere function, and the apprehension of culture by social agents serves nothing 
more than a veil for power, a deception of progress, or a re-ification of the exploitative, 
competitive and atomizing conditions under which they survive. It appears to strip away the 
power of non-elite social agents from contributing to the hegemony of a society, leaving no 
room for their own aspirations, ideas or interests to make a transformatory impact on the 
broader arc of power. 
 
I have demonstrated that the insights from Walter Benjamin’s The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction provides some respite from this overly deterministic view of 
culture and political economy. Benjamin unlocks the historical uniqueness of culture under 
conditions of mass reproducibility, suggesting that it opens up the potential for subordinate 
social agents to realize that there could be an emancipated future. The reason for this is that 
the very availability of culture to the ‘masses’, despite the loss of ‘authenticity’ of the 
artwork, represents a sea-change in the parameters of cultural hierarchy. It is therefore the 
breakdown of cultural barriers that anticipate a change in the politics of society. As such, 
Benjamin’s innovation was to provide a template through which we can grasp how social 
agents think about their political and economic demands in cultural terms. This holds special 
resonance in the United States, which had pervasive discourses of upward social mobility 
existing throughout the 19
th
 century. 
 
This approach forces us to re-think what non-elite groups in society actually wish for. It 
requires the analyst or critic of political-economy to be sensitive to the aspirations of social 
agents and the terms in which they depict what they are fighting for. In neo-Gramscian 
theory, as well as the Frankfurt school, consumption appears as a domain in which workers 
find compensatory modes of fulfillment, a refuge from the pressures generated by the 
atomization of working conditions, which include both de-skilling and increasing 
disciplining. This thesis suggests otherwise; that the domain of consumption can be 
somewhere in which political challenges are continually issued, as demands for a stake in 
mobility, rather than as ‘analgesic’ compensation. I believe this has important consequences 
for how International Political Economy theorizes about social transformations and the 
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broader arc of global hegemony. Instead of thinking about the mass culture industry as a 
branch of the totalizing influence of capitalism, it is possible to re-imagine it as an arena in 
which subordinated social groups can contribute their culture as an act of emancipatory 
politics. 
 
As an example, the Frankfurt School dismissal of popular culture, particularly Jazz, is a part 
of their obsession with highlighting the importance of ‘authenticity.’ Schemas that delineate 
what constitutes ‘proper’ culture abound in Marxist discourses. As a result there is no chance 
to understand the emergence and popularity of Jazz as a ‘moment’ in which a highly 
repressed culture makes its voice heard, achieving popularity amongst diverse social groups 
who embraced it as ‘fashionable.’ In the scheme of the Frankfurt School, there is no avenue 
to explore what that meant for people. Did it act as a catalyst for improving race relations? 
Social Science does not have the tools to explore those kind of issues. It requires an aesthetic 
approach, to delve into the feelings of sensuality and ascribe virtue and beauty, in order to 
grasp how this affected people’s daily lives. It requires an aesthetic approach to understand 
the appeal of Jazz culture during that period. Without these kinds of theoretical tools, any 
possibility of capturing the ‘hegemonic’ moment is doomed to recourse into materialist 
conceptions of power and production, because it does not seek to understand the very 
processes that transform and affect the structures and apparatuses of ideology. 
 
6.2 Class and Class Consciousness 
 
The issue of hegemony in the United States requires a further departure from the traditional 
Marxian frameworks. I have shown in this thesis that a defining feature of American society 
in the early 20
th
 century was the emergence of a mass society. The curiosity of this 
emergence is that despite divergent cultural norms and values of those thought to constitute 
the ‘mass,’ they were ascribed general characteristics by social commentators who tried to 
grapple with the role and potential of this new social phenomenon. Marxist theories of 
political economy once again fall into this trap of over-generalization, and in the case of neo-
Gramscians, the cultural desires and aspirations of the ‘masses’ are overlooked completely in 
favour of a materialist resolution in the factory site between capital and labour. It therefore 
sidesteps some of the key contestations and challenges that might also provide a fuller 
account of hegemony, and how consent was achieved amongst the mass of society. 
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I have argued that these contestations and challenges were fought over in the domain of 
aesthetics. The presumed stability of norms and values that are articulated as the centrepiece 
of how hegemony works in society comes into question in the United States during the latter 
part of the 19
th
 century and beginning of the 20
th
 century. Inter-generational conflicts within 
elite groups show how the stifling strictures of Victorian era morality and cultural norms 
were overcome by a younger generation who were willing to embrace modernity. They 
looked towards ideas of self-fulfillment, social equality and appreciation of other cultures as a 
means of experiencing the world. They rallied against the moral outlook of their elders 
because they did not provide an aesthetic template to fulfill their aspirations and interests. 
 
This conflict is a key arbiter of the aesthetics of hegemony, as the challenge over cultural 
norms and artistic appreciation laid the groundwork for a Sloanist form of capitalism that 
prioritized those very same aspirations of the younger: and appreciation of the ‘new,’ the 
fulfillment of individual self-hood, and the equalization of different cultures. The rise of 
modernism, for example and its overcoming of academy-sanctioned during the Armoury 
Show of 1913 attests to the strength of the cultural voice of the younger generation. All these 
instances of the younger generation proclaiming a new era of their own- whether it be in 
painting, literature or architecture, or just in the way in which their conducted their lives- are 
tantamount to serious challenges to the cultural hegemony of the Custodians. The ‘aesthetic’ 
contestations between these two generations highlight their role in the arbitration of norms 
and values- of what constituted the ‘common sense’ of good judgement in thinking about 
issues from art to government.  
 
6.3 Culture and Political Economy 
 
By analyzing the transformation in structures of class an class consciousness, this thesis has 
demonstrated that in the United States, individuals and social groups did not apprehend 
culture as a functional corollary, but rather had ‘space’ in which to interpret and imbue 
cultural processes according to their own aspirations and interests. The conception of the 
Lockean Heartland as articulate by Kees Van der Pijl I believe to be crucial in this respect, 
particular what it means for the development of ‘Civil Society.’ Whilst Lockean ideas of 
private property and individual freedom fostered the commercialism and profiteering for 
which American society is renowned for, these same ideas provided an independence for 
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European settlers in America to foster their own vernacular cultures that were detached from 
the power of the state during the settlement of the West in the 19
th
 century.  
 
In doing so, they established not just their own vernacular art, but developed their own 
‘exceptional’ aesthetic criterion of judgement of art and culture in contradistinction to the 
parameters of judgement favoured by East Coast elites. This vernacular aesthetic prioritized 
innovation, efficiency, sleekness and simplicity, as opposed to emulation of classical styles, 
ornamentations and European decorative refinement as favoured by the elites. The 
importance of this is the tension it lent to aesthetic practices and ideas of simplicity versus 
materialist demonstrations of wealth. It arguably culminates in artefacts like the Brooklyn 
Bridge, a work of both scientific and artistic achievement, one that both incorporated the 
heritage of vernacular engineering as well as the grandiloquence of internationally iconic 
architecture. These tensions were integrated into the ‘aesthetics’ of hegemony in the sense 
that large industrial projects such as the Ford plants at River Rouge and Highland, were not 
just thought about as scientific achievements, but also apprehended as cultural artefacts- 
imbued with virtue and beauty, and forming a part of a developing iconology of capitalism 
and mass industrialization. The thesis argues that taking an aesthetic approach to hegemony 
shows that these visualizations of paramount importance when thinking about how American 
power is understood and thought about, what it means to people in their daily lives. 
 
The very idea that cultural artefacts should be designed to fulfill individuals’ desire to 
experience beauty is something that played a large part in the formation of counter-
hegemonic and ‘anti-modern’ ideas of art and craft. Beginning in mid 19th century England 
with John Ruskin, artists, designer and industrialists debated the merits of increasing 
mechanization in industry, reacting to the negative effect it was having on workers. They 
addressed political-economic issues through the domain of culture and art, arguing that 
products should be designed in order fulfill people’s happiness. These ideas existed in a 
transnational circulation of ideas between Europe and America culminating in the highly 
politicized Bauhaus movement. These modernist practices initially rallied against 
mechanization and the crass materialism generated by capitalism and wanted their art and 
architectural designs to reveal forms of emancipatory and harmonious living. These 
alternative and counter-hegemonic practices and ideas as such hold appeal precisely because 
they are directed towards the improvement of people’s daily lives. In short, they were to 
make people happy. Given that the Bauhaus and other modernists contributed to both the 
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design of mass consumable products and the techniques of mass persuasion in advertising 
and public relations, I would argue that the moment of ‘consent’ occurs where the positive, 
emancipatory tones of modernism intersect and provide the means of conveying ideas for the 
new mass production, mass consumption society. 
 
6.4 The Possibilities for an Aesthetic Neo-Gramscian Political Economy 
 
As stated from the outset, the purpose of this thesis is to highlight the enduring relevance of 
the ‘aesthetic’ as a means of giving a fuller realization to ‘hegemony’ in International 
Political Economy. It has, fundamentally, addressed a key problematique of what might be 
the appeal of American ‘soft’ power in the contemporary. By re-visiting the era in which neo-
Gramscians begin their analysis of hegemony, I have demonstrated that grasping the aesthetic 
dimension of mass production-mass consumption processes allows us a number of additional 
conceptual and theoretical tools. In particular I have highlighted the importance of thinking 
about cultural and aesthetic issues as central to the formation of hegemony, rather than as 
corollaries to the more visibly obvious materialist relationships. Through this, we can 
‘broaden’ out the social agents and groups involved in the formation of hegemony, and 
account for the aesthetic challenges that collide and change the nature and meaning of 
‘norms’ and ‘values.’ I have also highlighted how these challenges to received cultural orders 
and transformation in artistic and cultural practices intersect with industries of mass 
persuasion. These things together, I believe give a fuller understanding of the ‘hegemonic’ 
moment. 
 
In this respect, I believe that neo-Gramscianism is better equipped to theorize the more 
contemporary processes of ‘globalization,’ ‘Americanization,’ and ‘transnationalization.’ If 
we look at the ‘aesthetics’ of hegemony for example, analysis of policies such as the Marshall 
Plan and how the initial phase of ‘Americanization’ was received by other cultures could look 
to see how domestic cultural values were arbitrated with those ‘coming from’ America. In 
other words, if commentators really believe that the ‘American Way of Life’ is becoming the 
‘Global’ way of life, then neo-Gramscian theory using ‘aesthetics’ may be well positioned to 
explain the power of that American way of life in terms of its appeal and consensualizng role 
in International Political Economy, complementing its already rigorous study on the more 
traditional Marxian, materialist aspects. It may contribute to explaining the power of 
‘transnational classes,’ and how norms and values are arbitrated in the contemporary period.  
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 Because of aesthetic contestations continue to resonate in the contemporary period. As an 
example, we could look at the phenomenon of the music industry as a branch of the global 
mass culture industry. One of the most globally popular styles is that of hip-hop. As a form of 
music it emerged in some of the most socio-economically deprived urban areas of late 1970s 
America, ghettoized enclaves that resided near demonstratively wealthier districts. The 
producers and consumers of this new sound were African-Americans, and the lyrics 
highlighted the poverty and exclusion felt by its community. In techniques of production, the 
music showcased unique innovations that would later became standard techniques of mass 
produced music. At the time it represented a political and cultural challenge, becoming a 
recognized and sometimes feared voice, drawing ire from conservative commentators. 
 
Yet in the contemporary period, commentators speak of an entire hip-hop culture, that has 
branched out into fashion styles and in some instances influenced local vocabularies and 
lexicons. It is a ubiquitous form of popular music broadcast all over the world on syndicated 
music channels. Its aesthetic is a very modern version of the ‘American way of life,’ 
prioritizing an aesthetic of ‘getting-rich-quick.’ Yet how could a culture that emerged from 
conditions of political-cultural repression and economic exclusion become a part of the fabric 
and image of American power in today’s world? It is the task of critical political-economists 
to pay attention to those cultural trends and be sensitive to the idea that cultural challenges 
and changes of aesthetic style do not always mean another moment in the relentless co-option 
of culture by totalizing capitalism, but that those challenges and trends contribute to the 
maintenance or transformation of hegemony precisely because they speak to individuals’ 
values and aspirations, and in some cases may hold genuine emancipatory qualities. 
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